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vPreface
The present PhD thesis is concerned with the question whether good reason-
ing requires that the subject has some cognitive grip on the relation between
premises and conclusion. There are two rough, quite distinct considerations
speaking in favor of such a requirement.
The first, which is well-known from discussions of scepticism about induc-
tion, is the following: In order to acquire justification by reasoning, I must
antecedently justifiably believe that the reasoning I am going to employ is
good. For instance, I must justifiably believe that if my premises are true,
then it is likely that my conclusion is true. Currently quite few people would
adduce such a consideration without much qualification.1 Quite the contrary,
many have identified this claim as the weakest supposition in the argument
of the inductive sceptic.2
The second consideration is almost on a different subject-matter. It goes as
follows: In order for my belief-formation to be an instance of reasoning, and
not merely a causally related sequence of beliefs, the process must be guided
by my endorsement of a rule of reasoning. Therefore I must have justified
beliefs about the relation between my premises and my conclusion. I think
the following passage from Pollock and Cruz [1999, 67] expresses well the
current consensus on the latter consideration:
We reason in accordance with rules like modus ponens, but to
reason in accordance with them and to be guided by them does
not require that we be self-reflective about our reasoning to the
extent of having beliefs about what rules we use.
And we could add “and without having beliefs about how the premises relate
to the conclusion”.
1Some of the few who endorse some such requirement are Fumerton [1995], Bonjour
[1998], Wright [2004a] —but not without qualification.
2For instance Van Cleve [1984], Greco [1999].
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Thus, neither of these considerations carries much conviction nowadays. In
its negative parts (in particular chapters 2.3, 4.3, 4.4) the present thesis
recommends dismissing the first consideration. It defends the claim that
one must sometimes have justification for the conclusion of one’s inferential
argument without having antecedent justification for beliefs about the rule
or the relation between premises and conclusion. While it also much qualifies
the second consideration, it is in the spirit of this consideration that a positive
view of reasoning is developed in chapter 3.
Chapter 2 focuses on the question whether the reasoning subject must justi-
fiably believe that the step from premises to conclusion is truth-preserving.
The different questions to which the considerations above pertain are dis-
tinguished. In chapter 3 some accounts of reasoning —or better: accounts
of believing for inferential reasons— are discussed and one account is put
forward. According to this account reasoning does involve a specific kind of
dispositional mental state towards the proposition that the premises imply
the conclusion. Chapter 4 focuses on the question whether the subject must
be in a position to justifiably believe by reflection that her premises provide a
good reason for believing the conclusion. By bringing together reflective abil-
ities and deductive justification it relates the issues discussed in the preceding
chapters to the issue of (one kind of) epistemological internalism. Chapter 5
further pursues the issue of the tenability of epistemological internalism. In
particular it criticizes recently defended views on how to stop the regresses
and avoid the circularities developed in chapter 4 by appeal to pragmatic
factors. This discussion links the preceding chapters to the issue of epistemic
responsibility, the main motivation for epistemic internalism.
I have chosen to focus on the case of deduction, rather than on inference
in general. But in many places, in particular when accounts of reasoning
are discussed, questions concerning inference in general are addressed. The
focus on deduction is intended to simplify the discussion. There are two
respects in which the case of deduction poses less problems than other cases
of reasoning: First, we have a better grasp of the conditions under which a
deduction is justified than of the conditions under which an inference to the
best explanation, say, is justified. Or, at least, it easier for us to state such
conditions in a general form.
The second respect in which the focus on deduction eases the discussion is
a bit more difficult to expose without starting the argument in the preface.
As said, certain objections will be raised against the view that for inferential
justification antecedent justification for beliefs about the relation between
premises and conclusion is required. But the most important problem for the
view does not depend on assumptions about how such antecedently justified
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beliefs are justified. In contrast, the classic sceptical paradox about induction
depends on the claim that the justification for the belief that if the premises
are true, then the conclusion is likely to be true, would have to be inductive.
It is from this claim that the sceptic can argue that such a justification
would be circular. The reason why a corresponding paradox about deduction
has not been discussed as often is that it has seemed plausible that beliefs
about the relation between the premises and the conclusion of a deduction
are non-inferential. It has often been assumed that we have non-inferential
justification for the belief that the premises entail the conclusion. For at
least some beliefs on logical subject-matter could well be non-inferentially
justified. Thus by simply granting the proponent of the first consideration
above that such beliefs can be non-deductively justified, it is easier to focus
on the more serious problem.3
It is perhaps best to note here that my discussion, except for chapter 5, will
not engage with many different proposed or imaginable accounts of deductive
justification. I discuss different requirements of the sort mentioned above,
i.e. requirements to the effect that the reasoning subject must have a cog-
nitive grip on the relation between premises and conclusion. And I discuss
theories of deductive justification only insofar as endorsement of some such
requirement is a characteristic claim of the theory.4
I owe many thanks to the people in Fribourg and elsewhere with whom I
have discussed related and unrelated philosophical topics. In particular I
would like to thank Davor Bodrožić, Fabian Dorsch, Philipp Keller, Mar-
tine Nida-Rümelin, Gianfranco Soldati and Juan Suarez. Many thanks to
my supervisor Martine Nida-Rümelin, who not only commented on previous
versions of the present text but over the years read several drafts on various
topics then intended to be the topic of my PhD. I am especially gratetful for
her invaluable help in the preperation of the thesis-defense.
3I do not discuss the epistemology of logic in this thesis at all.
4For instance I discuss the negative points made in Boghossian [2003], but I do not
discuss his positive view of deductive justification (by appeal to meaning-constitution).
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2 CHAPTER 1. INFERENTIAL INTERNALISM IN CONTEXT
1.1 Summary
Inferential Internalism is, on a rough characterization, the claim that an in-
ferred belief isn’t justified, unless the reasoner rationally takes a stand on the
question whether her premises provide her with an adequate reason for her
conclusion. Concerning the question whether Inferential Internalism should
be accepted or not, important considerations pull in different directions. On
the one hand, regress- or circularity arguments seem to show that such a
requirement on inferential justification is either incoherent or at least im-
possible to satisfy for human reasoners, so that scepticism about inference
ensues. On the other hand, the connection between the notion of justification
and that of responsibility renders the claim that the subject need not have
a view on her reasons suspect. The aim of the view developed in this thesis
is to reconcile these considerations. The aim of this chapter is to situate
the discussion that is to follow in the subsequent chapters in the context of
current epistemological debates.
The question whether to accept Inferential Internalism raises for the exem-
plary case of inference a number of fundamental issues in current epistemol-
ogy. These include at least the following:
(i) basic justification: Are there cases where justification obtains, in spite
of the fact that the thinker has no justified view on such questions as
whether the belief-formation is reliable, the reasons adequate, and so
on?
(ii) the nature of norm-guided belief-formation: What distinguishes norm-
guided belief-formation from mere belief-formation? Is it that in the
former but not in the latter the thinker’s cognitive grasp of the norm
plays some psychological role in the belief-formation? And, if yes, what
role, and what kind of cognitive grasp? Is the cognitive grasp consti-
tuted by explicit or implicit higher-order belief or merely by a stable
disposition to form first-order beliefs according to certain patterns?
(iii) responsibility and justification: Is it right that the connection between
justification and responsibility supports requirements to the effect that
the reasoner must have a justified attitude towards the grounds of her
beliefs? Or are there less demanding ways to behave in an epistemically
responsible manner?
In this thesis these issues will be discussed as they arise for the specific
case of inference and inferential justification. Some specific problems for
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Inferential Internalism are developed and discussed, e.g. the regress appealed
to in traditional inductive sceptical arguments and the regresses alluded to
as versions of the “Lewis-Caroll-Problem”.
1.2 Inferential internalism: the problem
It is very plausible that the question whether someone has justifiably deduced
a conclusion from a set of premises is connected to the question whether
she believes, justifiably believes, has evidence against or bears some sort of
attitude towards the proposition of the form [premises] entail [conclusion].
The claim that there is such a connection can be loosely expressed by the
following intuitively compelling requirement: If someone justifiably infers a
conclusion from a set of premises, then she must not be indifferent to the
question whether the premises entail the conclusion. But given this loose
but intuitive claim is acknowledged, two further questions arise. First, why
must she not be indifferent to the question whether the premises entail the
conclusion? Is this because, if she were indifferent, then she would not have
deductive justification? Or, is it because, if she were indifferent, she would
not be deducing at all? Second, how much “not indifferent to the question”
must she be in order to justifiably deduce, resp. to be deducing at all? Does
she need to justifiably believe that the premises entail the conclusion, or is
it enough that she believes it? Or, is it even enough that she does not have
evidence to the contrary?
Inferential Internalism is the view —about inference in general, not only
deduction— that the reasoner must “not be indifferent” to the proposition of
the form [premises] support [conclusion] in a demanding sense: The reasoner
must justifiably accept that the premises support the conclusion, in order
to justifiably believe the conclusion. This rough characterization leaves still
room for many variants of different strength: (i) Variants may differ with
respect to the demands put on justifiably accepting a proposition. (ii) And
they may differ with respect to the interpretation of the connective, i.e. the
in order to, in the requirement of Inferential Internalism (Is it merely a
material conditional, or something stronger, e.g. temporal antecedence?).
But the rough characterization excludes for instance that the reasoner need
only believe that the premises support the conclusion (without that belief
having a positive epistemic status), or that she must merely not have evidence
against it.
Inferential Internalism in this sense is a traditional thesis implicitly endorsed
by many philosophers (arguably by Hume, Russell and Goodman). It has
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been explicitly endorsed in the 1990’s by Fumerton [1995], Bonjour [1998]
as a reaction to the influence of non-traditional epistemology in the form of
externalism. Epistemological externalism takes in general a critical stance
towards all requirements on the reasoners ability to assess her grounds. It is
the cooperation between the environment and the belief-forming mechanisms
itself which bestows a belief with justification, rather than the thinkers own
capacity to view her belief in a positive light. Due to the influence of exter-
nalism (but also due to a new interest in the sceptical arguments —in some
of which, particularly inductive scepticism, it is an important premise—, [cf.
Stroud, 1984]) Inferential Internalism lost its status as orthodoxy during the
1980’s [e.g. Van Cleve, 1984].
However, many people are uncomfortable with an outright rejection of Infer-
ential Internalism. Critics of externalism think that it generally overlooks the
connection between justification and responsibility [Bonjour, 1985, Boghos-
sian, 2001, 2003]. A responsible reasoner, some of them claim, ought to
have some view on what constitutes her grounds for believing. In particu-
lar, while relying on an inferential belief-formation she ought to accept that
her premises support her conclusions. Other critics think that externalism
is in general unable to answer satisfyingly the challenge posed by traditional
scepticism [Wright, 2007].
However traditional sceptical arguments about induction themselves seem to
show that Inferential Internalism (at least for inductive inference) imposes
a requirement on justified belief such that no belief can ever be inferentially
justified. Externalism paves the way for a conception of justification that
does not need such strong requirements. In addition, some newer arguments
inspired by Lewis Carroll [1895] point in the same direction [Van Cleve, 1984,
Boghossian, 2001, 2003]. If these arguments are sound, then we face an un-
easy choice between rejecting Inferential Internalism outright and accepting
scepticism about inferential justification. On the assumption that scepti-
cism about inference is unacceptable this dilemma prompts the need to re-
evaluate either the arguments against Inferential Internalism or the negative
assessment of the externalist’s capacity to account for the responsibility-
justification connection.
1.3 Inferential internalism: prospects
With a re-evaluation of the arguments against Inferential Internalism goes
an assessment of the many different possible variants of it. It may be the
case that once the correct kind of acceptance-state and the correct kind
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of connection between the thinker’s acceptance and the thinker’s property
of being justified in believing the conclusion have been found (see above),
Inferential Internalism does not fall prey to the objections alluded to above
[Leite, 2008].
Both sorts of specifications of the requirement of Inferential Internalism, i.e.
the kind of acceptance-state involved and the kind of connective used, are
connected to a larger question about the source of the requirement. In order
to justifiably believe something, (i) one must have an adequate reason and
(ii) believe for that reason (believe in response to that reason). A belief is
not justified simply whenever the thinker has a good reason in its favor, —it
is not justified simply whenever the belief-formation is in accordance with an
epistemic norm. The belief must be held as a response to a reason, the belief-
formation must be guided by a norm. According to (i) and (ii) the acceptance
of the proposition of the form [premises] support [conclusion] may enter a
requirement on justifiably believing the conclusion in two ways:
On the one hand, there may be a requirement on having adequate reasons.
In this case, one claims that the reason provided by the reasoner’s justified
beliefs in the premises is bound up with the reasoner’s justified acceptance
of the proposition of the form [premises] support [conclusion].
On the other hand, one may think that the reasoner’s belief-forming behavior
is a response to a reason, only if she accepts it as her reason, where this implies
that she accepts the proposition of the form [premises] support [conclusion].
In the first case, Inferential Internalism follows (perhaps with additional
claims) from a thesis about the constitutive facts of having inferential rea-
sons. In the second case, Inferential Internalism follows (with additional
claims) from a thesis about how reasons and norms guide belief.
The question of the ‘source’ of Inferential Internalism in this sense has not
yet been fully addressed. Discussion of the nature of inference (normative
guidance in the case of inference) and discussion of Inferential Internalism
are often held in isolation of each other. But according to some accounts
of inference a belief-formation counts as an inference partly in virtue of the
reasoner’s (actual or potential) attitudes towards propositions of such forms
as [premises] support [conclusion][Audi, 1993, Leite, 2004]. According to
such a view on normative guidance, it may be the case that the belief in the
conclusion isn’t justified, unless the reasoner justifiably accepts such a propo-
sition. Hence it may motivate Inferential Internalism. There are contending
accounts of inference that do not involve any such acceptance [e.g. Harman,
1964, Wedgwood, 2006]. Even so, discussion concerning both issues, the na-
ture of inference and Inferential Internalism, may profit from being brought
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together. This has already been done to some extent in certain discussions
of the “Lewis Carroll Problem” [Engel, 2005, 2007, Stroud, 1979].
1.4 Wider issues
Inferential Internalism is a rather specific thesis. But it is tightly linked to a
number of fundamental questions in contemporary epistemology:
Basic justification: The requirement imposed by Inferential Internalism is
an instance of a more general (real or alleged) requirement: A cognizer must
justifiably accept that her grounds for a given belief are adequate, if the
belief is to be justified. The dominant view in epistemology is that the
general requirement must be rejected. This is the view that there is basic
justification and knowledge. That is, there are some cases in which a belief
is justified, even though the subject has no justified view on the question
whether the belief is reliably formed, supported by adequate evidence, and
so on. Many philosophers think that basic justification (or “entitlement” as
it is sometimes called [Burge, 2003, Dretske, 2000a]) must be part of any
sensible epistemological theory. However the view has also been criticized
for allowing forms of justification that are intuitively to be excluded [Cohen,
2002]. The question whether to reject Inferential Internalism is the question
whether to accept basic inferential justification.
The issue of basic justification is, as may already be clear from the above,
closely linked to the question of scepticism. Most (but not all) proponents
of basic justification think that it’s main motivation is that it is required in
order to avoid scepticism [e.g Field, 2000]. Some even think that accepting
basic justification provides the solution to the sceptical paradoxes. If basic
justification is allowed, then no further problematic justification (for the fal-
sity of sceptical scenarios) is required in order to be justified and the sceptic’s
demand to do so can be dismissed. And if basic justification is allowed, then
the justification of such further propositions may not be that problematic:
the further propositions may be rule-circularly justified [Van Cleve, 1984],
i.e. justified by a use of the method the adequacy of which is under question
without thereby relying on a belief that the method is adequate. “Dogmatist”
responses to scepticism [Pryor, 2000] rely on countenancing basic justifica-
tion. If basic justification is rejected, then some other response to scepticism
must be given [e.g. Wright, 2004b]. This is thus one of the wider issues which
bears on Inferential Internalism and vice-versa.
The nature of norm-guided belief-formation: As said, one motivation for In-
ferential Internalism may come from the idea that a belief-formation will not
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count as an inference, unless the subject links her premises to her conclusion
via an acceptance of the proposition of the form [premises] entail [conclu-
sion]. In general, a justified belief must bear a certain specific relation to
those states —these may be beliefs, but also perceptions, memories, and so
on— that provide the adequate reason for holding that belief. In traditional
terminology: the belief must be based on these states. Even more generally,
everything supported by an adequate reason, whether this is a belief or a
practical act, is justified, only insofar as it occurs because of, or in response
to the reason. For the case of belief, one can distinguish two traditional
views of the basing-relation, causal and cognitive. On the one hand, one may
think that the right relation is to be specified in causal terms: there is a
sort of non-deviant causal chain connecting the beliefs in the premises or the
other states with the belief in the conclusion (or the perceptual belief, and
so on). On the other hand, one may think that the right relation obtains in
virtue of the cognizer’s accepting that the one state (or its content) supports
the belief. Someone wanting to motivate Inferential Internalism from a view
on normative guidance must defend a cognitive view of the basing-relation.
Thus, the general issue of the nature of the basing-relation is directly relevant
for this line.
A connected general problem about normative guidance is that of reconcil-
ing the objectivity of the supporting reason with its motivational impact [e.g.
Dancy, 1995]. Is responding to a reason (being guided by a norm) something
which is itself outside or inside rational cognitive control? If it is outside
such control, for instance partially the effect of non-cognitive pro-attitudes
[Gibbard, 1995, Field, 2000], then relativism threatens; if it is under such
control by further reasons, then a regress threatens (see below)[Blackburn,
1994, Engel, 2005]. Connected to the issue of normative guidance is the ques-
tion of the nature of belief and acceptance. If belief is guided by acceptances
of propositions about what supports what, how are we to conceive of these
states. Are these simply dispositions to connect certain contents or are we to
conceive of them in a more substantial way (as Inferential Internalist’s must
claim in order save the distinctive feature of their view)?
Responsibility and justification: The third wider question —besides basic
justification and normative guidance— to which the discussion of Inferential
Internalism is directly relevant is one of those involved in the Internalism-
Externalism debate. The unspecific motivation for Inferential Internalism
is the idea that justification is linked to the notion of responsibility and
control. This idea is the driving force behind many recent attacks on ex-
ternalism. There are a number of attempts to reconcile basically externalist
epistemologies with this idea —for the case of justification in general, as well
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as for inferential justification in particular. One strategy is to divide justi-
fication into reflective justification being under the constraints imposed by
internalist intuition and animal justification, a pure externalist kind of justi-
fication [Sosa, 1997, Bonjour and Sosa, 2003]. Another strategy is to appeal
to epistemic or intellectual virtues in addition to (or instead of) simple reli-
ability [Greco, 1999, 2002, Sosa, 1985]. The issue of Inferential Internalism
is thus an instance of the wider issue of how to account for the (alleged or
real) link between responsibility and justification.
1.5 Specific issues
There are the four following main obstacles for a proponent of Inferential
Internalism:
Classical Regress: First, the requirement imposed by Inferential Internalism
seems prone to the classical regress problem exploited in traditional sceptical
arguments. If the inference is only justified, if something else is justified
(inferential internalism), then, if this something else is inferentially justified,
as well as everything that is required by any further inference (inferentialism
about the reflective acceptances), then the initial inference is only justified,
if infinitely many things are justified. There are a number of responses to
this regress problem: (i) One might reject inferentialism about the reflective
acceptances and claim that this acceptances are the result of and justified
by non-inferential a priori insight [Bonjour, 1998]; but this is less plausible
for induction than for deduction. (ii) One might accept the conclusion and
adopt infinitism, the view that (inferential) justification obtains only once a
certain infinite number of acceptances is acquired (in the right way) [Klein,
1999]; but this faces the problem to have to account for the fact that there
is a psychological dependence, i.e. the basing relation, between an infinity of
states.
Justificatory Lewis-Carroll Problem: Second, there is a problem concerning
the justificatory import of the acceptance of the proposition of the form
[premises] support [conclusion] (henceforth “reflective acceptance”). (This
is one aspect of the Lewis-Carroll-Problem) How does the (granted to be
justified) reflective acceptance bear on the justificatory status of the belief in
the conclusion? This must be by way of inferential support, for the propo-
sitional content of the reflective acceptance is not identical to the content of
the conclusion. But if the support is inferential, then according to inferen-
tial internalism a further justified acceptance is required, and again a regress
ensues [Boghossian, 2001, 2003]. This problem needs a careful evaluation,
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because it probably applies only to some variants of Inferential Internalism.
Inferential Internalism need not countenance the claim that the reflective ac-
ceptance partially constitutes (or explains) inferential support. But even if
it does apply, it has been suggested that the acceptance need not be proposi-
tional and hence need not support the inference inferentially [Wright, 2001,
Bonjour, 2005].
Psychological Lewis Carroll Problem: Third, there is also a problem concern-
ing the psychological import of the reflective acceptance. (This is another
aspect of the Lewis-Carroll-Problem, [Cf. Stroud, 1979]) Even if the reflec-
tive acceptance is itself not based on any other belief, one may ask how it
partially explains the belief in the conclusion. If it is inferentially, in the
way a belief in a premise explains a belief in a conclusion, then a regress
looms. For a further reflective acceptance would have to explain this further
inferential connection, and so on. A defense of Inferential Internalism must
be able to secure for the reflective acceptance a distinctive (not premise-like)
psychological role.
Alternative strategies: Fourth, even if none of the aforementioned problems
proofs to be insurmountable, one may ask whether Inferential Internalism
is necessary in order to take the intuitions on responsibility into account.
There are proposals to capture such intuitions in other ways. For instance,
it has been argued that —even lacking the view on her reasons demanded by
Inferential Internalism— a subject is inferring in a responsible manner when
behaving in accordance with the inference-pattern is constitutive of the sub-
ject’s possessing some of the concepts involved in the premises[Boghossian,
2003]. Or, it may be claimed that if the inferential dispositions qualify as
epistemic virtues, then it can thereby be said that the reasoner behaves in a
responsible manner [Greco, 1999]. Or, one may claim that in some cases it
is practically rational (and thereby not irresponsible) to indulge in an infer-
ence in the absence of a reflective acceptance [Enoch and Schechter, 2008].
Inferential Internalism must compare favourably with these views.

Chapter 2
Deduction and Awareness of
Logical Fact
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2.1 Introduction
It is very plausible that the question whether I have justifiably deduced a
conclusion from a set of premises is connected to the question whether I
believe, justifiably believe, have evidence against or am in some other way
related to the proposition of the form [premises] entail [conclusion]. The
claim that there is such a connection can be loosely expressed by the fol-
lowing intuitively compelling requirement: If I justifiably infer a conclusion
from a set of premises, then I must not be indifferent to the question whether
the premises entail the conclusion. But given this loose but intuitive claim
is acknowledged, two further questions arise. First, why must not I be in-
different to the question whether the premises entail the conclusion? Is this
because, if I were indifferent, then I would not have deductive justification?
Or, is it because, if I were indifferent, I would not be deducing at all? Second,
how much “not indifferent to the question” must I be in order to justifiably
deduce, resp. to be deducing at all? Do I need to justifiably believe that the
premises entail the conclusion, or is it enough that I believe it? Or, is it even
enough that I do not have evidence to the contrary?
In this chapter I introduce three views on deduction and deductive justifica-
tion. The three views acknowledge that one must not be indifferent to the
question whether the premises entail the conclusion. But they tell competing
stories about why and in what sense this is so. Suppose I justifiably deduce
a conclusion from a set of premises. On all three views, I can in that case
not have available evidence to the effect that my premises do not entail my
conclusion. According to the first view, which I will call “minimalism”, this
is all there is to the intuitive idea that I can not be indifferent to the ques-
tion whether the premises entail the conclusion. All three views hold that
evidence against the proposition of the form [premises] entail [conclusion]
undermines deductive justification. But according to minimalism nothing
further about how I “relate” to the proposition of the form [premises] entail
[conclusion] is relevant. In particular, according to minimalism I need not
justifiably believe this proposition in order to have deductive justification.
Nor do I need to bear an attitude towards the proposition in order to be
deducing. What I will call “the psychological view” agrees with minimalism
that I must not have evidence against the proposition. It also agrees with
minimalism that I needn’t bear some attitude towards the proposition in or-
der to have deductive justification. But it contends that I need to have such
an attitude in order to be deducing at all. Only my making the link between
the premises and the conclusion ensures that the belief-formation is a deduc-
tion. What I will call “Strong inferential internalism”, the third view, agrees
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with minimalism that I must not have evidence against the proposition. It
also agrees with minimalism that I need not have such an attitude in order
to be deducing at all. But it contends that I need to bear such an attitude
—which in that case must be justified— in order to have deductive justifi-
cation. Strong inferential internalism is the view that the subject’s justified
attitude (e.g. belief) towards this proposition is essentially responsible for the
fact that she has deductive justification. Thus, the three views present con-
tending interpretations of the intuitive requirement that “the subject must
not be indifferent to the question whether her premises entail the conclusion”.
Section 2.1 examines some statements in favor and against taking it to be a
necessary condition on deductive justification that the subject justifiably be-
lieves the proposition of the form [premises] entail [conclusion]. In section 2.2
I characterize the three views. In section 2.3 I discuss an argument to the
effect that every other view than minimalism is incoherent. In section 2.4 I
present an argument in favor of the psychological view.
Consider a subject who looks out of the window, sees that it rains and forms
on the basis of the belief that it rains the belief that the roads are wet by
going through the following inference (henceforth called “Wet Roads”):
(1) It is raining outside.
(2) If it rains outside, the roads are wet.
(3) The roads are wet.
Under normal conditions this is a way of acquiring a justified belief in The
roads are wet. But what characterizes such “normal conditions”? Henceforth
I will refer to the normal conditions, the one in which Wet Roads leads to
a justified belief in (3), as N . Some things are pretty much obvious: The
subject must have justified beliefs in the premises. It is understood that apart
from the perceptual justification for (1), the subject has some justification for
(2), very possibly by past experience. It is also understood that the subject
does not have strong independent evidence against The roads are wet, such as
at the same time seeing that the roads are dry. But there may also be features
that are much less obvious. In particular, some non-occurrent justified beliefs
or other attitudes may be operative in the background of each “normal case”.
I am particularly concerned with attitudes towards the following proposition:
L (1) and (2) entail (3)
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I will henceforth refer to any proposition standing to an inference as this one
stands with respect to Wet Roads either as “L” or as “the linking propo-
sition”. It states that there is a logical relation between the premises and
the conclusion.1 But not only attitudes towards L are potentially in the
background of the normal case. Evidence in itself for or against L might be
relevant for characterizing the normal condition N . For instance, if I have
strong evidence that Wet Roads exploits an equivocation, for instance in the
concept rain,2 then arguably I am not justified in believing the inferred con-
clusion. Or, if a very distinguished logician tells me that it is a common
mistake to believe L, this may undermine my justification for believing (3).
But such evidence is evidence against L. So, a complete specification of N
may include some facts about the subjects situation with respect to the link-
ing proposition; where “the situation with respect to L” can be read both as
“evidential situation with respect to L” and “the subjects attitudes towards
L”.3
As said, N is such that the subject has a justified belief in (3) in virtue of
going through Wet Roads. This can be expressed by saying that in N the
following is true:
(a) The subject has a good epistemic reason to believe (3).4
(b) The subject believes (3) for this reason.5
The distinction between having a reason to believe and believing for a (given)
reason applies in general, not only in N . For instance, it is possible that I
1This proposition is, at least at the face of it, not equivalent to the proposition (1)
and (2) epistemically support (3). The latter proposition is about an epistemic support-
relation, not about a logical relation. But I think that some of the things said in this
chapter about L apply to the latter proposition too. But there are very important differ-
ences between the two [cf. Cohen, 1998], so that they must be properly treated separately. I
discuss similar issues with respect to the proposition about epistemic support in chapter 4.
2“equivocation” may be understood as designating the fact that the same linguistic
expression in two different premises stands for two different concepts. In this sense the
mental process of inferring cannot show “equivocation”. But whenever we fall prey to an
“equivocation”, it is also true that our reasoning is defective. It is this defect in reasoning
that I call equivocation.
3I discuss the relation between evidence and attitudes in section 2.2.
4I sometimes express this fact by saying that the subject “has justification for (3)” or
that for the subject “(3) has positive epistemic status”.
5I express the fact that the subject believes (3) for her good epistemic reason sometimes
by saying that she “justifiably believes (3)” or that she “is justified in believing (3)”.
Furthermore, the subject’s believing (3) for her good epistemic reason in N , involves the
fact that I express by saying that the subject “bases her belief in (3) on her beliefs in (1)
and (2)”. See below in the text.
2.1. INTRODUCTION 15
have good perceptual reasons for a certain proposition —plausibly partly in
virtue of having a perceptual state with a certain content, e.g. that there is
a cup of tea on my desk, but I may nevertheless not believe that there is a
cup of tea on my desk for this perceptual reasons. I could not believe it at
all, because the question didn’t occur to me. Or I could believe it for other
reasons, perhaps bad ones such as that I had a vision of my guru telling me
that there is a cup of tea on my desk. So, if I believe there is a cup of tea
on my desk for my good epistemic reason, my belief must be appropriately
connected to my reason. That is, condition (b) must be fulfilled.6 It will be
my contention that when addressing the question whether L (resp. evidence
or an attitude towards it) is relevant in N , it is important to distinguish
these two aspects, (a) and (b), of N .
Which aspects of N are relevant for which of (a) and (b)? Very little can be
said without foreclosing the possibility to investigate the relevance of L from
a sufficiently neutral starting point. One aspect of (a) is certainly that the
subject has justification for the premises and does not have evidence against
the conclusion.7 But is her believing the premises relevant for (a) or only
for (b)? One might think that she has a reason for believing the conclusion
partially in virtue of justifiably believing the premises. But one might also
think that she has a reason for believing the conclusion partially already in
virtue of having justification for the premises, even if she does not believe
them. So, we cannot simply assume the one or the other (see also immediately
below on the question of how to conceive of reasons). As to (b), one aspect
of it is that the belief in the conclusion is “connected” to the beliefs in the
premises. This connection goes by the name of the “basing relation”. Thus
one condition on (b) in N is that the belief in the conclusion be based (at
least)8 on the beliefs in the premises. But it is a controversial question, what
that connection, i.e. the basing-relation, is. An initially plausible idea is that
the belief in the conclusion is causally related in a certain way to the beliefs
in the premises. But it is best to remain open to other possibilities, as will
become apparent in the course of the chapter.
6A similar distinction applies also to practical reasons: I can have a good reason to
act, but not act for that reason.
7In what follows I generally disregard the fact that evidence, reasons, justification etc.
are in degrees. I therefore also merely implicitly appeal to the comparative weight of
evidence etc. So, in fact, there must not be evidence against (3) that is strong enough in
comparison with the evidence or the reasons in favor of the premises. Furthermore, when
I say “evidence” or “reasons”, I generally mean evidence or reasons that aren’t outweighed
by further evidence or reasons.
8As will become apparent later on, some argue that the belief in the conclusion must
be based in addition on other beliefs.
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I will as far as possible remain neutral on how one should conceive of the
subject’s reason. Are “reasons to believe” other beliefs? Or propositions
in themselves, or even facts? On many views, having a reason to believe
has something to do with having evidence. But, again, there are different
manners to conceive of evidence. For some a subject’s total evidence is
constituted by her experential states, for others by the totality of her beliefs,
still for others by what she knows, and so on. Very roughly, evidence for P is
something indicating that P is true, where there are different accounts of the
sense in which evidence “indicates”. I would like to keep these questions in
the background. My question therefore is whether whatever in N is relevant
for (b) or (a) involves a propositional attitude or evidence related to L.9 N
is a particular context. I ask what the features in the typical example N
are. So, the answer to this question will provide general conditions on (b)
and (a).
There is a possible spectrum of views on this question, from minimalism
which requires only that there is no evidence against L (I assume that one
cannot be “more minimalist” than that)10, to the exuberant views that I
will introduce below. I will briefly cite some philosophers suggesting that
minimalism is not enough. Then at the end of this section I will introduce the
widely shared suspicion that more than minimalism is incoherent or at least
indefensible. In the main part of the chapter I will evaluate the minimalist’s
argument for her view, precisely the argument that more is incoherent or
indefensible. I will suggest that more exuberant views can escape that charge.
And I will begin to argue for a view that is slightly more than minimalist.
Here is Richard Fumerton [1995, 85-86] arguing for the view that one is
justified in believing in the conclusion, only if one is justified in believing in
L, resp. some similar proposition:11
[. . . ] it is prima facie plausible to suggest that one’s belief in
some proposition E can justify one in believing another proposi-
tion P only when one’s belief that E is itself justified and one has
9Besides the question “what are reasons (states, facts, facts of what kind)?” there
is the question “In virtue of what are these things (i.e. states, facts) reasons to believe
(3)?”. What is responsible for their normative import? I will come back to this question
in sections 2.2 and 2.3.
10But on the view that no more than believing ¬L, even in the absence of evidence
against L (resp. for ¬L), is relevant, see later one page 27. I also sketch a “more minimal-
istic than the minimalist”-view near the end of the chapter in section 2.4.
11As said, I use “L” to refer to any proposition of the form [Premises] entail [Conclusion].
Not only the one associated with Wet Roads. But here Fumerton’s example does not even
involve a deductive inference. See below in the text.
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justification for thinking that E makes probable P. [. . . ] one can
make the claim initially plausible simply by looking at the ways
in which it seems appropriate to challenge someone’s claim to
have good (epistemic) reasons for believing something. [. . . ] if I
am talking to an astrologer who infers from the present alignment
of planets that there will be prosperity this year, I am perfectly
entitled to challenge the reasonability of the astrologer’s thinking
that there is a connection between the two states of affairs. If the
astrologer shrugs her shoulders and admits it is just a whimsical
hunch that Jupiter’s alignment with Mars might have something
to do with economic prosperity here on earth, I can for that rea-
son dismiss the astrologer’s claim to have a justified belief about
prosperity based on the position of planets relative to one an-
other.
This is not a case of deductive inference. But Fumerton [1995, 88] thinks
that in deductive reasoning one also has to be justified in believing that E
makes probable P. In the deductive case the subject has justification for the
proposition that E makes probable P with probability 1, i.e. the proposition
E makes certain P. And he takes E makes certain P to be equivalent to L.12
In order to avoid introducing too many abbreviations, I will, when discussing
Fumerton’s example, therefore simply but incorrectly call “L” the proposition
If Jupiter aligns with Mars, then (ceteris paribus)13 there will be prosperity
this year.
Fumerton draws a parallel between the premises and L. This parallel suggests,
according to him, that just as N includes justified beliefs in the premises,
so does it include a justified belief in L. The parallel is that just as one
can challenge the inferred belief by challenging the reason for believing the
premises, so one can challenge the inferred belief by “challenging the reason
for believing” in L. Perhaps Fumerton’s description is tendentious, for it
describes the challenge as a challenge for the reason for believing L —thereby
implying that there is such a reason. But this is precisely what the minimalist
denies. Still, it is a fact that one can challenge the inferred belief by raising
doubts about L just as one can challenge the inferred belief by raising doubts
about the premises. So, this suggests that the premises and L are on a par
with respect to the justification for the inferred belief. It suggests that they
play a somewhat similar role.
12Furthermore Fumerton does not distinguish between E makes probable P and E sup-
ports/justifies P. In his commentary to Fumerton [1995], Stewart Cohen [1998] objects to
taking the latter two propositions to be equivalent.
13A very useful clause for astrologists!
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There are other considerations suggesting that minimalism is false. For in-
stance, John Greco [1999, 280] says the following:
[. . . ] consider two cases of inferring a mathematical theorem
from axioms. In the first case, a student knows that the axioms
are true and believes the theorem on the basis of valid deductive
reasoning. In the second case, another student also knows the
axioms are true, but believes the theorem on the basis of reason-
ing that is fallacious. Clearly the first student knows that the
theorem is true and the second student does not. But why? The
overwhelmingly plausible answer is that the first student “sees”
the relationship between the axioms and the theorem. In other
words, she can see that if the axioms are true, then the theorem
must be true as well. The second student has reasoned falla-
ciously, however. She does not see the relationship between the
truth of the axioms and the truth of the theorem, although she
might think she sees it.
Greco’s claims translate to claims about being justified, if we take knowledge
to imply justification. Greco considers two cases. On the one hand a case in
which normal conditions N obtain (in which the inferred belief is justified),
on the other hand one in which N do not obtain. But in both cases the
premises are justified and the entailment relation between premises and con-
clusion holds, i.e. L is true. The difference, according to Greco, is that the
first student is led to infer the theorem by her correct insight (or we might
say: a justified belief) into L. The second student however is lacking such
an insight into L (even though he may unjustifiably believe L). There seems
to be a cognitive difference between the two students (over and above the
cognitive difference with respect to the theorem). It is not just that they are
doing things differently.
Minimalism may have the resources to respond to these two points. With
respect to Fumerton’s case with the astrologer, the minimalist will (i) want
to quarrel with Fumerton’s description of the case, and (ii) argue that the
essential intuition can be captured by her minimal requirement. The mini-
malist will object to Fumerton’s description on the basis of the two following
points. First, Fumerton describes a dialogue. His conclusion is that, I, the
astrologer’s interlocutor, can dismiss his claim “There will be prosperity this
year”. This means that I have not been convinced by the astrologer. But
Fumerton wants to claim that the astrologer is unjustified, because he lacks
a reason for the linking-belief. But the minimalist can challenge the assump-
tion that what the astrologer lacks in order to convince me is also what he
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lacks in order to be himself justified. So, even if it is true that in order to
convince me of his conclusion, the astrologer would better be justified in be-
lieving the linking proposition (and convince me with his reasons for it), this
is not so easily transferrable to the astrologer’s own justification.14
Second, Fumerton describes the case as one where the astrologer’s belief in
the linking proposition is challenged, thereby implying that the astrologer has
to have such a belief. Similarly he says that the astrologer “admits it is just
a whimsical hunch that Jupiter’s alignment with Mars might have something
to do with economic prosperity here on earth”. But according to the mini-
malist the astrologer need not believe the linking proposition and therefore
cannot admit that he believes it on a whimsical hunch. The minimalist will
insist on describing the case as one where I challenge the reasonability of the
astrologer’s inference —where “challenging the inference” means challeng-
ing believing the conclusion on the basis of the premises. Evidence against
the linking proposition can, according to the minimalist, directly undermine
the premises’ status as reasons15 for believing the conclusion. It does not
have to do so indirectly via undermining a reason for believing the linking
proposition (which in its turn partly constitutes the reason for believing the
conclusion). Of course, evidence against L would undermine the reason for
believing L, if there were one. But it can also undermine the reason for be-
lieving the conclusion directly, or so the minimalist claims. The minimalist’s
description is not prima facie less plausible in this respect than Fumerton’s.
The minimalist need not deny that there is something right about what
Fumerton says on the astrologer’s case. First of all, she will probably agree
that the astrologer is unjustified in his belief that there will be prosperity. Of
course, according to minimalism too there is a feature of N that is respon-
sible for the fact the subject there has a reason to believe (3). And perhaps
this feature is missing in Fumerton’s example. For instance, inferences have
certain objective features such as that they are valid or that the involved
propositions stand in some other formal relations, e.g. inductive ones. Per-
haps a good general candidate for such an objective property is conditional
14Fumerton anticipates the similar objection that the astrologer must be justified in
believing the linking proposition only in order to have second-order justification, i.e. in
order to be justified in the belief that he is justified in believing that there will be prosperity.
This is a similar objection, since second-order justification is arguably what is required
in order to be able to convince an interlocutor. Exuberant views will at least sometimes
be motivated by a principle linking first and second-order justification, thereby dismissing
the minimalist’s objection. I cannot discuss this issue here.
15By calling the premises “reasons” I violate neutrality towards different conceptions of
reasons. The more careful formulation would be this: . . . undermine the reason for (3) in
N , without undermining a reason for L allegedly present in N .
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reliability. An inference is justified if it is conditionally reliable in the fol-
lowing sense: the inference reliably results in true belief, when the premises
are true.16 Nothing prevents the minimalist from claiming that this feature
is absent in Fumerton’s example.
However, the intuition to which Fumerton appeals is that the astrologer is un-
justified, because he cannot give a reason for the linking-proposition, and not
because of some other fact, such as that the inference is not of the right form.
But even on this, one might think, the minimalist could agree. She could
agree that if the astrologer had a reason to believe in the linking-proposition,
then the inference would be of the right form: once the linking proposition
is added, the otherwise illegitimate inference gets the right shape. However,
by doing this the minimalist would concede Fumerton’s whole point. This
is merely concealed by the fact that inference in question is not a deduc-
tion. But the spirit of minimalism is precisely that inferences can provide
(transmit) justification in the absence of linking-propositions, whether the
inferences are deductions or not.
Still the minimalist can concede more than only that the astrologer is unjus-
tified. In particular, she can argue that her concession that N requires the
absence of evidence against L, may account for the intuition that it is because
of the astrologer’s inability to give a reason for the linking proposition that
he is unjustified. Indeed she may say that cases such as the astrologer’s are,
correctly described, precisely the reason why she subscribes to her minimal
requirement. The minimalist may agree that the astrologer’s belief in the
conclusion, i.e. There will be prosperity this year, is unjustified. But the
minimalist will insist that this is either (a) because the astrologer already in
fact has evidence against the linking proposition, i.e. “There is a connection
between the alignment of planets and human prosperity”, or (b) because in
the course of the dialogue such evidence is presented to him. We imagine, she
may say, the situation as resembling ours enough for it to be the case that the
astrologer has evidence against the linking proposition. He simply disregards
it —for whatever bad, perhaps even non-epistemic17, reason. She can insist
that we understand the case implicitly as resembling ours, so that we ascribe
to the astrologer, as to any real-life exemplar, evidence against the linking
proposition. Or, she can claim that putting the challenge to the astrologer,
presents her with evidence against the linking proposition. Perhaps, by chal-
lenging his inference in this way, we present him with testimonial evidence
against the linking proposition. Or perhaps we push him to consider his own
16[Cf. Goldman, 1979, ]
17Such as the non-epistemic reason of finding comfort or excitement in the idea that the
events of a life mirror events in the (visible) universe.
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evidence against L, thereby making it unjustified for him to continue to rely
on his inference.
Furthermore, Fumerton draws a parallel between the premises and L. But
there are other propositions besides L with which the parallel can be drawn.
For instance, the proposition I am not at the moment too tired to draw in-
ferences is also such that evidence in favor of it would undermine believing
the conclusion on the basis of the premises. Or consider the proposition ‘if
. . . then’ is not ‘tonk’-like. If I had evidence that the accepted usage of ‘if
. . . then’ allows deducing anything from anything else, like the defined usage
of Prior’s connective ‘tonk’ does, then inferences such as Wet Roads, making
use of ‘if . . . then’, would be undermined. If Fumerton is to insist that the
parallel gives a reason to think that exuberance with respect to L is right,
then he must admit that in N these propositions are also justifiably believed.
This in itself does not refute his argument, but it leads to a generalization
of exuberance. If propositions such as I am not at the moment too tired to
draw inferences must be justifiably believed in the normal conditions N of
an inference, then, it is to be expected, similar propositions must be justifi-
ably believed in the normal condition of any other belief-formation. In fact,
for any sort of justification that is defeasible, there would be such further
propositions that must be justifiably believed. For instance, a perceptual
belief can then only be justified if the proposition My sense organs are at
the moment working properly is justifiably believed. For its role with respect
to perceptual belief-formation is arguably exactly the same as that of I am
not at the moment too tired to draw inferences with respect to inference.
The perceptual belief can be challenged by raising doubts about the sense
organ’s proper functioning. I think that Fumerton, for one, would not be
willing to endorse such a thoroughgoing exuberance. So, seeing that the
argument for exuberance with respect to L generalizes to an argument for
general exuberance, discredits the former for all those who think that the
latter is untenable.
Very briefly, the trouble with thoroughgoing exuberance is that it is very
implausible, at least at the face of it, that the further propositions are all
non-defeasibly justified. And if they are defeasibly justified, then there are
further propositions which must be justifiably believed. And they will also
be defeasibly justified, hence there are further propositions to be justifiably
believed, and so on. There is an imminent danger of a vicious regress. If
exuberance could be limited to L, it is plausible that the regress can be
avoided. If the justification for L were deductively inferential, then the dan-
ger of a regress would arise. But it is plausible that a belief in L can be
non-inferentially justified by logical intuition. Hence, there is no further L-
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proposition to be justifiably believed. Unfortunately I cannot go into more
detail here.
I have much less ideas about how a minimalist could respond to Greco’s
point. However Greco’s passage does not provide a worked out argument
against minimalism, it merely suggests that it is false. Perhaps the mini-
malist can provide a full description of the difference between the two cases.
Or perhaps, she could argue that something that is plausible for the case of
a deduction in the sense of a manipulation of schemata does not apply to
deduction in general. She could hold that if I deduce schemata or mathe-
matical propositions, it is true that I have to know the entailment relations
in order to be justified. But in the case of a simple modus ponens such as
Wet Roads that is not required.
But minimalists generally think that they do not need to go into arguments
about their opponents positive points. For they think that exuberant views
are fatally flawed. The following passage by Paul Boghossian [2001] gives an
idea of the problem they raise against exuberant views:
[. . . ] at some point it must be possible to use a rule in reason-
ing in order to arrive at a justified conclusion, without this use
needing to be supported by some knowledge about the rule that
one is relying on. It must be possible simply to move between
thoughts in a way that generates justified belief, without this
movement being grounded in the thinker’s justified belief about
the rule used in the reasoning.
Preceding this passage Boghossian actually gives an argument in order to
support what is here claimed. He thus does not simply attempt to elicit an
intuition. Nevertheless I think one can intuitively grasp the worry concerning
exuberant views from the passage. The worry can be expressed simply thus:
What is the subject to do with her insight into L? It can not be that for every
inference, one must use ones knowledge of L inferentially. For if one uses one’s
knowledge of L inferentially, one uses L as a premise in an inference. But
then one must use further knowledge for this inference, just as the knowledge
of L is needed with respect to Wet Roads. And so on ad infinitum. So, at
some point, as Boghossian says, one must stop using further knowledge and
just draw the inference. This is all very loose and rushed, but there is at least
an initial suspicion that there is some such fatal problem for exuberance.
Before going to discuss this worry in more detail in section 2.3, I want to
discuss in more detail in section 2.2 the difference between minimalism and
non-minimalistic or exuberant views.
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2.2 Minimalism, strong inferential internal-
ism and the psychological view
The point about challenge from the citation of Fumerton on page 16 sup-
ports according to the minimalist’s viewpoint a minimal requirement on N :
The subject must not have evidence against L. According to minimalism the
subject is “situated with respect to L” in the sense of not having evidence
against L. According to exuberant or non-minimalistic views, the “subject’s
situation with respect to L” involves more than that, for instance that she
justifiably believes L. In this section I want to further characterize minimal-
ism and its contenders. The simple opposition between “merely no evidence
against L” and “more than that” is in need of clarification. I will therefore
in this section further characterize minimalism and non-minimalism. And I
will characterize two initially plausible non-minimalistic competitors, strong
inferential internalism and the psychological view.
Attitudes, evidence and epistemic status
As introduced so far, minimalism subscribes to the following requirement on
N having to do with L, and on no other :
(E) In N the subject must not have evidence against L.
But even to the eyes of someone sympathetic to the spirit of minimalism
(E) might be too restrictive. It might be argued that slightly more must
be excluded than only evidence against L. It seems that less than evidence
against L is already enough to undermine (3)’s epistemic status18 in N .
Consider a situation C resembling N in all respects except that the subject
believes ¬L. But she does not have evidence either for or against L. It seems
that in C the subject’s deductive reason for (3) is undermined. If I believe
that (3) does not follow from (1) and (2), is not something wrong when at
the same time I go through the inference Wet Roads and thereby come to
believe (3)? And this, whether or not my belief that (3) does not follow from
(1) and (2) is supported by evidence?19 So, the intuition about C seems to
support the following requirement in addition to (E):
18The epistemic status of a proposition is determined by the subject’s epistemic reason
in favor or against believing that proposition. I use the three expressions “the reason to
believe P”, “P’s positive epistemic status” and “the justification for P” equivalently.
19Evidence against L is evidence in favor of ¬L.
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(D) In N the subject must not disbelieve L.20
Both (E) and (D) are in the spirit of minimalism. Neither of them requires an
attitude or evidence towards, resp. in favor of, L. So it is to be expected that
these two requirements are derived from one simple requirement. I suggest
that it is the following:
(R) The subject must not have a reason to disbelieve L.
Minimalism is the view that L plays only the following role in N . A reason
to disbelieve L directly undermines (i.e. without undermining or defeating
an otherwise present reason for believing L) the subject’s reason to believe
(3) that she otherwise would have in N—in virtue of some features of N , on
the exact nature of which I want to remain neutral in this chapter. Accord-
ing to minimalism the deductive justification for (3) in N is defeasible. If
the subject has certain additional reasons, then her reason to believe (3) is
defeated. Among these possible reasons one finds for instance reasons (that
are sufficiently strong) to disbelieve (3) or reasons to disbelieve any of the
premises. But also, reasons to disbelieve L.
But having thus characterized minimalism as the endorsement of (R) and
no other requirement on N relating to L, I should come back on the steps
from (E) and (D) to (R). On what assumptions do the intuitions supporting
(E) and (D) support (R)? I have claimed to want to remain neutral on the
correct conception of reasons and evidence. And I also want to remain neutral
towards views on epistemic reasons such as evidentialism and pragmatism or
coherentism and foundationalism. But do the steps from (E) and (D) to (R)
really permit such neutrality?
In fact the step from (D) to (R) clearly is not very neutral, for it assumes a
quite unorthodox view on the relation between evidence, belief and reasons
to believe. Someone who derives (R) from (D) must claim that disbelieving L
in the absence of evidence for or against L is prima facie justified. Therefore,
the subject in C —where she disbelieves L on no evidence, and hence violates
(D)— violates (R). This step forces the minimalist to take a certain general
view on justification. This is the view that belief is prima facie justified.
Whatever belief-state I happen to find myself in, if there is nothing (no
evidence) indicating that it is false or unjustified, it is justified. That is, it
is prima facie justified. I will give this view the label “affirmativism”.21 Of
20I take believing ¬L to be equivalent to disbelieving L.
21This view is endorsed by Harman [1984, 1986, 2003]. Some remarks in Burge [1993]
also suggest this view. In Pollock and Cruz [1999] this view is called “negative coherence
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course, a minimalist could avoid commitment to affirmativism by rejecting
the intuition about C and thus by rejecting (D). This seems at first not an
impossible way to go, since the intuitions are perhaps clearer about violations
of (E) than about violations of (D). I will come back to affirmativism and
the intuition about context C in section 2.4.
But the step from (E) to (R) has to be taken. Of course, a non-minimalist
will also accept (E), but she will draw a different conclusion from it.
If in a situation otherwise like N the subject had evidence against L, two
consequences would follow. First, the subject would loose her reason to be-
lieve L, if she had any. Second, the subject would have a reason to disbelieve
L. Accordingly there are two candidate requirements from which (E) could
be derived, namely either of the two following:
(R∗) The subject must have a reason to believe L.
(R) The subject must not have a reason to disbelieve L.
These two requirements are of course not equivalent. A subject can fail to
have justification for L, even though the subject does not have justification
to believe ¬L. It is possible that both L and ¬L are unjustified.
The first, (R∗), is an anti-minimalistic requirement. This is the conclusion
the non-minimalist would draw from (E). A minimalist will precisely reject
the claim that justification for L is required. It is true that evidence against
L would undermine such a justification, but this cannot be the minimalist’s
concern. So the minimalist will claim that the no-evidence requirement de-
rives from (R). It is because evidence against L would provide a reason to
disbelieve L that such evidence must not obtain in N .
The derivation of (E) from (R) is unproblematic. For on plausible any view
on epistemic justification (which appeals to the notion of evidence) evidence
partially determines justification. In particular, on any view, sufficient ev-
idence against L will provide justification for disbelieving L. It is true that
reliabilism is a view of justification that usually does not appeal to the notion
of evidence at all, but then, of course, (R) will anyway be the relevant require-
ment on N . As to other views on justification, they all agree that evidence
partially determines justification. For instance, people who think that justi-
fication is partially determined by pragmatic factors, will agree that evidence
is still partially responsible for justificatory status. And other views, such as
theory” (although in that case it supposes that all evidence is provided by belief, something
which affirmativism need not endorse).
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doxastic theories of justification and the view I have called “affirmativism”
will simply conceive of evidence in a certain way.
According to some people, non-evidential features of N are relevant for the
justificatory status of eventual attitudes with respect to L (and for justifica-
tory status in general). For instance, it is claimed that practical constraints
on the subject’s available time for gathering evidence on the subject matter
(here L) determines how much and whether evidence is required for justifi-
cation. On such a view justificatory status is determined by evidence and
the practical constraints together. Opposing this view are evidentialists, i.e.
those who hold that justification is solely determined by evidence. But the
step from (R) to the no-evidence requirement (E) merely presupposes that
evidence partially determines justification. It does not presuppose evidential-
ism. Someone thinking that pragmatic factors are relevant for justification
need not deny that the presence of evidence against L makes it the case, to-
gether with the relevant pragmatic factors, that the subject has justification
for disbelieving L. Such a person would certainly hold that insofar as evi-
dence against L violates a requirement on N , it does so because the evidence
in question is relevant, due in part to pragmatic factors, to L’s epistemic
status. So, such a person would not hold that the no-evidence requirement
holds independently of (R). The view that pragmatic factors are relevant
does not question the derivation of the no-evidence requirement from (R).
On some views justification is determined solely by a subject’s propositional
attitudes. In particular, coherentists would hold that the epistemic status of
an eventual belief in L solely depends on the subject’s other propositional
attitudes (with respect to any “related” proposition, where the coherentist
proposes criteria for “relatedness”). Does this not undermine the claim that
evidence partially determines epistemic status? No, one must simply under-
stand “evidence” in a way in which it is relevant to epistemic status according
to coherentism. A coherentist would hold that the evidence with respect to L
is determined or constituted by the subject’s other attitudes. So, this view
could be accommodated by identifying these other attitudes with the evi-
dence for or against L.
Finally, there are those who think that a belief in ¬L or in L is prima facie
justified. I have in mind those views according to which a belief is prima-facie
justified by the fact that the proposition thereby appears to the subject in an
“affirmative mode”. As long as there is no undermining evidence (understood
in whatever way, e.g. other beliefs, experiences etc.) a proposition that
appears in an “affirmative mode” before the mind is justified. On such a
view —I have called it “affirmativism”— a belief has an intrinsic positive
epistemic status that can only be undermined by evidence, but does not
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need to be supported by evidence. But wouldn’t a proponent of affirmativism
reject the claim that the epistemic status with respect to L is determined by
the evidential dimension? For according to affirmativism the attitude in a
certain sense endows itself with a positive epistemic status. However, it is
possible to integrate this view too. According to affirmativism, the evidence
is relevant for justificatory status too. Simply, a belief in a proposition is
evaluated positively when there is no evidence against it, but none in favor
of it either.
Affirmativism does then not challenge the idea that evidence determines
epistemic status. As said, a minimalist proponent of this view will have only
one requirement on epistemic status, (R). According to him (D) is not an
independent further requirement on N . According to him, having evidence
against L, as well as simply disbelieving Lgives a negative justificatory status
to L. And both undermine knowledge of (3), resp. undermine the justification
for (3) in N .
It is possible to endorse (R) without endorsing affirmativism. But if one
shares the intuition that in circumstance C the subject is not justified in
her inferred belief in (3), then one needs to endorse requirement (D) on
independent grounds. But if the minimalist’s view on the total relevance
of L is that a reason to disbelieve L is a defeating reason for the subject’s
reason to believe (3) in N , then there does not appear to be any motivation
for her to endorse (D) on independent grounds. For such a view has two
independent requirements on N , one on L’s epistemic status, (R), the other
on the subject’s attitude towards L, (D). Minimalism has no motivation for
the second requirement. But non-minimalistic views, as I will explain shortly,
can endorse two distinct requirements on N , one on L’s epistemic status, the
other on the attitude towards L. And they may have a motivation for each.
I turn now to the characterization of non-minimalistic or exuberant views.
As said exuberant views require “more” than the minimalist. But this can be
both “more attitude” and “more evidence”, resp. “higher epistemic status”.
Consider someone who claims that in N the subject must believe L, but does
not need to be justified in her belief in L. Such a person actually endorses a
non-minimalistic requirement on the attitude and (probably) the minimalist’s
requirement on the epistemic status. This view is suggested by Peter Klein
[1999, Fn 41].
More typical is perhaps the view that can be ascribed to Fumerton: The
subject must have a belief in L and it must be justified, presumably by being
supported by evidence. On this view the subject is required to have an
attitude and she is required to have enough evidence for the attitude to be
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justified. This kind of view endorses a requirement of the following general
form:
justified-attitude-requirements: In N the subject (i) must have attitude
A towards L, and (ii) attitude A must be justified, resp. L has positive
epistemic status with respect to attitude A.
So far, I have used the locution “proposition P has positive epistemic sta-
tus” without relativizing to an attitude. In fact, I have explained positive
epistemic status in terms of potential belief : P has positive epistemic status
for subject S, if and only if a potential belief by S (which is rightly based) is
justified. But, at least according to some, other attitudes can be positively
epistemically evaluated. For instance, one can evaluate whether in a given
situation one has the right to “simply assume something”. And an evalua-
tion can be positive for some non-belief attitude, while if the attitude were
a belief, it wouldn’t be justified. According to Wright [2004b,a] there is just
such a requirement on N of the justified-attitude-form where the attitude is
not a belief and where the constraints on evidence are therefore weaker. His
requirement is the following: The subject must have the attitude of rational
trust towards L. And according to him trust in L is rational when the sub-
ject has no evidence against L and some further non-evidential conditions
are fulfilled. According to him one has, in certain circumstances at least,
the right to assume (he prefers “trust on”) L to be true on no evidence. So
there is potentially a variety of exuberant views according to which attitude
they require. Furthermore there are the exuberant views which are not of
the justified-attitude form. Such views have independent requirements on
epistemic status of L and on the attitude towards L.
The foregoing characterization of non-minimalism is still quite superficial.
For it is silent on the motivation of the respective (if more than one) require-
ments on N . I will now turn to this question and thereby come to distinguish
two very different kinds of non-minimalistic views.
Dependence-relations
Variation among views on the import of L can also come from a different
source. They may give different answers to the following question: Why is
the epistemic status of L or an attitude towards L relevant in N ? Why is
there any such requirement on N ?
Minimalism will hold that the epistemic status of L is relevant merely be-
cause ¬L is a defeater for deductively inferential justification. She says that,
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just as arguably any other kind of justification, deductively inferential jus-
tification is defeasible or prima facie. Something about N is responsible for
the prima facie positive epistemic status of (3). But whatever it is, it does
not directly involve L’s epistemic status nor an attitude towards L. However,
¬L is a defeater: If ¬L has positive epistemic status for the subject (and
hence L negative epistemic status), then (3) looses its prima facie positive
epistemic status. The truth of a defeater, e.g. ¬L, undermines knowledge.
All else being equal, if someone infers deductively but in fact her premises
do not entail the conclusion, then she does not acquire knowledge in this
way. According to minimalism ¬L’s being a defeater in N neither implies
that L must have positive epistemic status, nor that the subject must have
a positive attitude towards L.
Opposite minimalism, there is the view that it is in virtue of a justified belief
in L that the premises provide22 reasons for believing the conclusion. Ac-
cording to this view, that the subject is justified in believing L explains why
she is right to take the inferential step. I will call this view “strong inferential
internalism” (although I cannot discuss here how it fits into the different pro-
posed categorizations of epistemological internalism and externalism). This
implies that the epistemic status of (3) depends on the positive epistemic
status of L. But it implies a special kind of asymmetric dependence that it
is worth specifying in some detail.
In order to make the kind of dependence more precise one can consider the
following case: Suppose I walk through some wood. I see some small unique
object on the ground and form the belief that X, some person I know, is
or was in this wood. But what I see is in itself completely unconnected to
what I come to believe as a result of what I see. It’s only in virtue of the
fact that I justifiably believe that this object belongs currently to X that
the resulting belief can have a positive epistemic status. Strong inferential
internalism holds that just such a role is played by a belief in L in N . On
this view, just as seeing the object in the wood in itself cannot provide a
reason for believing that X was in this wood, so the justified beliefs in the
premises of Wet Roads do not in themselves constitute (or provide) a reason
for believing the conclusion. I will call the asymmetric dependence relation
between the justification of my belief in X was in the wood and my justifica-
22When I say that “the premises provide or constitute reasons”, I intend still to remain
neutral on what exactly the reasons are in N . As said before, it is uncontroversial that
the subject must have reasons for her premises. It is only in this sense that “the premises
provide or constitute a reason for (3)”. The strong inferential internalist’s claim is that it
is in virtue of the reasons for L, that the subject’s having reasons for the premises is at
all relevant to her having a reason for (3).
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tion for the belief in The object I see belongs to X the “resting on” relation:
My justification for the belief in X was in the wood rests on my justification
for believing in The object I see belongs to X. Similarly, that the positive
epistemic status of (3) in N depends on the positive epistemic status of (1)
and (2) in this way is uncontroversial. Strong inferential internalism holds
that the justification of (3) in addition rests on the subject’s justification for
L. 23
In order to further explain the resting-on relation one can contrast it with
other dependence-relations between different epistemic status’. The epistemic
status of (3) also depends, but in a different way, on the epistemic status of a
given defeater. And there is the further, third kind of dependence illustrated
by the following example:
Suppose I have (only) weak mnemonic evidence that there are
infinitely many prime numbers greater than 100. And I have weak
evidence, obtained by hasty calculation, that there are more than
four prime numbers greater than 100. Suppose this combination
of weak evidence is sufficient to confer positive epistemic status
on both of the two following propositions:
(A) There are infinitely many prime numbers greater than 100.
(B) There are at least four prime numbers greater than 100.
23I take “resting on” from Pryor [2000, 524-526]. He explains it by appeal to the intuitive
notion of “begging the question”. If the justification for a proposition A rests on the
justification for a proposition B, then the justification for B cannot beg the question
whether A. He gives the following example of a case where one begs the question:
If my reasons for believing that the butler committed the murder crucially
rest on the assumption that the murderer was left-handed, then I obviously
couldn’t appeal to the claim that the butler was left-handed, and that he
committed the murder. To do so would be question-begging.
(Here it’s rather the imagined activity of justifying which is question-begging than a justifi-
cation one has. The problem for spelling it out in terms of a question-begging justification
is purely verbal: it is that a justification one has, either is not question-begging or it is not
a justification at all. Therefore one can not say “I would have a question-begging justifi-
cation”. One could spell it out in terms of the justification for which one believes a certain
proposition: If I believed the butler was left-handed for the reason that he committed the
crime, I would beg the question. For the justification for which I believe the butler did it
rests on the justification for which I believe that he is left-handed.)
Similarly, in my example, I would beg the question if I were to conclude that the object
I see belongs to X on the basis of my belief that X was in this wood. Similarly, according
to strong inferential internalism, inferring the conclusion (3) as a step towards justifying
L would beg the question.
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But neither individual piece of evidence is sufficient to confer
positive epistemic status on one proposition individually.
In that case there is a dependence between the positive epistemic status of
the two propositions: For each it is the case that if the other hadn’t positive
epistemic status, then it wouldn’t have positive epistemic status. I call this
relation “mutual dependence”.
The following three definitions summarize the difference between the three
mentioned dependence-relations.
P is a defeater for my reason for believing Q if and only if, all else
being equal, if I had a (sufficiently good) reason for believing P, then
I would not have the reason for believing Q (that I would otherwise
have).24
my reason for believing Q rests on my reason for believing P if and
only if, if I had not the reason for believing P , then I would not have
my reason for believing Q; but not vice versa: It would not be that
case that if I had not the reason for believing Q, then I would not have
my reason for believing P .
my reasons for believing P and Q mutually depend on each other
if and only if, if I had not the reason for believing P , then I would not
have my reason for believing Q; and vice versa.25
There are still other relations between justifications. For instance, if the sta-
tus of two distinct propositions exclusively rests on the status of the same
third proposition, then they happen to be justified only if the other is. Con-
sider the following example:
24For the purpose of comparison it is good to keep in mind that if P has positive
epistemic status, then ¬P has negative epistemic status. Minimalists hold that ¬L is
a defeater of the epistemic status of (3) in N . So the counterfactual relation obtaining
between the epistemic status of L and that of (3) is the following:
If L has negative negative epistemic status, then (3) has not the positive
epistemic status (that it would otherwise have).
25The counterfactuals in the text are to be contrasted with the kind of counterfactual
used in some (externalist) accounts of knowledge, e.g.Dretske [1970, 1971], Nozick [1981],
Sosa [2002]. Here we have a counterfactual dependence between reasons, not between facts
and the beliefs about them.
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I have good testimonial evidence for (A) from the example above,
i.e. There are infinitely many prime numbers greater than 100.
Arguably26 the two following propositions thereby acquire posi-
tive epistemic status for me:
(B) There are at least four prime numbers greater than 100.
(C) There are at least two prime numbers greater than 100.
So, the positive epistemic status’ of (B) and (C) both rest on the
justification for (A).
In that case, they are either both justified of unjustified, for their justification
rests on the same evidence. Either the evidence does confer positive epistemic
status on both (in fact all three) propositions, or, in the case epistemic status
is defeated, it confers positive epistemic status on none. One might speak
of co-instantiation of epistemic status. I will call this relation the “common
support relation” where I take “support” to designate the converse of the
resting-on relation. Transposed to the case of Wet Roads, someone could
claim that the justification for (3) and for L stand in the common support
relation. But this is, firstly, not very plausible. For what could support L
and at the same time together with (1) and (2) support (3)? Second, even
if there is something like this, the resulting theory would be very close to
strong inferential internalism. For it would entail that the justification for
(3) rests on some further proposition than the justification for (1) and (2). I
will therefore not consider this relation separately in what follows.
So, in principle, views of the relevance of L may differ with respect to which of
the several mentioned relations between the epistemic status of L and that of
(3) they claim to obtain: the defeater-relation, the resting-on relation, mutual
dependence, or the common support relation. It is important to distinguish
these different relations when examining the argument minimalists take to be
fatal for the exuberant views in section 2.3. Of the four mentioned relations,
minimalists hold that it is the defeater-relation, strong inferential internalism
26The example has the defect that it involves deductively inferential justification. So,
it assumes precisely one of the issues addressed in the paper, namely whether evidence
for (A) in itself confers justification upon (B) or (C) or whether for each there must be
additional evidence for a linking proposition. Such a linking proposition would differ with
respect to (B) and (C). In that case the epistemic status of (B) or (C) do not exclusively
rest on that for (A), and hence do not exclusively rest on the same justification. The
example therefore assumes that strong inferential internalism is false. However, since I am
here distinguishing different views (of the dependence between (3) and L) which need not
be compatible with one another, this does not matter.
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holds that it is the resting-on-relation. Coherentists may be tempted by the
claim that it is mutual dependence.
As said, strong inferential internalism implies that the epistemic status of
(3) rests on the epistemic status of L. This is a claim about a dependence-
relation. But the view is characterized by an explanatory claim, namely that
the attitude towards L explains why (3) has positive epistemic status. How-
ever, it is possible to appeal to the resting-on relation in order to explain the
epistemic status. There are different senses of “explaining the epistemic sta-
tus”. Someone might want to reductively explain epistemic status in general,
as when (some) reliabilists claim that justification can be naturalistically ex-
plained in terms of reliability. Such an explanation is not the issue here. For
if one epistemic status is explained by appeal to another on which it rests, the
explanation clearly appeals to the same normative notion. The explanation
at issue is less ambitious. It is possible, at least sometimes, by pointing to a
resting-on relation to make a given epistemic status less mysterious. In my
example of the object in the wood above, it is clear that one does not un-
derstand how I could be justified in believing that X was in the wood on the
basis of the perception, as long as one does not know that my justification
rests on a justification for the proposition that the object I see belongs to X.
Strong inferential internalism holds that just in this sense, the justification
the subject obtains in N for (3) is explainable by appeal to the resting-on
relation.
But besides the mentioned views of minimalism, strong inferential inter-
nalism, and claims that one of the two remaining mentioned dependence-
relations obtains, there is another view of the relevance of L in N . The
relations considered so far were all relations among epistemic status’. A pos-
sible different view is that in N there is a dependence relation between the
belief in (3) and an attitude towards L. On such a view the attitude towards
L partially explains why the subject believes (3). This implies a dependence
that can also be expressed in terms of a counterfactual. But this time the
relation is between beliefs (or attitudes):
psychological dependence: The subject does not believe L 2→ the sub-
ject does not believe (3).27
Endorsement of the psychological dependence claim, i.e. the claim that in N
the belief in (3) counterfactually depends on the attitude towards L, is one
of the characteristic claims of what I call the “psychological view”.
27I abbreviate the counterfactual conditional by the aid of “2→”.
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A proponent of the psychological view does not merely claim that the belief
in L somehow explains the belief in (3). For instance, it is no part of the view
that the belief in L plays that kind of non-justifying role in the belief forma-
tion, as in the usual illustrations of the difference between non-justifying and
justifying role of a belief. Here is an example of the common kind illustrating
the notion of a belief playing some non-justifying role in a belief-formation:
The detective in the story about the butler’s murder above comes
to believe that the butler did it in the following way: He hears
someone say that butlers are generally left-handed. The detective
finds this an obviously absurd claim. However, due to his believ-
ing that someone was talking about butlers and left-handedness
he comes to wonder wether in the present case one might deter-
mine whether the murderer is left-handed. Eventually he thereby
comes to justifiably believe that the butler committed the mur-
der. In that case it is true that if the detective didn’t have the
belief that he heard someone talking about left-handedness, he
wouldn’t have formed the belief that the butler is the murderer.
So, his belief that the butler committed the murder psycholog-
ically depends, in the way explained above, on the detective’s
belief that someone talks about left-handedness.
This is of course not the role the psychological view reserves for the belief in
L. The claim is that as a matter of one of the characteristic traits of situation
N the psychological dependence obtains. On page 14 I have characterized
N as a situation in which (a) the subject has a good epistemic reason to
believe (3), resp. (3) has positive epistemic status for the subject, and (b) the
subject believes (3) for this (good epistemic) reason.The dependence-relations
considered so far were only concerned with (a). But L, resp. an attitude
towards it, might be exclusively relevant for (b): such an attitude explains
why the subject believes (3). The attitude is partially responsible for the
fact that in N the subject believes (3) for that reason —and not for another
or for no reason at all. Suppose for the sake of simplicity that the attitude is
a belief in L. Then proponents of the psychological view hold the following:
By believing L the subject links the content of her premise-beliefs with the
content of her belief in (3). And it is in virtue of her making that link that
she comes to have (or sustains) her belief in (3).28 But her belief in L is not
28There are different interpretations of the claim that “it is in virtue of her making the
link that she comes to have (or sustains) her belief in (3)”. According to one interpretation
the subject comes to believe (3) in virtue of a reflective inference: an inference taking L,
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relevant for (a). The subject has in N a good epistemic reason to believe (3)
independently of her believing L.
Furthermore, one of the facts relevant for (b) is that the psychological depen-
dence of the belief in (3) on the beliefs in the premises is that characteristic of
deduction. The subject in N believes (3) for her good epistemic reasons (par-
tially) in virtue of deducing (3) from the premises. The psychological view
holds that the specifically deductive feature of the belief-formation involves
the subject’s bearing some attitude towards L. So, if the relevant feature of
N is made explicit, the psychological view holds the following:
deduction: If the subject believes (3) for her good deductive reason, then
(i) she believes L, and
(ii) she does not believe L 2→ she does not believe (3).
In general, the psychological view makes a connection between the explana-
tory role of the belief in the linking proposition and the fact that the belief
formation qualifies as a deductive inference: If a subject comes to believe
C as a result of a deductive inference from premises P , then the belief in
the linking proposition L partially explains why she believes (3). If a belief
formation is a deduction from P to C, then L plays an explanatory role.
The psychological view gives an answer to the question “What is a deductive
inference?”. It does not provide an answer to the question “Why is deductive
inference justified, resp. epistemically valuable?”.
The psychological view is (part of) an account of one kind of reasoning-
process. It is natural to suppose that for the psychological view the epis-
temic status of the attitude towards L is not relevant. Suppose still that
the attitude in question is a belief in L. That the reasoning process is a
deduction cannot depend on the question whether the belief is justified or
not. Whether the process is a deduction is a purely descriptive, psycholog-
ical question. The epistemic status of all the involved beliefs is therefore
irrelevant. I will later qualify this claim. But for the moment it provides
a further feature by which one can distinguish the psychological view from
strong inferential internalism.29
(1) and (2) as premises and concluding (3). See below in section 2.3 for the difficulties
this interpretation encounters.
29It is plausible that Klein [1999, fn 41] has a psychological view in mind, when he
suggests that it is a requirement on inferential justification that the subject believes L,
but not that she be justified in this belief (I have mentioned his suggestion on page 27).
But he does not (at this place) distinguish between having inferential justification and
being justified in inferentially basing the belief in the conclusion, i.e. between (a) and (b),
so that it is difficult to tell.
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So, there is a broad distinction between three distinct conceptions of the
relevance of L in N . The mere-defeater-conception endorsed by minimalists
holds that L is relevant insofar as ¬L is a defeater for the good epistemic
reason the subject has in N . Strong inferential internalism holds that the
subject in N has a good epistemic reason in virtue of having a reason to
believe or a reason to bear some other attitude towards L. The psychological
view in turn holds that the subject’s attitude towards L is responsible for the
fact that she believes (3) for her good epistemic reason. Minimalism, resp.
the mere-defeater-conception, and strong inferential internalism exclude each
other. This is not surprising, since they give different answers to the same
question, i.e. “Why does one have deductive justification in N ?”. The mere-
defeater-conception and the psychological view are compatible. Again, this
is not surprising since the two views give answers to different questions, i.e.
on the one hand the question about having justification, on the other the
question about deductively basing belief. In fact, it is here understood that
a proponent of the psychological view holds that with respect to (a), i.e. the
subject’s having of a good epistemic reason, the mere-defeater-conception is
correct. He claims that the intuitions which seem to support strong inferen-
tial internalism, namely intuitions to the effect that L is more involved than
merely as the negation of a defeater, in fact support the psychological view
instead.
In the remainder of this chapter, I will concentrate on three competing,
mutually exclusive views:
(I) Minimalism as endorsement of the mere-defeater-conception and de-
nial of the psychological view. L is only relevant as the negation of a
defeater of the reason for believing (3).
(II) Strong inferential internalism as holding that the justification for (3)
rests on and is partiallly explained by the justification for L and that
L is not relevant in any further way. In particular it is not relevant for
explaining why the subject believes (3) for her good epistemic reason.
(III) The psychological view as endorsement of the mere-defeater-conception
and the endorsement of the claim that an attitude towards L is par-
tially responsible for the fact that the subject believes (3) for her good
epistemic reason.
In this spectrum of views the psychological view is moderate in the sense
that it endorses the positive claim with respect to L of minimalism, i.e. the
mere-defeater-conception, but attributes a further role to L without going as
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far as to give L (resp. its epistemic status) the credit for the subject’s having
a good deductive reason.
Without doubt, strong inferential internalism faces fierce opposition. Many
people subscribe to the view loosely characterized by the following thesis:
In order to be justified in inferring (deductively or non-deductively), it is
not required to be justified in believing that the inference-rule is sound,
justification-conferring, probability-conferring or has any similar property.
Examples include Van Cleve [1984, 558], Klein [1999], Railton [2000], Boghos-
sian [2001, 2003, 2006], Bergmann [2004] and there are many others.30 As I
have said in note 1, there are important differences between the propositions
L and for instance the proposition the inference is justification-conferring.
But it is safe to say that these authors would, and some explicitly do, also
deny that in order to obtain deductive inferential justification, one is required
to justifiably believe L. In that case they deny strong inferential internalism.
They do not deny the psychological view, if that view does not entail that
the belief in L must be justified —as I have suggested above. Supporters
of (views similar to) strong inferential internalism include Fumerton [1995]
and Bonjour [1998]. Variants of the psychological view are defended in Audi
[1993, Chap. 8] and Leite [2004].
In section 2.3 I will discuss the minimalist’s incoherence-objection alluded to
in the introduction. This objection, if it cannot be deflected, is a powerful
argument for minimalism. I will develop two versions of this objection, one
against strong inferential internalism and one against the psychological view.
I will argue that the objection is more convincing against strong inferential
internalism than against the psychological view. In the final section (2.4)
I will begin to defend the psychological view. I will argue that it better
accounts for the fact that something goes wrong when the subject believes ¬L
than minimalism.
2.3 Two Carrollian arguments
In this section I discuss the minimalists main objection against all other
non-minimalist views. It is the intuitive problem to which Paul Boghossian
refers in the passage cited in section 2.1. This intuitive problem goes by
30People subscribing to the thesis just mentioned will also be inclined to subscribe to a
more general thesis about all sources of knowledge, not only inference: In order to acquire
knowledge through some source, it is not required to know that the source is reliable. In
the terminology of Stewart Cohen [2002] and others this is the claim that there is “basic
knowledge”.
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the name of the “Lewis-Carroll-Problem”, because it can be read into the
famous dialogue between the Tortoise and Achilles by Lewis Carroll [1895].
In fact, as has been noted, there are (at least) two distinct problems that
can be read into this dialogue. To each of the views that I have presented
as competing with minimalism applies only one of the two problems. On
the one hand there is a problem for the strong inferential internalist’s claim
that the epistemic status of (3) is dependent on and explainable by appeal
to the epistemic status of L. On the other hand there is a problem for the
psychological view’s claim that (occurrence of) the belief in (3) is explainable
by appeal to (the occurrence of) an attitude towards L.
The argument against strong inferential internalism
As said, according to strong inferential internalism, the positive epistemic
status of L explains why the subject has a reason to believe the conclusion
on the basis of the premises. But what is it to “explain why one is justified”?
It’s not an explanation of some belief-forming process. It’s an explanation of
something normative, namely that the subject has a reason to infer.31
I take all the following sentences to express the same or a similar question:
“In virtue of what does one have justification?", “What are the justification-
conferring facts?”, “Why does one have justification (on a given occasion)?”.
Accounts of epistemic justification provide general answers to these ques-
tions. Such accounts have certain ambitions. For instance, reliabilism wants
to give a reductive account of justification in naturalistic (non-normative)
terms. Other naturalistic accounts take the route of non-factualism about
normativity.32 Ambitious forms of internalism want the account of justifi-
cation to be such that it is knowable via reflection and a priori reasoning
whether we have justification or not.
31The most fully developed version of the argument I am about to give can be found
in Boghossian [2003]. My version differs from his in some respects, mostly a matter of
emphasis. First, his characterization of the view the argument is supposed to refute is
compatible with both strong inferential internalism and a variant of the psychological
view. Second, I put the emphasis on the argument’s power to refute an explanatory claim.
The Carrollian problem in my opinion is not so much that the attacked view gives rise to
a regress of reasons, as that it attempts to circularly explain why one has a reason. This
will become clearer in the text.
32If non-factualism about epistemic justification is true, then all that can be said in
explaining why certain kind of (fundamental) inferential steps are justified, is that these
are the fundamental modes of reasoning we accept. Nothing further is expressed by these
epistemic evaluations than that we fundamentally accept the mode in question [cf. Field,
1998, 2000, Gibbard, 1995].
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But these general questions about justification are not at issue here. Strong
inferential internalism, although perhaps committed to certain views on these
issues, attempts to explain much less. Consider again the example given
above about the object I perceive in the wood. Given only the information
that I see the object, it is in a very straightforward and uncontroversial sense
mysterious why this contributes to my having a reason to believe that X was
in the wood. And one reveals part of the mystery by giving the additional
information that I have a reason to believe that the object I see belongs to
X.33
As said, according to strong inferential internalism it is the fact that my
justification for the proposition X was in this wood rests on my justification
for the proposition The object I see belongs to X that carries the explanatory
burden. For the argument that follows, it is important to insist on this
double aspect of strong inferential internalism. This view does not merely
claim that the justification for (3) rests on the justification for L, but also
that this explains why one has inferential justification for L in N . The two
theses are the following:
(A) The justification of (3) inN rests on the justification for L. (dependence-
claim)
(B) That in N one has justification for (3) can be partly explained by appeal
to A. (explanatory claim)
According to one reading of Carroll’s dialogue, it shows that one cannot
explain why one has justification for a given fundamental kind of deductive
inference by appeal to the justification for the logical belief, because such
an explanation is circular. Consider the case of Wet Roads. There is an
33There are cases where it is in fact a controversial issue whether there is a mystery
about why one has a reason or not. For instance, proponents of inferential accounts of
perceptual justification would perhaps claim that it is mysterious how the mere perception
of an object gives me a reason to believe that there is such an object. They would argue
that just as in the example above one needs some additional information, in particular
something like the information that the subject has a reason to believe that she has a
perceptual state and that this state indicates the truth of its content. Their opponents
would argue that it is not at all mysterious in the first place how the perceptual state
can contribute to the subject’s having a reason. They would perhaps claim that this
appears mysterious only for those with misguided general views on justification. Similarly
in the case of deduction, minimalists would perhaps argue against the strong inferential
internalist that it is not mysterious how the justified premises can confer justification
upon the conclusion. However, the example of the object I see in the wood is not such a
controversial case. In that case the additional information is clearly required to understand
why I have a reason to believe that X was in the wood.
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important disanalogy between an appeal, in the course of an explanation,
to the fact that the subject has justification for (2), the conditional, and
an appeal to the fact that the subject has justification for the proposition
that (1) and (2) entail (3), i.e. L. When one wonders why a subject having
justification for (1), i.e. It is raining outside, in a given circumstance has
justification for (3), i.e. The roads are wet, the information that in the
circumstance the subject has justification for (2), i.e. the conditional, reveals
part of the mystery why she has justification for (3).
It is difficult to say why this explanation is successful. One aspect of it is that,
given the additional information about (2), the set34 of justified propositions
that confer justification upon another, i.e. the set of the premises, bears a
necessary relation to the proposition upon which justification is conferred, i.e.
the conclusion. That is, the truth of L seems to make such an explanation
possible. Without (2), the contents (1) and (3) are unrelated. With (2)
premises and conclusion are related in the manner expressed by L. So, one
aspect of the explanation is that it reveals a necessary connection among
the (or some)35 propositions involved in the inference. Furthermore there is
something general about the connection between premises and conclusion.
The propositions are necessarily connected due to logical form. (1), (2), (3)
have the following logical form (“p” etc. are proposition-schemata): p, If p,
then q, q. So, the explanation allows to see the connection between the three
propositions as an instance of a general connection among propositions with
a certain logical form.
Another aspect of the explanation seems to be that the additional information
allows to see the subject’s transition to conform to a general principle of
reasoning. Again, it is in virtue of the logical form of the three propositions
that the transition conforms to the principle. The principle can be stated
thus:
MPP-reasoning: Believe q, if you believe p and if p, then q! (Or else give
up p or If p, then q!)
Of course the two mentioned aspects of the explanation, i.e. on the one
hand that there is a necessary connection between all or some of the involved
propositions, on the other hand that there is a general principle linking the
beliefs in the premises with the belief in the conclusion, are connected. But
34Or a subset of that set. See footnote 35.
35According to strong inferential internalism, L is also involved in the inference. In order
to remain neutral at this point one must say that it reveals the connection among some
of the involved propositions.
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there is no simple correspondence. It is not sufficient for a transition to
conform to a principle of reasoning that the propositions stand in a necessary
connection. As has been noted many times, there are propositions that
stand in a necessary connection to each other, even in virtue of logical form,
although there is no justified direct inference from the one to the other. That
is, there is no principle of reasoning linking the one directly, i.e. without
any further propositions, to the other. Take any example of a proposition
entailing another where even the best logician needs to construct a proof in
several steps. The direct step from the first to the second is not justified
and there is no general principle of reasoning linking the beliefs in them.
Furthermore, it is generally agreed that there are principles of non-deductive
reasoning that link beliefs in propositions that do not stand in a necessary
relation to each other. So there is no simple correspondence between the two
aspects of the successful explanation. I will content myself with pointing to
these two aspects without claiming that one or the other is more fundamental
in understanding why the explanation is successful. For the argument against
strong inferential internalism it is not necessary to endorse any further claim.
For, according to that argument, both aspects are missing in the strong
inferential internalist’s alleged further explanation by appeal to L.
The strong inferential internalist’s opponent claims that no similar advance
in understanding can be achieved by an appeal to the justification for L.
It is not possible to subsume Wet Roads under a more general, or in some
other way explanatorily more fundamental principle in virtue of the subject’s
further belief in L. And it is not possible to establish any tighter connection
between the set {(1), (2), L} and (3) than the relation that obtained between
the set {(1), (2)} and (3). The relation in both cases is entailment. Surely
there is no sense in which including L makes the connection between the set
of the premises and the conclusion tighter.36
Nothing here speaks against claiming that a belief in L is involved. But on the
supposition that MPP-reasoning is one of our fundamental forms of correct
reasoning, the belief can at best be involved as part of reasoning of the form
corresponding to that very same principle or a no more fundamental other
principle. For instance, someone could correctly infer from L the proposition
36In a relatively early paper on the Lewis-Carroll-Problem by J.F. Thomson [1960]
entitled “What Achilles should have said to the tortoise” the observation that no “tighter”
logical relation than entailment can obtain is claimed to be sufficient to avoid the problem.
This seems to miss the aspect to which I allude here as that of conforming to a principle
of reasoning. A step to a conclusion entailed by a set of premises can fail to conform to
a principle of reasoning. In that case addition of further premises, although not altering
the kind of logical relation between premises and conclusion, may well have the effect that
the step now conforms to a principle of reasoning.
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If (1) and (2), then (3) (by another principle of reasoning)37. From If (1)
and (2), then (3) and (1) and (2), she could then infer (3). But obviously
this last step is just another instance of MPP-reasoning. So, this alleged
explanation is circular.38
And even if it is false that MPP-reasoning describes one of our fundamental
principles of reasoning, the same Carrollian argument would apply to what-
ever is a fundamental principle. As Boghossian says, at some point, we have
finished explaining by appeal to further beliefs about the relation between the
contents. At some point the principles by which reasoning is evaluated are
reached. And while one can still try to explain why the principle plays a role
in determining what a subject has an epistemic reason to believe, one cannot
do so by appeal to further beliefs of the subject and more general principles.
I have given the argument in a form that directly challenges the strong in-
ferential internalist’s explanatory claim (p. 39). In this form the argument
refutes the idea that the information that the justification for (3) rests on
the justification for L can explain why (3) has positive epistemic status in
N . The moral to be drawn is that the strong inferential internalist’s ex-
planation is circular. But often when the Carrollian argument is presented
or mentioned the accent is put on a regress. This is of course in line with
Lewis Carroll’s original dialogue which, it is suggested, is never ending. If
the accent is put on the regress, one is led to think that the problem for
37 Something like:
modal reasoning: Believe q, if you believe 2q! (Or else give up 2q!)
38 The following adaption of the Carrollian dialogue illustrates the predicament of strong
inferential internalism as I understand it:
A: Why is S’ step from p to q justified?
B: Because S’ also believes that if p, then q.
A: I see, S infers q from p and if p, then q. This seems OK.
A: But wait, thinking of it, why is S’ step from p and if p, then q to q justified?
B: Oh, because S also justifiably believes that that step preserves the truth.
A: I see, S infers q from p, if p, then q and if ‘p’ and ‘if p, then q’, then q.
A: But I still don’t get it. Why is S justified in taking the last inferential step?
B: (in a mood of despair) Because S believes that that last step preserves the truth.
Here B and A do not directly appeal to the proposition corresponding to L, but rather the
one corresponding to If (1) and (2), then (3). There is a difference, but it is ultimately
irrelevant to the argument against explanation. There does not seem to be an explanatorily
more fundamental principle linking belief in L, (1) and (2) and the conclusion (3).
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the attacked view, here strong inferential internalism, is that it commits the
proponent of the view to the claim that a subject who justifiably infers must
have an infinity of justified beliefs. It is possible to illustrate the fact that
an explanation is circular by giving the basically same explanation over and
over again.39 But one should not conclude from this that the problem for
strong inferential internalism lies in the fact it is committed to the claim that
a subject who justifiably deductively infers must have an infinity of justified
beliefs or justification for an infinity of propositions, i.e. the propositions
corresponding to L on infinitely many further levels.
It is in the aim of keeping the problem of circular explanation and the prob-
lem of requiring justification for infinitely many propositions apart that I
have distinguished on page 39 between the strong inferential internalist’s
explanatory claim and her dependence claim. Her motivation for the depen-
dence claim is the explanatory claim. Suppose there is another motivation
for the dependence-claim. The justification for (3) rests on the justification
for L. Suppose further for the sake of illustration that it also rests on the
justification for the infinitely many propositions of the form of L but taking
as antecedent always the set of premises one level below (the consequent is
always (3)). For instance, at the level next to one where one appeals to L
the proposition is the following: (1), (2) and L entail (3). Given these sup-
positions, a subject only has justification for (3), when it has justification
for an infinity of further propositions. This is problematic, but not as ob-
viously problematic as a circular explanation. It is not generally impossible
to have justification for infinitely many propositions. After all, when one
has justification for a general proposition about an infinite population (e.g.
numbers), then one has justification for an infinity of propositions. Now, the
issue here is not only having an infinity of reasons, but furthermore having
an infinite chain of reasons each resting on the preceding one. When I have
one (or a finite number) of reasons justifying a general proposition about
an infinite population, I have an infinity of reasons. But it is the one (or
the finite number of) reason(s) for the general proposition on which all the
others rest. However, it is not wholly implausible to suggest that one and the
same capacity provides me in a sort of “inductive way” (in the mathematical
sense of “inductive”, not the epistemological) with the infinity of reasons for
the infinity of propositions and with an infinity of reasons for the general
proposition. The reasons for the individual propositions do hence not rest on
the reason(s) for the general proposition. If there is a one way dependence,
then rather in the other way: the reason for the general proposition depends
on the infinity of reasons for the individual propositions. In the same vain, it
39I do this in footnote 38.
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is not wholly implausible that whatever capacity allows the subject to have
a reason for L, also provides a reason for any similar proposition “higher up”.
Of course, I cannot vindicate here the claim that reasons can be arranged
in such a way. Nevertheless, I think one can conclude that the regress of
reasons is not obviously vicious.40 But even if such a regress of justifications
is not vicious, this does not help the strong inferential internalist. For his
explanation of the inferential justification of (3) is still circular. So, it is not
so much the dependence claim as the explanatory claim which in my eyes
seriously undermines strong inferential internalism.
My rendering of the argument explicitates the traditional diagnosis of the
Lewis-Carroll-Problem: L should not play the role of a further premise. It
seems at first, that strong inferential internalism does not make this mistake.
For, he attributes to L not the same, but a more important or fundamental
role than that of the premises. That the subject has a reason for L is supposed
to explain why the reasons for the premises provide a reason for (3). However,
it turns out, that the only way the justification for L could help explain why
(3) is justified is in the way (2) (or in the example about the object in the
wood the proposition The object I see belongs to X) helps to explain it, and
this is as a premise. So, the traditional diagnosis seems right to me; but
sometimes people think that it is the Tortoise’ avoidable mistake to think of
L’s role as that of a premise. This line is not available to the strong inferential
internalist, for as a premise seems to be the only way L could play the role
strong inferential internalism reserves for it.
The Lewis-Carroll-Problem as developed here poses a serious threat to strong
inferential internalism. I have not provided a full discussion of the problem.
There might be some further moves and objections a strong inferential in-
ternalist would want to consider.41 But the view I want to defend is the
psychological view. Therefore it is more important to determine whether a
version of the Lewis-Carroll-Problem poses a similarly strong threat to the
psychological view.
40That that particular regress, i.e. a regress concerning propositions such as L in the
course of inferential justification, is not vicious is suggested by C. Wright [2001]. Wright
does, following Boghossian, not distinguish between the explanatory regress and the regress
of dependences. For other epistemic regresses and the claim that one can have justification
for an infinity of propositions, see [Sosa, 1980, Klein, 1999].
41I discuss in more detail a version of the Lewis-Carroll-Problem as it pertains to a view
similar to strong inferential internalism, but appealing to a proposition about epistemic
support instead of L, in chapter 4.4.
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The argument against the psychological view
I will continue talking of a belief in L, even though the psychological view
may appeal to other attitudes instead. According to the psychological view
the subject believes (3) in virtue of making the link between {(1), (2)} and
(3) via a belief in L. But this is not an exact description of the psychological
role of her belief in L. How does she “make a link” between premises and
conclusion via belief in L? Perhaps by making an inference involving L as
a premise. But this leads to a circularity-problem analogous to the one
encountered by strong inferential internalists.
The problem can be posed in the following way.42 The psychological view
claims that the belief in L partially explains why the subject believes (3). Her
making the link between premises and conclusion via belief in L is responsible
for her belief in (3). More particularly the causal efficacy of the belief in
L is responsible for the fact that the occurrence of the sequence of beliefs
corresponding to Wet Roads is a rational form of belief-transition. There
are rational and “arational” belief-transitions. For instance, suppose in the
following sequence of propositions, the belief in any one is causally responsible
for the belief in the following one: Here is a hat; Paul has a hat; Paul’s
apartment is nice; I should buy some flowers to put on my kitchen table.
This belief-transition is arational in the sense that each belief plays a non-
justifying role in the transition to the following belief. In contrast, in N the
premises of Wet Roads play a justifying role, the transition the conclusion is
therefore a rational form of belief-transition. According to the psychological
view the fact that a belief in the linking-proposition is partially responsible
for the transition from premises to conclusion marks the different between a
rational and an arational belief-transition.
That a belief-transition is rational, does on this meaning of “rational” not
imply that the belief in the conclusion is justified. A belief-transition can be
of a rational form when, for instance, the premise-beliefs are unjustified and
hence the conclusion unjustified too. Therefore if the belief in L is needed to
explain why the transition is of a rational form, it does not thereby explain
why the subject has inferential justification for (3). In order to be justified in
believing (3) in N the transition must be rational in this sense, but in order
to have inferential justification, the subject need not even believe (3).
The Lewis-Carroll-Problem arises for this view as follows: In what sense
is the causal efficacy of the belief in L to mark the difference between the
42My exposition of the problem does not differ greatly from the exposition in Stroud
[1979]. For basically the same problem, posed as a challenge to account for the motivational
force of logical reasons, see also Engel [2005]
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arational belief-transition above and Wet Roads? For the only way in which
a belief in L could be responsible for the belief in (3) that could plausibly
count as rational would be when L is a premise in a reflective inference (i.e.
an inference taking (1) and (2) again as premises) to the conclusion that (3).
But in that case, the explanation must appeal to the claim that the reflective
inference is more primitively (in a more explanatorily fundamental manner)
a rational process. But since Wet Roads and L are of the same form, this
cannot be true. It remains still to be explained why the reflective inference
is a rational belief-transition.
It is true that we can imagine a transition corresponding to Wet Roads, that
is not rational in the sense explained. This happens when, to use the Stroud’s
phrase [Stroud, 1979, 186-187], the subject does not “put her premises to-
gether” and thereby fails to see the connection between them. So, the subject
has to put the premises together by having the belief in L in order for the
transition to be rational. The problem is that the “putting together of the
premises” is to be causally efficacious. And then it seems that for the contri-
bution of the linking-belief to be of the rational kind, the subject must “put
together” linking-belief and premises.
This version of the Lewis-Carroll-Problem again exploits the fact that L can
play a role similar to (2) in an inference of the same MPP-form involving
more complex propositions. But this time the similarity is not with respect
to the role in conferring justification upon (3), but in explaining the (oc-
currence or sustenance of the) belief in (3). In the argument against strong
inferential internalism it seemed that L could play no other role in order to
satisfy the explanatory goal set by strong inferential internalism. The cor-
responding claim in the version against the psychological view seems much
less convincing. The crucial question is wether the belief in L must be used
in an inference (hence as a premise) in order to explain the belief in (3). The
psychological view is not committed to this claim. Why could not the belief
in L contribute in some other way to the belief in (3)? It is not obvious
that it then couldn’t mark the difference between a rational and an arational
belief-transition. But the psychological view must then provide an alterna-
tive explanation of the belief in (3) involving the belief in L. I will not sketch
such an explanation in this chapter.43 In what follows I simply assume that
there is such an explanation.
43This will be done in chapter 3.
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2.4 An argument for the psychological view
In this section I will argue that the psychological view better accounts for a
certain intuition than minimalism. Of course, such an argument makes only
sense if the psychological view is a coherent position that can overcome the
Lewis-Carroll-Problem from section 2.3. But for the time being let us assume
that this is the case. Even so, the argument I give here does not have the
force to convince anyone who does not already find the psychological view
plausible. Rather, if the argument works, it establishes a certain theoretical
advantage of the psychological view over minimalism. Normally the place for
such a relatively weak argument is after one has exposed and given the main
motivation for one’s view. Still, the argument belongs in this chapter, because
it directly touches on and further clarifies the relation between evidence and
attitudes discussed in section 2.2.
The intuition to which I want to appeal is the following. On page 23 a context
C was introduced with the following characteristics: While being otherwise
like N , C is such that the subject does not have any evidence against L,
but all the same believes ¬L. Intuitively, in such a situation inferring the
conclusion (3) does not seem right.
This intuition may be disputed. In particular, someone who thinks that
the whole question of L’s relevance does not even arise in the first place
would certainly deny the intuition. Someone might think that L is not even
relevant in the way the minimalist thinks it is. She could argue for such a
view for instance by pointing out that animals and very young children draw
deductive inferences without even being capable of understanding L. So, the
argument continues, L cannot be relevant for adults either. In this chapter
I simply assume that this position is false. The point I want to make here
is that it would be odd for a minimalist, i.e. someone who accepts that ¬L
is a defeater, to reject the intuition. Indeed, it would be odd to say that
having evidence against L undermines the justification for one’s belief in (3),
but that it is perfectly all right to believe ¬L, provided one does not have
evidence for such a belief.
Given the intuition is accepted by both the minimalist and the proponent of
the psychological view, one can ask whether both views account for it in the
same way. In particular there appear to be two possible diagnoses of what
goes wrong in C:
(i) The subject’s justification for (3) is undermined, i.e. the subject does
not have justification for (3).
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(ii) Although the subject does have justification for (3), resp. does have a
good epistemic reason for (3) (because C resembles N enough), it is not
rational for her to believe (3) for this reason.
I will argue that a minimalist will give the first answer, i.e. (i), while a
proponent of the psychological view will give the second, i.e. (ii). But first I
have to explain how these answers differ from each other.
The distinction between options (i) and (ii) supposes that there are two ways
in which a certain belief can be evaluated. It supposes that one can evaluate
whether the reason is good and in addition whether it is rational to believe
for that reason. But this might seem odd at first. Is the question not whether
a given belief is rational the same as whether there are good reasons for it?
But in the general theory of normativity (or “meta-ethics”) it is now common
to distinguish between two sorts of evaluations. The distinction is expressed
in terms of “subjective” vs. “objective”, or “internal” vs. “external” reasons,
or sometimes between “having a reason” to act vs. “it being rational” (being
under a rational requirement) to act. John Broome [2000] has explicitly
addressed the issue in terms of epistemic reasons, not only practical ones.
He has argued that for a case of simple MPP such as Wet Roads, one is
under a rational requirement to believe the conclusion, when one believes
the premises, even in the case where one does not have a reason to believe
the premises and, thus (everyone agrees), when one does not have a reason to
believe the conclusion. Similarly in the practical case, to take a well known
example, when I want to drink gin and believe that the liquid in the bottle
before me is gin, then I am under the rational requirement to choose to drink
the liquid in the bottle. But given that what is in the bottle is petrol and
I do not want to drink nor have any other reason to drink petrol, I have no
reason to choose to drink the liquid in the bottle. So, there are two ways
in which beliefs and intentions to act can be evaluated, namely whether the
subject is under a rational requirement to be (or get) in the state in question
(i.e. the intention or the belief), or whether she has a reason to be (or get)
in the state.44
How can the difference between having a reason and being under a rational
requirement be characterized in a general way? Kolodny [2005, 509] says the
following:
When we say “you ought to” in the sense of “you have reason
to”, we usually seem to be saying something about the relation
44For discussion of this distinction, [cf. Williams, 1981a, Broome, 2000, Scanlon, 1999,
Wedgwood, 2003, Kolodny, 2005].
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between your situation and your attitudes. When we say “you
ought to” in the sense of “it would be irrational not to”, we seem
to be saying something about the relation between your attitudes,
viewed in abstraction from the reasons for them. We are saying
something, for example, about whether your beliefs are logically
consistent, or whether your intentions for ends cohere with your
intentions for means —things that are true, if they are, quite
independently of whether there is reason for you to have any of
those beliefs or intentions.
In characterizing the distinction in this way, Kolodny does clearly not aim at
explaining the two notions. They are merely characterized in relation to one
another. So, if we grasp the notion expressed by “having a reason to”, then
we can contrast it with the notion expressed by “being under a rational re-
quirement to”, as something that applies to an agent in virtue of the relation
among attitudes, irrespective of the reasons for them (i.e. whether one has
reason to have these attitudes). The characterization of being a reason for
as a relation between your actual situation and your attitude must also be
understood in contrast with the notion of being under a rational requirement.
If we grasp the notion expressed by “being under a rational requirement to”,
then we can contrast it with the notion expressed by “having a reason to”
as something that applies to an agent in virtue of further aspects of the
agent’s situation than what is relevant for the rational requirement. I think
this characterization of the distinction is sufficiently clear for what follows
without presupposing to much about epistemic justification, i.e. having an
epistemic reason for.
There are a lot of debated issues surrounding this distinction. For instance,
what is the exact form of rational requirements? Can rational requirements
be explained by appeal to reasons, or is the direction of explanation the other
way around, or can neither be explained by appeal to the other? I can of
course not address these questions here. The important point is that the
distinction applies to the case at hand. According to the intuition mentioned
above, something is wrong when the subject believes (3) in context C. But
wrong in which way? We can ask whether the belief in ¬L makes it the case
that the subject does not have a reason to believe (3), or whether it makes
it the case that in believing (3), the subject violates a rational requirement.
Let us begin by exploring the first option, i.e. that in virtue of the belief
in ¬L the subject looses the reason to believe (3) that she would otherwise
(namely in context N ) have. But one cannot loose a reason merely in virtue
of a rational requirement. With respect to the example above, suppose that
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I have in the circumstance a reason not (to want) to drink the petrol. For
instance, because it is very unhealthy to drink petrol. I could loose this
reason. (If I lost it, I would not necessarily have a reason to (want to) drink
the petrol, but I would no longer have a reason not (to want) to drink it.)
But merely believing that it is gin cannot make me loose my reason not (to
want) to drink it, although I am now rationally required (to want) to drink it.
It is still unhealthy to drink petrol and there is still no outweighing benefit
from my drinking it. My reasons for or against drinking the petrol in front
of me have not changed at all. Instead, if the situation changed in such a
way that I acquired a good reason to do something very unhealthy in the
circumstance —for instance if I acquired a very good reason to get ill— then
I would loose my reason not to want to drink petrol. To give an example for
the case of theoretical reasons, consider the following (somewhat worn out)
situation:
I see somebody who looks like Tom stealing a book from the
library. And actually it is Tom. Suppose this provides me with
a reason to believe that Tom stole a book from the library. But
his father tells me that he has a twin-brother who also goes to
the library sometimes. But I have good reasons to believe that
Tom’s father will lie through his teeth in order to save his son from
trouble. And Tom does not have a twin-brother. Still somehow,
against good reason, I come to believe that Tom has a twin-
brother.
Do I have a reason to believe that Tom stole a book from the library? It
seems that I have, for I have a good reason to believe it, because I saw him.
And I have no reason to mistrust appearances. In order to have reason to
mistrust appearances, I would need to have undefeated reasons to believe
that Tom has a twin-brother. But the father’s lie does not provide me with
such an undefeated reason, for I have a reason to mistrust the father. So,
my unjustified belief that Tom has a brother cannot undermine my reason to
believe that he stole a book from the library. Of course, this does not imply
that there is nothing wrong with my believing, on the one hand, that Tom
stole the book on the basis of my seeing someone with such appearances,
and on the other hand, that Tom has a twin-brother. But the problem is not
that I have no reason to believe that Tom stole the book.
If believing ¬L is to change/undermine the subject’s reason to believe (3),
then, according to the characterization above, we are to consider the atti-
tudes, as well as the reasons for them. Or, in other words, we are to consider
more aspects of the situation than if only a rational requirement is the issue.
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So, the belief in ¬L cannot be relevant irrespective of the reasons for ¬L.
For only attitudes for which there are reasons can undermine other reasons.
This means, that if option (i) is to be pursued, in C the subject has a reason
for ¬L. Since, by supposition, she does not have evidence in favor of ¬L, this
commits one to affirmativism. According to affirmativism, a belief has in the
absence of evidence for and against the proposition in question a prima facie
positive epistemic status, i.e. it provides one with a prima facie reason for
believing the proposition. According to option (i), in C the belief in ¬L un-
dermines the subject’s reason to believe (3). This it can only do, because in
virtue of having that belief and not having evidence against ¬L, the subject
has a reason to believe ¬L.
Of course, one could object to this account, because one finds affirmativism
implausible. It is clear that affirmativism is not orthodoxy at the moment.
But there is a much more straightforward objection to this account, indepen-
dently of one’s acceptance of affirmativism. The problem is that the intuition
persists, even when the subject has evidence against ¬L. Even in a context
C∗ otherwise similar to N in which the subject believes ¬L, but has evidence
in favor of L, something is wrong. Suppose someone I recognize as being very
good at logic affirms that L. Nevertheless I believe ¬L (in favor of which I
still do not have any evidence). If in that circumstance I base my belief in (3)
on (1) and (2), something is still wrong. But even according to affirmativism
in such a circumstance there is no reason to believe ¬L, i.e. the belief in ¬L
is unjustified. Hence, this belief cannot undermine my reason for (3). It is
then clear that in C∗, what is wrong can not be that my reason for (3) is
defeated. Therefore we can discard option (i) also for context C. Or at least,
if we persist in affirmativism and claim that in C the subject does not have
a reason to believe (3), we must admit that even in C something additional
is wrong. The upshot is that option (i), i.e. the diagnosis that the only
thing that is wrong in C is that the subject does not have a reason for (3),
can be discarded. The problem with believing ¬L must be that it leads to
irrationality.
Let us then turn to option (ii). This is the claim that the subject violates a
rational requirement when in C or C∗, she believes ¬L and bases her belief in
(3) on (1) and (2). So, although —at least in C∗— she has a reason to believe
(3), it is irrational for her to do so. There is a certain internal inconsistency
between her attitudes. And this is bad irrespectively of the reasons for these
attitudes.
But between which states does the inconsistency arise? (3) and ¬L are
not inconsistent. And (1)-(3) and ¬L do not form an inconsistent set of
propositions either. ¬L merely implies that it is possible that not all of (1)-
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(3) are true,45 it does not imply that one of (1)-(3) is false, if at least one
other is true. Furthermore, the intuitive problem in C or C∗ is not that (1)-
(3) and ¬L are all four believed. The problem is rather that (3) is deduced
from or based on (1) and (2). This serves the psychological view very well .
For according to this view it is precisely in virtue of the fact that the subject
bears an attitude towards L, that she deduces (3) from (1)-(2), or bases her
belief in (3) on her beliefs in (1) and (2). And, of course, L and ¬L are
inconsistent. And thus, on this view the subject has inconsistent attitudes
in C and C∗ and therefore violates a rational requirement.
The minimalist on the other hand denies precisely that the subject in any
of these contexts, including N , bears an attitude towards L. But if what is
wrong in C and C∗ is that a rational requirement is violated, the minimalist
is hard-pressed to explain how a rational requirement could be violated in
these contexts. It appears that she has no good explanation for the fact,
if it is a fact, that something is wrong in C or C∗. While with respect to C
the minimalist could by endorsing affirmativism hope to give an explanation,
this, as we have seen, is not possible with respect to C∗.
I will briefly raise two objections to this argument, both of which are useful
in order to evaluate the argument and relativize its force. The first objection
is that as long as we do not have a better grip on what rational requirements
there are, it is premature to claim that they can only be violated when there
are (logically) inconsistent attitudes. Perhaps there is a rational requirement
that is violated precisely when (3) is deduced from (1) and (2) and ¬L is
believed, without there having in addition to be an attitude (or a set of
attitudes) which is inconsistent with ¬L.
I completely agree with the first part of the objection. The argument depends
on the claim that rational requirements are only violated when there are
inconsistencies among believed (or otherwise accepted) propositions. But I
have not provided a defense of this claim, nor have I characterized the form of
rational requirements. And I agree that it is not clear that they only require
not to hold logically inconsistent attitudes. For instance, it is plausible that
there is a requirement not to be in the state of believing the following two
propositions, even though they are not logically inconsistent:
45As pointed out to me by Gianfranco Soldati and Martine Nida-Rümelin my formulation
here is misleading and strictly speaking incorrect. It is not possible that (1)-(2) are true
and (3) false, since this is logically impossible. For L is true. Furthermore, the logical
falsehood ¬L is prone to render any set of propositions of which it is a member inconsistent.
So, what I should be saying is that there is (at least one) quadruple of propositions (or
proposition-schemata) where one relates the others as a linking proposition such that the
falsehood of the linking proposition is compatible with the truth of the other three.
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• I have overall (epistemic) reasons to believe p.
• ¬p
There are other examples of plausible requirements of a similar form.46 How-
ever, even if it is quite right, that if rational requirements turn out to have
different forms than the one to which the proponent of the psychological view
appeals in order to vindicate her claim that the subject believe L, her argu-
ment does not go through quite as easily. In particular, perhaps she must
appeal to a different attitude than a belief in L. But what I find implausi-
ble is that the irrationality in C and C∗ is primitive. There must be some
additional attitude or other which in some way conflicts with the belief in
¬L. How could the belief in ¬L conflict with the fact that the subject bases
her belief in (3) on (1) and (2), if all there is to the basing-relation is that
a certain kind of causal route leads from the beliefs in the premises to the
belief in the conclusion?
The second objection is more important and I announce from the start that I
cannot satisfyingly rebut it in this chapter. I have hinted at the idea behind
this objection while considering briefly on page 22 a possible reply on behalf
of the minimalist to Greco’s suggestive point. The idea is that the intuition
in favor of any relevance of L in N , stems from the fact that the examples
such as Wet Roads are such that while they are claimed to be basic cases
of deductive inference, the way they are presented makes us think of other,
non-basic cases. And the intuition that L is relevant has its source in the fact
that in the non-basic cases of which we come to think instead of the basic
cases, L is relevant. But in these non-basic cases L simply is a premise. So,
the intuition applies not to N , but to a similar situation N ∗, in which the
inference is not Wet Roads, but the following:
46Scanlon [1999, 25-32] calls violation of these and similar requirements “irrationality
narrowly construed”. And it is these that he contrasts with “not doing what is the best
thing to do” which corresponds more or less to what I have called “having a reason” or
perhaps “having an overall reason to do”. In a similar spirit Kolodny [2005] argues that
all requirements of rationality, when properly specified, have a similar form, i.e. they are
requirements to conform one’s beliefs and intentions with one’s judgments about what
one has most reason to do or believe. According to him (I simplify quite a bit) there is
no rational requirement to believe q, when one believes p and p implies q in itself. The
requirement arises only when one further judges that one has better reasons for p and p
implies q, than one has reasons against q. Unfortunately I cannot discuss this here.
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(1*) If it rains, the roads are wet.
(2*) It rains.
(3*) It rains and If it rains, the roads are wet.
(4*) Necessarily, if It rains and If it rains, the roads are wet,
then the roads are wet. (L)
(5*) The roads are wet.
And because we think of cases where the reasoning takes this more compli-
cated form, we have rightly the intuition that L is relevant. But in fact for
the simple cases it is not. And, of course, if the case is of the more com-
plicated form, it is irrational for the subject to believe ¬L. For this belief
conflicts with her belief in one of the premises, L. But in the simple cases
where the inference is really Wet Roads, a belief in ¬L does not result in an
irrationality at all.
For someone who levels this objection against the psychological view, it would
be natural also to deny that evidence against L can defeat one’s justification
in N . According to such a person, the idea that ¬L is a defeater is the
product of the same confusion between N and N ∗ that gives raise to the
mistaken idea that the subject is irrational in C.
In this chapter, I must let this objection stand. But I hope that once the
psychological view is properly motivated and qualified, it can be addressed.
Chapter 3
The Psychological View
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3.1 Introduction
Suppose a subject successfully deduces a conclusion from a set of premises.
Must she be aware of the logical fact that the premises entail the conclu-
sion? This question hides two distinct further questions, namely “Must she
be aware of the logical fact in order to have deductive justification?” and
“Must she be aware of the logical fact in order for her belief-formation to
qualify as a deduction?” Views on the relation between justifiably deducing
and being aware of the logical fact of the form [premises] entail [conclusion]
are motivated by these two very different questions. On the one hand the
view can aim at explaining why one has in a given circumstance deductive
justification. According to one of these views, strong inferential internalism,
the subject does not have deductive justification, unless she is aware of the
fact that the premises entail the conclusion. On the other hand a view can
aim at explaining why in a given circumstance what the subject does or un-
dergoes is a deduction. According to one of these views the subject does not
deduce her belief in the conclusion from the premises, unless she has some
sort of awareness of the proposition of the form [premises] entail [conclusion].
This is the sort of view I have called “the psychological view”. 1
We have imagined a circumstance N in which a subject, as it was said,
“believes (3) by going through the inference Wet Roads”:
(1) It is raining outside.
(2) If it rains outside, the roads are wet.
(3) The roads are wet.
What it means to be “going through an inference” was deliberately left vague.
One could express the same idea by saying that in N the subject believes (3)
“by basing her belief on the inference Wet Roads”.2 I have pointed to two
features of N of interest to epistemology, namely:
1Throughout this passage I use “being aware of a fact or a proposition” in a very loose
sense. It can mean that one knows that the fact obtains, that one justifiably believes that
it obtains, that one merely believes that it obtains or, even, that one has some weaker
attitude than belief towards it, e.g. that one provisionally accepts the proposition. I will
become more precise in the course of the chapter.
2“Belief based on inference” is the locution used in Harman [1964], a paper entitled
“How belief is based on inference”.
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(a) The subject has a good epistemic reason to believe (3) partially in virtue
of justifiably believing (1) and (2).
(b) The subject believes (3) for her good deductive reason (provided at least
partially by her justified beliefs in (1) and (2)).3
In this chapter I will be concerned with condition (b). But the psychological
view is an alternative to strong inferential internalism. Thus we can for the
purpose of this chapter assume that concerning (a) it is not the case that
the subject has a good epistemic reason partially in virtue of a being aware
of the logical fact. In fact I will assume for this chapter that no other belief
than (1) and (2) is involved in the subject’s having a good epistemic reason
to believe (3).
Condition (b) again expresses the idea that the subject bases her belief in
(3) on the inference Wet Roads. The psychological view attempts to specify
conditions on (b). The simplest picture of what it means to base a belief
on inference is that the premise-beliefs cause the belief in the conclusion.
It was said that this is a plausible necessary condition on basing a belief on
inference. But it is clearly not a sufficient condition. We can imagine all sorts
of deviant causal chains leading from the premise-beliefs to the belief in the
conclusion (see below for an example). The psychological view attempts to
develop the simple picture into something more plausible. Roughly, the idea
is that a necessary condition on (b) is that the subject is aware of the logical
fact, thus tha she bears some attitude towards the following proposition,
abbreviated as “L”:
L (1) and (2) entail (3)
The idea is that the premise-beliefs cause the belief in the conclusion, be-
cause the subject brings the premises together —which she does by bearing
an attitude towards L and coming4 to believe (3) partially because of this
attitude.
The inference Wet Roads is more specifically a deduction. Thus the psycho-
logical view provides necessary (and perhaps sufficient) conditions on deduc-
ing. Here is again what the psychological view says about deduction from
3As said, the expression “reason provided partially by the justified beliefs in (1) and
(2)” is meant to be neutral with respect to different conceptions of reasons, as well as to
what exactly is responsible for the fact that the subject has such a reason.
4I discuss whether the question concerns why the subject comes to believe (3) or rather
why she maintains her belief in (3) later in this chapter. For the moment it does not hurt
to think of it as the coming to believe (3).
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page 35 (replacing “belief” with the more general “attitude A”, where “A”
is a certain type of attitude, e.g. belief, acceptance, supposition etc.):
deduction: If the subject believes (3) for her good deductive reason, then
(i) she bears attitude A towards L, and
(ii) she does not bear attitude A towards L 2→ she does not believe
(3).
(ii) specifies that the attitude is not just an idle wheel in the mechanism
leading to the belief in (3). (ii) expresses a counterfactual dependence. This
is more cautious than requiring a causal dependence. If attitude A is a
cause of the belief in (3), then (provided the belief in (3) is not causally
overdetermined) (ii) is true. But the converse does not hold. For instance,
when something s teleologically explains feature f , then s is not a cause of
f . But still, if s weren’t the case, then f wouldn’t be the case. Take as s
something of the form feature e is advantageous for the survival of species S
and as f something of the form species S has feature e. s is not in the usual
sense a “cause” of f , but s still explains f . In general, when p is a cause of
q (and q is not causally overdetermined) the counterfactual ¬p2→ ¬q holds.
But the converse is not true.
But clause (ii) is also at the source of the Lewis-Carroll-Problem for the
psychological view from chapter 2.3. For convenience, let us isolate clause
(ii) as before under the name of “psychological dependence” (from page 33,
here in the more general form, replacing “belief in L” by “attitude towards
L”):
psychological dependence: The subject does not bear attitude A towards L
2→ the subject does not believe (3).
The meaning of counterfactuals is standardly given in possible worlds seman-
tics. Thus its truth-conditions are the following: In all the possible worlds
that are nearest to the actual world and in which the subject does not bear
attitude A towards L, she does not believe (3) either. These nearest possi-
ble worlds to the actual world resemble the situation N in all the relevant
respects except that the subject does not believe L. For example, in the near-
est worlds in which the subject does not bear attitude A towards L she still
believes the premises (1) and (2). The counterfactual therefore expresses a
dependence of the belief in (3) on the attitude towards L.
The counterfactual represents a quite unspecific statement of this depen-
dence. Specific underlying mechanisms are responsible for the truth of the
3.2. INFERENTIAL DISPOSITIONS 59
counterfactual. We have seen that one possible mechanism would be that
obtaining when (3) is inferred from L as a premise in a reflective inference.
One can then think of the mechanism as a causal mechanism where the belief
in L is one of the (sustaining —see below) causes and the belief in (3) the
effect. But the Carrollian Argument from section 2.3 speaks strongly against
taking this to be the mechanism in virtue of which psychological dependence
holds. The belief in (3) must in some other way psychologically depend on
the attitude towards L. Thus, we can take the dependence-claim to be the
core or generative claim of the psychological view. And we can take different
specifications of the underlying mechanisms as variants of the psychological
view. In what follows I will be concerned with motivating, distinguishing
and evaluating such variants of the psychological view.
Thus, In this chapter I explore different ways an attitude towards L could
partially explain the belief in (3). In section 3.2 I will explore a strategy that
appeals to an attitude towards L that is psychologically very “thin”. The
idea is that such an attitude can be ascribed merely in virtue of the subject’s
manifesting a certain inferential disposition. In that case, we would not need
to think of the attitude towards L as a belief-state causally efficacious in the
same way that the premise-beliefs are. The Carrollian problem could thus
be avoided. I call this account the “dispositional account of deduction”. I
reject this account. In section 3.3 I introduce an account which appeals to a
proper belief in L, accordingly called “the belief-proper account of deduction”.
I defend this account against several objections, before giving in section 3.4
some reasons to be dissatisfied with it. In section 3.5 I introduce and argue for
a different explanation of the belief in (3). According to this explanation the
attitude towards L is ascribed in virtue of the subject’s being sensitive to the
defeater ¬L. This account is called “the sensitivity account of deduction”. I
argue that this account has some important advantages over the belief-proper
account.
3.2 Inferential dispositions
All accounts I will discuss in this chapter attempt to supplement the simple
view alluded to above. According to the simple view, the subject believes
(3) for the deductive reason provided by her justified beliefs in (1) and (2),
simply in virtue of the fact that the premise-beliefs cause the belief in (3).
Thus,
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(S) (3) is believed for the deductive reasons provided5 by (1) and (2), if
and only if
(a) the beliefs in (1) and (2) cause the belief in (3).
The problem with (S) is that one can be caused to believe (3) by the beliefs
in (1) and (2) without thereby deducing (3) from (1) and (2). For instance,
consider the following case:
The Evening Gets Worse: Paul looks out of the window and
comes to believe that it rains, i.e. (1). He then comes to oc-
currently believe that if it rains, the roads will get wet, i.e. (2).
These two beliefs give raise to an indefinite expectation that the
evening will get worse. For instance, he expects (believes) that
he will be involved in a row sooner or later this evening. And
among other things he expects that it will be difficult to drive
home, because the roads will be wet.
Even though Paul believes (3) as a result of believing (1) and (2), he does not
believe (3) for the deductive reason provided by (1) and (2). His expecting
the evening to get worse is mainly responsible for his belief in (3). An even
more blatant case represents the following example:
Anger and Pools Paul looks out of the window and comes to
believe that it rains, i.e. (1). He then comes to occurrently
believe that if it rains, the roads will get wet, i.e. (2). These two
beliefs give raise to an indefinite expectation that the evening will
get worse. This expectation leads Paul to become angry. In his
violent anger he destroys the garden pool and the water of the
pool floats in the direction of the roads. Paul comes to believe
that the roads will be wet, i.e. (3).
The problem with (S), in other words, is that even if the premise-beliefs
together cause a belief in the conclusion, it does not imply that the premises
are “brought together” in the way of an inference. In these examples the
belief in (3) does not solely depend on the specifics of the contents (1) and
(2), for without the intervening states Paul wouldn’t believe (3). So, the
contents (1) and (2) must play a more direct role in the formation of the
belief in (3).
5For the locution “reason provided by (1)-(2)”, see footnote 3.
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The first account I want to discuss adds a further requirement besides (a),
as follows:6
(D1) (3) is believed for the deductive reasons provided by (1) and (2), if and
only if
(a) the beliefs in (1) and (2) cause the belief in (3), and
(b) (a) is the manifestation of a disposition to believe (3), when one
believes (1)-(2).
According to the proposal the missing ingredient is specified by (b). In nei-
ther of the cases above Paul believes (3) as the manifestation of a disposition
the manifestation-condition of which is that he believes (1) and (2). I will
refer to the proposal at hand as the “dispositional account of deduction”.7
(D1) is not yet fully explicit. Dispositions come too easy. If there is a causal
route from some belief p to another q, however deviant, then it can be said,
that the subject manifests a disposition to believe q when she believes p. The
proposal at hand is that the disposition mentioned in (b) is a particular kind
of disposition. The intuitive idea is that the subject is disposed to behave in
accordance with modus ponens, MPP. When she comes to believe (3) in N ,
she does so in virtue of manifesting such a disposition to accord with MPP.
The subject has some more specific (the “easy”) disposition to believe (3)
(the proposition token, if you want), when she believes (1)-(2), in virtue of
having the disposition to believe some proposition-type, when she believes
other proposition-types. Thus, we can say that the set of proposition tokens
{(1), (2), (3)} is of the same type as many other sets of proposition tokens.
For instance (1)-(3) are of the same type as the following three propositions:
(i) Fritz is a cat. (ii) If Fritz is a cat, then Fritz has teeth. (iii) Fritz has teeth.
These propositions contain the same logical concepts (i.e. if . . . , then), and
are composed of each other in the same way as (1)-(3) —in short they are
of the same logical type. The logical type of (1)–(3) is the type shared by
all propositions which can legitimately be substituted for the proposition-
constants in the MPP-pattern. Thus, (1) is a p-type, where (2) is a (if p,
then q)-type, and (3) is a q-type proposition. So, the subject in N manifests
her general disposition to believe the q-type proposition, when she already
believes propositions of the p- and (if p, then q)-type.
6One might ask: Is there not a difference between deductively inferring and believing
for deductive reasons? See below in the text.
7Calling the account the “dispositional account” is somewhat misleading, since, as will
become clear later, all accounts considered in what follows appeal to a disposition or
another.
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According to the dispositional account, there is some fact about the subject
responsible for her belief in (3) which makes her treat contents of certain types
in similar ways. This fact is her disposition to accord with MPP. In this case
the right aspects of the contents (1) and (2) are responsible for the belief in
(3), namely their logical type. When the belief in (3) is a manifestation of
that disposition, it is due to the logical relation between contents (1) and (2)
—and not due to some further state to which they give rise, in virtue only
of some aspects of their content— that I come to believe (3).
It is at first sight not evident why the dispositional account should be treated
as a variant of the psychological view. For this it needs to subscribe to the
claim of psychological dependence on page 33,58. But to subscribe to the
psychological claim it must first ascribe to the subject an attitude towards
L.
But the dispositional account has been proposed in combination with the
claim that the subject’s inferential disposition warrants ascription of a belief
(or similar state) about the relation between the contents (1)-(3). That the
subject is disposed to accord with MPP on the occasion involving (1)-(3)
suggests that there is a sense in which she accepts that (1)-(3) satisfy a valid
pattern of inference, a pattern she is on other occasions disposed to accord
with. Without wanting to go into discussing criteria for belief, it can be said
that although the subject does not believe L, she behaves in so important
a respect as if she did, that one can ascribe to her an attitude towards L.
Belief can be roughly conceived as a state individuated by its functional role.
For instance a certain belief is a state that combines with certain desires to
yield certain intentions to act. Or it is a state that under some conditions
yields occurrent belief —where occurrent belief can perhaps be individuated
phenomenally. The attitude towards L, ascribed in virtue of the subject’s
disposition, fulfills just part of the functional role that the belief in L fulfills.
For instance a belief in L together with the beliefs in (1) and (2) would yield
a belief in (3). And the disposition together with the beliefs in (1) and (2)
does exactly this, yield the belief in (3).8
8The sketched view resembles what Stroud [1979, 195-196] discusses as the “permissive
model of understanding”. (It is a model of understanding, because according to the view
discussed by Stroud, the disposition to infer in question constitutes the subject’s under-
standing of the premises. On this view the fact that the subject understands the premises
[which she believes to be true] explains why she believes the conclusion. This link to
understanding is however optional and I do not make in the text. It is an influential idea
endorsed among others by Peacocke [1993]. Influential criticisms of the idea have been
advanced by Prior [1960], Williamson [2003].) It also resembles what Engel [2005, 31-32]
discusses under the heading “expressivism”. (According to “expressivism” the inferential
disposition is also responsible for belief in (3). In addition, according to expressivism the
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As said, the dependence-claim should not be understood in such a way that
the attitude towards L plays the role of a premise in a reflective inference.
The alternative interpretation of the psychological dependence claim given
by the dispositional account is the following: (i) The attitude towards L
ascribed to the subject is ascribed in virtue of the fact that the subject has
a certain kind of disposition to infer (3) from (1) and (2). (ii) And the belief
in (3) psychologically depends on this disposition insofar as the subject’s
coming to believe (3) is the manifestation of the disposition to believe (3)
when she believes (1) and (2). On this proposal, the subject has a disposition
to treat beliefs with the contents (1)-(3) in a particular way. Therefore, one
can ascribe to such a subject an attitude towards a proposition linking these
contents. And since it is in virtue of having that disposition, i.e. in virtue
of the belief-formation being a manifestation of that disposition, that the
subject believes (3), the disposition can be appealed to in the (psychological)
explanation of the belief. So, the belief in (3) is explainable by appeal to an
attitude towards L which does not play the role of a premiss. Thus the Lewis-
Carroll-Problem is avoided. And it is still true that if the subject hadn’t that
attitude/disposition she wouldn’t believe (3). Thus one can subscribe to the
psychological dependence claim without thereby supposing that L explains
belief in (3) in the way the premises do.9
inferential disposition partially provides the reason for believing (3). Expressivism is one
way to reconcile the justificatory force of a reason with it’s motivational (psychological)
force. I do not address the problem of reconciling these two aspects of reasons, because
I do not provide an account of deductive (justificatory) reasons. Still if it is supposed
that the reason for (3) is provided by no other state than (1) and (2), then there might
potentially arise the problem of how to account for the motivational force of such a reason.
However, there are various options, such as rejecting internalism about reasons (which is
prima-facie independent of epistemological internalism as discussed in chapter 4), and I
cannot discuss the issue here.)
9It is perhaps not exactly clear in what sense being disposed to accord with MPP
warrants the ascription of an attitude towards L. In particular, wouldn’t this disposition
rather warrant ascription of the belief in MPP is valid? L states that necessarily if this, i.e.
(1)-(2), is a fact, then that, i.e. (3), is a fact. It is thus about the particular propositions
or facts (1)-(3). In contrast, MPP is valid states that necessarily if any facts c1, c2 related
to each other as (1) and (2) obtain, then some fact c3 related to c1, c2 as (3) to (1)-(2)
obtains. It is thus about all proposition of a certain logical type [Cf. Haack, 1976]. Thus
if the inferential disposition to accord with MPP warrants ascription of an attitude at all,
then more plausibly an attitude towards MPP is valid than L.
Perhaps a proponent of the dispositional account could respond in the following way:
It is true that the subject in N manifests her general disposition to believe the q-type
proposition, when she already believes propositions of the p- and (if p, then q)-type. Still
we can also ascribe to the subject the disposition to believe token (3). It is just an
additional fact that the disposition to believe token (3) is had in virtue of the disposition
to believe logical type-(3). So, the attitude towards L is rather ascribed in virtue of the
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Inferring and believing for inferential reasons
There are reasons to be dissatisfied with the dispositional account of deduc-
tion. But before turning to more substantial problems, I want to address an
issue that has been looming for a while. On the face of it inferring (3) from
(1)-(2) is not the same as believing (3) for the deductive reasons provided by
(1)-(2). The first seems to be a description of the event of coming to believe
(3), while the second is a description rather of a state than an event —or if
it as an event, it is rather the event of maintaining belief in (3).
One could argue that this appearance is misleading. “believing (3) for the
deductive reasons provided by (1)-(2)”, according to this view, is not a de-
scription of why belief in (3) is maintained. Beliefs are maintained simply
because they are remembered or stored. That (3) is believed for a certain
reason hasn’t anything to do with the fact that the belief is stored, but only
with how the belief in (3) came to be stored. So, that (3) is believed for a
certain reason, involves that the event of coming to believe (3) is explained
in a certain way. It does not involve that maintaining the belief in (3) is
explained in a certain way.10
But this seems wrong. For according to this picture I could believe (3) for
the reason provided by my beliefs in (1)-(2), while I no longer believe (1)-(2).
Suppose that my belief in (3) is inferred from (1)-(2) and in this way comes
to be stored. Later on, I abandon or loose my belief in (1) or in (2) (or in
both), but still believe (3). Do I still believe (3) for the reason provided by
(1)-(2)? It seems not. The natural thing to say is that I now believe (3),
because I remember it. Very plausibly I do not have an experiential memory
of (3). This could normally only be the case if I had had an experiential
state representing (3), such as if I had seen that the roads are wet. But I
still remember (3) in a non-experiential way. It seems to me that when my
believing (3) becomes insensitive to whether I believe (1) or (2), I am not
believing (3) for the reasons provided by (1) and (2). And thus I am not
believing (3) for deductively inferential reasons, even though I came to first
have my belief in (3) as the result of inferring it from (1)-(2).
Usually one takes account of this by saying that the premises (or more gener-
ally the involved states) are sustaining causes of the belief in (3).11 Sustaining
causes are events (extended in time), such that when they cease to exist, their
disposition to believe token (3) than the disposition, also had by the subject, to believe
logical type-(3).
10Such a view is suggested by Goldman [1999b].
11For instance Korcz [1997], Bergmann [2004]
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effect ceases to exist. So, because the beliefs in the premises are sustaining
causes, the following counterfactual holds:
premise dependence (PD1): The subject ceases to believe the premises
2→ the subject does not maintain her belief in (3).
This gives rise to a minor complication. Instead of appealing to a counterfac-
tual in order to express the idea of a sustaining cause, one could also appeal
to a disposition. This is not surprising, since counterfactuals and disposition-
statements are related.12 It is to some extent controversial how exactly they
are related. Consider the following statement:
premise dependence (PD2): The subject is disposed to give up belief in
(3), when she abandons belief in (1) or (2).
It is widely held that (PD1) and (PD2) are not equivalent. The subject can
have the disposition without the counterfactual being true, and the coun-
terfactual can be true without the subject having the disposition. For my
purposes these differences do not matter. However, (PD2) complicates the
situation in so far as that the proposal now appeals to dispositions at two
levels. For (PD2) does not refer to the inferential disposition that is charac-
teristic of the proposal at hand.
How is the characteristic (i.e. inferential) disposition to be integrated with
the idea of sustaining causes? The disposition is of course not an additional
sustaining cause besides the beliefs in the premises. Rather the premises
are sustaining causes, in virtue of the subject’s disposition. Thus, there is a
lower-level dispositions, which obtains because the beliefs in the premises are
sustaining causes. And there is a higher-level dispositions, the disposition to
treat (1)-(3) content-types in a certain way. Taking this into account, we can
give the following characterization of the dispositional account of deduction,
or more appropriately “the dispositional account of believing for deductive
reasons”:
(D2) (3) is believed for the deductive reason provided by (1) and (2), if and
only if
(a’) the subject is disposed to abandon the belief in (3), if she abandons
belief in (1) or (2), and
12[Cf. Goodman, 1955, Lewis, 1997].
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(b’) (a’) is the manifestation of a disposition to treat (1)-(3)-type
propositions in that way.
The vocabulary of “treating” and “abandoning” propositions is not here in-
tended to suggest that these are voluntary actions. So, the premises are not
simply sustaining causes for the belief in (3) —which would be compatible
with it’s being so in virtue of some kind of irrational dependence. Rather
they are sustaining causes in virtue of the subject’s stable disposition to be-
lieve the (3)-type propositions, as long as she believes the corresponding (1)-
and (2)-type propositions.
So, there seems to be no obstacle in principle to amend the proposal in
such a way as to account for maintaining a belief rather than coming to
believe. On the proposal at hand, the higher-level disposition is attitude A
without which the subject wouldn’t have the lower-level disposition. And the
lower-level disposition, together with the fact that the subject believes the
premises (or: does not loose the premises) explains why the subject continues
to believe (3). The higher-level disposition therefore partly explains why the
subject continues to believe (3).
However, in the course of taking sustaining causes into account, the sense
in which the beliefs in the premises and the attitude towards L together
“explain” the belief in (3) has changed. The intuitive idea was that the
three states, i.e. the two beliefs in the premises and the attitude towards L,
together cause or at any rate explain the belief in (3). This means that for
each there is a counterfactual stating that if the subject weren’t in that state,
then she wouldn’t believe (3). The counterfactuals for the premises still hold
in the amended account. If the beliefs ceased to be held, the subject would
cease to believe (3). But the counterfactual for the attitude towards L, called
“psychological-dependence”, is not part of the amended dispositional account
(D2) anymore. If the subject ceased to have the higher-level disposition
mentioned in (b’), condition (a’) would no longer obtain. This means, the
belief in (3) would cease to depend on the beliefs in the premises, but it
does not mean that the belief in (3) would cease to be held. Whether in
that case the subject would still believe (3) or not is a further question not
ruled by (D2). It is still true that the higher-level disposition together with
the fact that the subject maintains her belief in the premises in some sense
“explains why” the subject maintains belief in (3). But by abandoning the
psychological-dependence claim we are a bit further away from the initial
intuitive idea behind the psychological view.
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The tracing-back intuition
My reason for rejection this proposal is that something is missing: Even if a
subject manifests such a higher-level disposition, this is not sufficient for her
belief to be believed for a reason. The intuition cannot very well be brought
to bear when one considersWet Roads. Ideally one could produce an example
where the subject has good deductive reasons, believes the conclusion, the
belief depends on beliefs in the premises in the way of the lower-level dispo-
sition, and it does so as the result of her having the higher-level disposition;
and she intuitively still wouldn’t believe for her good deductive reasons. But
I think that this direct route is not possible. Intuitions concerning such a
case are too much muddled by considerations of relative theoretical advan-
tages, so that one would have to lay out a number of theoretical alternatives
first. I will therefore provide an example where the subject does not have
good reasons —or where it is at least not clear that she does, and then argue
that something else besides the fact that there are no good reasons is also
going wrong in this example. And this something else is that in this case the
conclusion is not really believed for a reason at all.
Consider the following pattern (We can not assume here that it is an infer-
ential step, therefore I call it “pattern”) to which I will refer as Sad Day:
(A) x is sad.
(B) Today is a sad day.
Suppose a subject has the disposition —due to a somewhat morose or over-
empathic character— to believe (B)-type propositions, as long as he believes
some (A)-type proposition. When he stops believing the (B)-type proposi-
tion, he will stop to believe the (A)-type proposition and this safes his day.
Here an (A)-type proposition is a proposition expressed by any sentence as
(A) where “x” is replaced by any grammatically and semantically suitable
term. A (B)-type proposition is any proposition with the (concept of the)
day on which it is thought in place of “today”.13 So, let us assume that the
belief in (A) is coupled (as a matter of personal character) to an emotional
13I disregard here a complication due to the fact that today is an indexical concept. On
many views such a concept has two “sides”. It has a “character” which specifies features of
the circumstance of thought, e.g. the day when it is thought, that determine its “content”,
e.g. May 2, 2007. A (B)-type proposition is any proposition with the same “character” as
(B), while the “content” differs for different proposition tokens of this type. [Cf. Kaplan,
1989]
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response which in turn is responsible for the belief in (B). And this in such
a manner that were the emotion to disappear, the belief in (B) would dis-
appear. And were the belief in (A) to disappear, the emotional response
would disappear. So, the subject has a disposition to abandon the (A)-type
proposition when she abandons the (B)-type proposition. I will refer to the
whole so characterized circumstance also as “Sad Day”.
Perhaps our subject does not have a good reason to believe his (B)-type
proposition, whenever he believes the (A) type proposition. Even though I
do not know in a general form the application conditions for “sad day”, at
least sometimes the belief in (B) will be clearly unjustified. For instance,
when in the (A)-type proposition “x” stands for “yesterday”, the subject will
believe according to the following pattern:
(A’) Yesterday was sad.
(B’) Today is a sad day.
It seems clear to me that in that case he does not have a good reason to
believe (B’).14 But furthermore, it seems plausible to me that such a subject
does not believe the (B)-type proposition for a reason provided by (A’) at
all. His belief in the (B)-type proposition is explainable by appeal to the
disposition and the belief in the (A)-type proposition. But this explanation
is not of the same type when a belief is explained as being held for a (bad)
epistemic reason.
So, the question is whether a manifestation of the disposition to accord with
Sad Day is a case of believing for a reason—whether or not the reason is good.
Now, a proponent of the dispositional account of deduction at first sight need
not be too worried by this case. Very clearly the case cannot constitute a
counterexample to her account. Even if it is not a case of believing for a
reason, it is not true that it satisfies conditions (a’) and (b’) of (D2). First,
14Someone might argue that the emotional response constitutes (or transmits) a good
reason for believing (B) or (B’). After all sad day is an evaluative concept, and it is not
completely out of the question that evaluative judgments are at least sometimes justified
partially by appropriate emotional responses. However, even if appropriate emotional
responses do sometimes provide good epistemic reasons for evaluative beliefs, it seems
to me that if the emotion arises from the belief yesterday was a sad day it could not
license the belief in today is a sad day. Either the emotional response to the belief in
(B’) is inappropriate, or the “step” from the emotional response to the belief in (A’) is
inappropriate. I do not assume here that emotional responses can never provide a reason
to believe something evaluative. It is simply very implausible that this is such a case.
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(D2) is only about believing for deductive reasons, not about believing for a
reason in general. Second, (D2) as specified below obtains in virtue of what
has been called the “higher-order disposition” to accord with MPP. But the
disposition to accord with Sad Day is obviously of a very different kind.
I do not intend to present Sad Day simply as a counterexample to the dis-
positional account of deduction. The strategy is, first, to point out why Sad
Day does not qualify as a case of believing for a reason; second, to make
plausible that the missing feature is a completely general feature that must
be had by all cases of believing for a reason. And, third, to argue that the
feature is missing from the dispositional account of deduction.
Sad Day is different from The Evening Gets Worse (on page 60). Neither is a
case of believing for a reason (provided by the respective “premise”-beliefs),
but The Evening Gets Worse even less so than Sad Day. Concerning Paul’s
case I didn’t speak of dispositions. But as said, dispositions come easy, and
we can ascribe to Paul the disposition to believe (3), when he believes (1)-
(2). The interesting question is whether the disposition is a disposition to
react to a certain type of proposition and whether the disposition in Sad
Day and the disposition in The Evening Gets Worse react to similar kinds of
types. So, in Sad Day, the subject has a stable disposition to make depend
(beliefs in) certain types of contents on others, namely the (B)- on the (A)-
type proposition. In the former case, The Evening Gets Worse, if we try to
identify types of propositions which the subject is disposed to make generally
depend on others, we are led to incorporate many circumstantial features.
Thus, that it is the belief in (3) that results from the beliefs in (1)-(2) depends
on the fact that on the occasion it appears to be a bad thing to Paul that the
roads are wet. If he thought or felt that it was good that the roads are wet,
he would never have come to believe (3), resp. he would never make depend
belief in (3) on the beliefs in (1)-(2). Thus (3) is believed in virtue of being
of the type “proposition with a content that is bad on the occasion”.
Also, believing (3) here depends on the fact that (1)-(2) lead Paul to expect
something bad. So, Paul is disposed to react to the proposition type “propo-
sitions which lead to expecting something bad”. And it is to be supposed
that other propositions could play that role just equally well as (1)-(2).
In other words, the specific contents of (1)-(3) are not sufficient to determine
Paul’s belief-forming- or belief-revising-behavior. The beliefs in (1)-(2) are
not sufficient in themselves to determine that it is (3) that Paul comes to
believe instead of some other proposition. This is not so in Sad Day. The fact
that the subject has a disposition to accord with Sad Day determines that
it is exactly because of the (A)-type proposition that she comes to believe
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the (B)-type proposition. So, in the spirit of the dispositional account we
could ascribe in Sad Day an attitude A towards a content linking (A) and
(B). The subject’s stably conforming in his belief-revising and belief-forming
behavior to Sad Day warrants saying of him that he accepts that (A), in itself,
supports (B) —at least, one could expect a proponent of the dispositional
account agreeing to this. But Paul does not in this sense “accept” that
(1)-(2), in themselves, support (3).
It is true that the disposition in Sad Day is not a disposition to react to the
same features of the propositions as is Wet Roads (according to the disposi-
tional account). In Wet Roads the disposition is to react to the logical type
of the proposition, as explained above. In Sad Day the proposition types
are not individuated merely by the logical concepts and the way the propo-
sitions are composed of each other. The type of proposition is for instance
individuated partially by the concept sad. I will discuss below whether this
difference is of any help to a proponent of the dispositional account.
Given that Sad Day is not a case of believing for a reason, we can ask why
this is so. Perhaps one aspect is that the disposition involves a mediating
emotional response. But it is not to this that I would like to draw attention.
I will express the point here in the form of an intuition with a somewhat
vague content. It is to be seen later what precise requirement does justice to
this intuition.
The problem is that the subject is not —not in virtue of the mentioned
disposition, anyway— sensitive to criticisms of her belief in (A’) as she would
be, if she believed (A’) for the reason provided by (B’). (i) She is not sensitive
to challenges to the effect that (A’) and (B’) are unrelated. If someone
convincingly pointed out to her that (A’) does not support (B’), this would
not result (not because of the disposition, anyway) in her loosing the emotion
triggering belief in (B’). And thus, even if she were to accept that (A’) and
(B’) are unrelated, it would not result in her giving up (B’). (ii) And even
though successful challenges to (A’) would result in her giving up belief in
(B’) —because if she gave up (A’) the emotion would wane, this is not because
she understands that a challenge to (A’) is in her case a challenge to (B’).
We can express this loosely by saying that she does “not trace back her
commitment to (A) to (B)”. When a belief-formation is guided by the sort
of character-trait responsible for the emotion’s being triggered by the belief
in (A’), then, in a sense to be specified, one does not understand oneself as
having a reason to believe (B’) because one has a reason to believe (A’). Even
though the emotion wanes at the same time as the belief in (A’), and thus
also the belief in (B’) disappears, it does not thereby disappear in the right
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way (or “for the right reason”). As said, this is merely an intuition and it
is only hinted at what is missing by way of formulations that are not at all
clear. What does it mean to say “does not trace back one’s commitment”
or “does not understand oneself to have a reason because one has another”?
But it seems to me that there is the intuition and it is an advantage for
an account of believing for a reason, if it can give a sense to these loose
expression such that they apply to believing for a reason. I will call the
intuition the “tracing-back-intuition”.15
Restricting the eligible dispositions
As said, the disposition in Sad Day differs from the disposition that according
to the dispositional account manifests itself in N with respect to Wet Roads.
I will now examine whether this difference is of any help to a proponent of
the dispositional account. Could she generalize her account in such a way
to believing for a reason (not only for a deductive reason) that Sad Day is
excluded? And would such a generalized account do justice to the tracing-
back intuition?
The proponent of the proposal must argue that only dispositions concern-
ing certain proposition-types have the effect that one believes for a reason.
That is, she must restrict the eligible disposition. I therefore refer to this
response on behalf of the dispositional account as the “restriction-strategy”.
For instance, in Wet Roads the subject believes (3) as a reaction to believing
(1)-(2) qua propositions of the type that can be substituted in the MPP-
pattern. Her belief-forming behavior depends on the logical type of (1)-(3).
This suggests that for the case of believing for a deductive reason she could
restrict the eligible dispositions to those that are disposition to accord with
some valid patterns such as MPP. For the case of believing for non-deductive
reasons there are equally patterns specified in terms solely of logical vocab-
ulary to which the dispositions must be restricted. These patterns would be
“inductively valid”.
15Here is a passage by Audi [1993, chap. 8, 240-241] expressing the same idea with
similarly loose expressions as I do:
[. . . ] when S believes p for a reason r [i.e. believes p for the reason provided
by belief in r], he believes p in the light of r, not merely because of it, and
that he must in some way see r as supporting p [. . . ] where this suggests, not
his explicitly taking r into account, but his belief system’s somehow reflecting
r’s subjectively registered support for p.
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A question arises concerning the validity of the pattern. There are several
problems. First, arguably there is no inductive validity. That is, there are no
inductive patterns specifiable in purely syntactic terms (except for the logical
concepts), such that when the premises are justified, so is the conclusion.
This is one of the upshots of Goodman’s new riddle of induction. Whether
the induction is justified depends on the precise non-logical concepts involved
in the observation-beliefs.16 Second, validity should not be required anyway.
It is a general requirement on an account of believing for a reason that it
does not rule out that one sometimes believes for bad epistemic reasons. On
the current proposal this is not completely ruled out. That would happen for
example when although the premises entail the conclusion (a valid pattern
is satisfied), the premises are unjustified. But one could not believe for a
bad reason because an inferential step is invalid. If the step is invalid, so the
response goes, the “conclusion” is not believed for a reason at all.
This is counterintuitive. Consider the “gambler’s fallacy”. Suppose someone’s
betting behavior accords with the following principle: “If in a fair lottery a
number is not drawn many turns in a row, the probability that it will be
drawn in the next turn increases”. We say of such a person that she “reasons
fallaciously”. Intuitively, that is, we say of such a person that she does reason,
hence that she does believe something for a reason. The problem is that her
reason is bad, not that she does not believe for a reason. Similarly, when
someone falls in to an equivocation, we say that he reasons fallaciously, hence
that he does reason. In contrast, in Sad Day, we do not say that the person
behaving in accordance with the pattern exhibits fallacious reasoning. That
person does not reason at all.
So, this poses a problem for a proponent of the restriction strategy. For
she must make some indication how the dispositions are to be restricted.
Validity is not a good criterion. This is perhaps not an insurmountable
problem. Perhaps even when the pattern is invalid the subject who reasons
is disposed to react only to “formal” features of the proposition in question.
Thus, reasoning according to the gambler’s fallacy abstracts away from the
kind of game we are playing and so on. In an equivocation the propositions
somehow appear to be other than they are. And it is their appearing to be
of certain logical type that triggers the belief-formation. So, perhaps there is
a way to restrict the disposition to disposition to react to “formal” features.
But perhaps there are other differences between Sad Day and Wet Roads
which could be exploited in the aim of restricting the eligible dispositions.
There must be a way to exclude Sad Day without excluding the gambler’s
16[Cf. Goodman, 1955]
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fallacy and similar cases. Perhaps the way to do this is not to restrict to
dispositions to react to “formal” features. Another idea would be to exclude
certain specific features present in Sad Day. For instance, one could make the
following claim: a disposition can be responsible for the fact that something
is believed for a reason, only when no emotional response or character trait
grounds or is involved in the disposition. Although I cannot argue that no
such account could be convincing, it seems to me that a proponent would be
hard pressed to avoid the charge of ad-hocness. (See also below.)
Anyway, even if some such account were at hand, it is not clear in what
sense restricting the eligible dispositions is supposed to give a meaning to the
tracing-back-intuition. Indeed, why should the fact that only certain content-
types are linked together, provide the means to claim that the subject “traces
back her commitment”?
Perhaps one could argue that every instance of believing for a reason is the
manifestation of the disposition to accord to MPP-reasoning or some similar
(perhaps invalid) pattern involving a conditional. In that case perhaps the
presence of the conditional premise, e.g. (2) in Wet Roads, secures that the
subject “traces back her commitments”. By believing (2) the subject believes
that her claim to (3) depends on her claim to (1). Perhaps even some such
premise can be identified in induction too. One could perhaps argue that
enumerative induction is a form of inference to the best explanation, because
it relies on the premise that the generalization best explains the instances.17
So, here again there is then a premise with what might be called a “linking
content”. Suppose we leave out “best” in the premise about explanation.
Enumerative induction has then the following form:
(1’) n observed X’s have been Y’s, 0 observed X’s have not been Y’s.
(2’) The explanation for (1’) is that all X’s are Y’s.
(3’) All X’s are Y’s.
In this inference (2’) arguably implies if (1’), then (3’). So, this inference can
be seen as a disguised MPP. And if every inference-form that is eligible can
17Gilbert Harman [1965, 1968] has argued that enumerative induction is a form of infer-
ence to the best explanation. But (at least in Harman [1968]) he does not claim that there
is a premise such as (2’) involved. He says that in an enumerative induction, one “infers
an explanation from the data” and this does not imply that one of the premises is about
explanation. He clearly thinks that inference to the best explanation is not a deductive
form of inference Harman [cf. 1968, 166-167].
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be interpreted as having a similar underlying form, then each one contains a
“linking premise”. And, thus, if we restrict the inferential dispositions that
underly believing for an inferential reason to the MPP-form (or similar), we
can take on board the intuition that the subject traces back her commitment
for the conclusion to the premises. Hence, by restricting the eligible disposi-
tions in the right way we can accommodate the tracing-back intuition, or so
one could argue.
There are a number of serious problems with this account. Most importantly,
if every justified inference is deductively valid —as it would be if it is of the
MPP-form, then it is hard to see how premises such as (2’) could be justified.
It does not seem to be non-inferentially justified. But from what could it
ultimately logically follow that something is to be explained by something
else? That (1’) is explained by (3’) is not “contained” in anything we already
know. Genuine induction is required to extend our knowledge to new facts,
deduction can only bring out what is already implicitly known, so the saying
goes. But I do not want to pursue this issue, for the proposal is anyway
speculative in the extreme.18
In particular, it is from the start questionable whether the tracing-back intu-
ition can be satisfied merely by the fact that one of the premises, here (2), has
a content linking the other premise(s), here (1), to the conclusion, here (3).
It is true that no belief with a conditional form is present in Sad Day. But
the absence or presence of some conditional or other is in fact irrelevant for
the point expressed by the tracing-back intuition. The conditional must link
the conclusion to the contents of the beliefs in virtue of which the subject has
a reason to believe the conclusion. Consider again Wet Roads. The problem
is that in Wet Roads it was agreed that the good epistemic reason the subject
has, is had in virtue partially of her justifiably believing both (1) and (2). So,
even if believing (2) ensures that the subject traces back her commitment
to (3) to (1), this does not mean that she traces back her belief in (3) to
her good epistemic reason for believing (3). For this reason is provided by
her justified beliefs in both (1) and (2). So, the suggested deductivism about
inference cannot do justice to the tracing-back intuition.
In any case, I would like to put forward an alternative. A convincing case
against pursuing the restricted proposal could be made, if an alternative
convincingly accounts for the difference between Sad Days and cases of rea-
soning, and furthermore successfully captures the tracing-back intuition. To
18Corresponding to apriorism about induction, i.e. the claim that what is called the
“Uniformity of Nature” is known a priori, one could try to argue that facts about expla-
nation, at least in basic cases, are known a priori. In that cases some premises of the kind
of (2’) are not inferred from observations.
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provide such an account will be my aim in what follows.
3.3 Belief proper
A very straightforward way to take the tracing-back intuition into account
is by appealing to a belief in L proper. The discussion above suggests that
a conditional that links the conclusion to all the premises is required to do
justice to the tracing-back intuition (more on this below). And a belief in L
ensures that the subject believes precisely such a conditional. The resulting
account, to which I will refer as “the belief-proper-account” of deduction
takes the following form:
(B) (3) is believed for the deductive reasons provided by (1) and (2), if and
only if
(a*) the subject is disposed to abandon the belief in (3), if she abandons
belief in (1) or (2), and
(b*) the subject is disposed to abandon the belief in (3), if she aban-
dons her belief in L.
The clause that differs from (D2) is (b*). How does (b*) exclude the imag-
ined case Sad Day? As before, Sad Day is intuitively not only not a case
of deductive inference, but it is not a case of inference at all. So, the ques-
tion is how a belief-proper account extended to non-deductive inference would
exclude Sad Day. If extended to other cases of inference, the belief-proper
account would require that the subject believes some kind of linking propo-
sition. For believing a linking (complex) proposition is the requirement by
which the belief-proper account wants to ensure that the subject traces back
her commitments. So, the account of believing for inferential reasons is the
following:
(BI) p is believed for the inferential reason provided by the justified belief
in q, if and only if
(a*) the subject is disposed to abandon the belief in p, if she abandons
belief in q, and
(b*) the subject is disposed to abandon the belief in p, if she abandons
her belief in a linking proposition with a content similar to q makes
probable p.19
19More on the precise content of the latter proposition below.
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So, Sad Day is excluded, because the subject does not satisfy (b*). The
case as imagined is that an emotional response triggered by belief in x is
sad in turn triggers belief in Today is a sad day. Furthermore it was said
that the subject has an emotional set-up (the morose character) such that
this mechanism manifests a stable disposition. But this is not relevant at
present, since the belief-proper account does not appeal to stable dispositions
at what was called the “higher-level” (I come to this in a moment). So, what
is missing in Sad Day (as it is implicitly understood) is that the subject does
not believe such a linking proposition or, at least, her belief in it would be
irrelevant to whether she believes today is a sad day. If I were to present
evidence to such a person that even if, yesterday, say, was a sad day, today
could very well be a happy day, she would presumably abandon her belief
in the linking proposition, but not in today is a sad day. It was understood
that she could come to abandon belief in today is a sad day, only if her mood
changed. And arguing for my claim that today could still be a happy day,
even if yesterday was a sad day, does not obviously change her mood. On
this version of Sad Day the subject thus fails to satisfy condition (b*).
But suppose now a version of Sad Day in which the subject’s mood would
change, if she came to be convinced that yesterday was sad is unrelated to
today is sad. She would therefore abandon her belief in today is sad. I refer
to the version of Sad Day in which the subject does (i) believe the linking
proposition, and (ii) react to her ceasing to believe the linking proposition
as “Sad Day*”. Concerning Sad Day* I would no longer affirm that she does
not believe Today is a sad day for a (bad) reason provided by her belief in
Yesterday was a sad day. This will be contested. I claim that in Sad Day*
the subject does believe for a reason (although, of course, for a bad one).
One could object that since there is still the intervening mood which is re-
sponsible for whether belief in Today is a sad day is abandoned or not, the
belief in Yesterday was a sad day cannot provide a reason for which it is
believed. It could be argued that when emotions are responsible for my be-
liefs in the way sketched in Sad Day*, then these are not held for a reason.
But this does not seem to me to be a pre-theoretic judgment. If one al-
ready thinks that believing for a reason has something to do with how the
dependence between the involved beliefs is implemented in the subject’s psy-
chology, then it might seem clear that this is not a case of believing for a
reason. But if one thinks, as a proponent of the belief-proper account does,
that the important thing is the dependence —in particular the dependence
specified in (b*)— and not how it is implemented, then one will not take this
to be clear at all. If the subject in Sad Day* is sensitive to evidence for x’s
being sad has nothing to do with today’s being a sad day, then I am ready to
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think of the case as one in which the subject does believe Today is a sad day
for the reason provided by her belief in x is sad.
Everyone agrees that clause (a) (= (a’) = (a*)) is insufficient,20 for it allows
that the belief in the conclusion depends in all sorts of manners on the belief
in the premises —manners that we would not be willing to treat as inferring
or believing for a reason. But the belief-proper account addresses that prob-
lem in a fundamentally different way from the dispositional account. The
dispositional account tries to be more specific on the mechanism underlying
the dependence required by clause (a’). Thus clause (b’) refers back to (a’)
and requires that it obtains in virtue of a stable disposition with respect to
content-types. I have argued that cases like Sad Day (not: Sad Day*) are
not cases of believing for a reason, although it is not clear how a proponent
of (b’) could exclude them. I have argued that it is not obvious how the
dispositional account could modify (b’), resp. restrict the eligible disposi-
tions —especially if it tries to take the tracing-back intuition on board. The
belief-proper account does not attempt to specify the mechanism underly-
ing (a’). It rather adds a further dependence-requirement. This dependence
requirement is sought to exclude Sad Day and to do justice to the tracing-
back intuition. And if the account succeeds in doing this, then it can allow
itself to be very liberal with respect to the mechanisms underlying any of
the two dependences. Thus, it does not matter whether emotions intervene
or whether the dependence between the propositions obtains only once in a
lifetime.21
20But see below.
21To these two strategies for finding the further necessary condition(s) besides (a*)
correspond, unsurprisingly, two strategies for finding further conditions besides mere causal
dependence in accounts of the “basing-relation”. The basing-relation is the relation that
obtains when a belief’s being justified (being believed for good epistemic reasons) depends
on its being psychologically related to other states, typically other beliefs and perceptual
states. For instance, on many accounts, I have a perceptually justified belief, only if it
depends in the right way, i.e. is “based” on, a perceptual experience. It is uncontroversial
that I have a deductively justified belief, only if it depends in the right way, i.e. is
based on, the beliefs in the premises. In the chapter I speak of “believing for a reason”
rather than the basing-relation. But it is clear that when I “believe a conclusion for the
reason provided by my beliefs in the premises”, then the relation that obtains between
the beliefs in the premises and the belief in the conclusion is the basing-relation. Thus,
an account of believing for deductive (or more generally: inferential) reasons will include
an account of the basing-relation, at least as it obtains between beliefs. On most accounts
the basing-relation involves a causal dependence between the states in question. But it is
acknowledged by all sides, that there are causal dependences that do not qualify. Sad Day
is just such a case. There are then two broad strategies to exclude these cases. The first,
which might be called the “non-deviant causal chain” strategy, attempts to exclude them
by being more precise on the underlying causal mechanisms. The other strategy, which
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There are probably some limits to be set. Suppose my brain is monitored
by some scientist. Upon realizing that I do not believe L anymore and
being a bit of a pedant he decides that I should loose belief in (3). He can
and does bring this about by intervening directly in my brain. Without his
intervention, however, I would have continued to believe (3). In that case I
do not believe (3) for the reason provided by (1) and (2). The disposition
to give up believe in (3) when I loose belief in L must in some sense be “my
own” disposition. But in order to defend the belief-proper account it is not
required to be more specific. One must take (B) as an approximation. It is
still sufficiently different from the dispositional account in order to evaluate
their respective merits.22
How does the belief-proper account take the tracing-back intuition on board?
According to the present account the subject traces her commitment to (3)
back to her premises in a very straightforward sense. If we take the expression
“trace back her commitment to the premises” in the most demanding and
literal sense (of course, even then “tracing” is a metaphor), then we think of
the subject as having fully conscious beliefs about her commitments, resp.
about what is her reason for believing (3). But clearly it would be too
strict to require such a belief to be conscious. A non-occurrent belief would
certainly suffice. However, the belief-proper account does not even appeal to
a non-occurrent belief in the proposition My reason for believing (3) depends
on my reasons for believing (1)-(2) or any similar proposition involving the
concept reason or the concept commitment, but it appeals to a belief in the
proposition L and this is not . According to the belief-proper account the
might be called the “cognitive” strategy attempts to exclude them by putting further
cognitive requirements on the subject. For instance, the subject must believe or know
certain things about the relation between her belief in the conclusion and her belief in
the premise. An example of someone pursuing the second strategy is Audi [1993]. The
dispositional account can be seen as an attempt of the “non-deviant causal chain” kind,
while the belief-proper account can be seen as an attempt of the “cognitive” kind. A useful
overview on accounts of the basing-relation is Korcz [1997].
22The two conditions (b’) and (b*) are not exclusive. So it is possible to combine the
two accounts. In fact, a plausible version of the dispositional account could include the
idea that the dispositional basis of the inferential disposition is also the dispositional basis
for a belief in L. Depending on the details of the adopted theory of belief, it is thus also
the dispositional basis of a dispositional (i.e. non-occurrent) belief in L, or of a disposition
to believe L. In fact this could be claimed to be the reason why having such a disposition
constitutes bearing an attitude towards L.
However, even on this version of the dispositional account, (b*) would be a further
condition besides (b’). For if the dispositional basis did not obtain, then according to (b’)
it is not the belief in (3) which would cease, but the dependence of (3) on the beliefs in
(1) and (2) as specified in (a’). Whether the subject would still believe (3) is a further
question. This is the question on which in that case condition (b*) would rule.
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subject need not believe that her reasons depend on the truth of the premises
or on the fact that the premises support the conclusion. Therefore, there is
a sense, in which the subject need not “trace back her commitment to the
premises”. However, her belief-revising behavior is to some extent as if she
did believe these things. What would be her belief-revising behavior if she
had these beliefs about reasons?
(i) If she believed My reason for (3) depends on the truth of the premises,
then if she didn’t believe in the truth of the premises, she would when
reflecting on the question abandon belief in (3).
(ii) Similarly if she believed My reason for (3) depends on the fact that (1)
and (2) support (3), then if she were to doubt that (1) and (2) support
(3), she would also abandon believe in (3). Let us further make the
plausible assumption that she believes (1) and (2) support (3) on the
basis of the belief in L. So, given she ceased to believe L, she would
cease on reflection to believe (1) and (2) support (3). And, then, given
her belief in My reason for (3) depends on the fact that (1) and (2)
support (3) she would on reflection cease to believe (3).
This corresponds to the belief-revising behavior predicted by (B). (i) is also
the belief-revising behavior predicted by clause (a*): If she ceased to believe
(1)-(2), then she would abandon belief in (3). And (ii) is the belief-revising
behavior predicted by clause (b*): If she ceased to believe L, she would cease
to believe (3). Thus the subject’s belief-revising-behavior with respect to
(3) according to (B) is as if she reflected on her reasons for believing (3).
It is as if she “traced back her commitment to (3) to (1)-(2)” in the full
sense of having beliefs about her reasons for believing (3). In virtue of this
resemblance with respect to the “net result” in belief-forming behavior, I
think the belief-proper account does justice to the tracing-back intuition.
So, the belief-proper account succeeds where the dispositional account failed.
It can exclude Sad Day while at the same time do justice to the tracing-back
intuition. But let us turn now to more critical questions.23
23The belief-proper account also a resembles another intuitive way, in which one might
account of believing for a reason. It can be extracted from the following passage from
Harman [1964, 354]:
To say that my belief in p is based on the (abstract) inference i [a sequence
of propositions] is to claim that stating the inference gives the reason why I
believe p in some sense of “reason”. Here one is torn between taking “reason”
as “cause” and taking it as “justification”. That is, sometimes I believe p
because I consciously made the inference i; and this explains how my belief
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The Lewis-Carroll-Problem again
The first question that arises for a proponent of the belief-proper account is
whether it can avoid the Lewis-Carroll-Problem. In its most general form
the Lewis-Carroll-Problem arises whenever the motivation for introducing
the further belief in L (and perhaps in addition reasons for that belief, as in
the version against strong inferential internalism) “carries on” on any further
level such that ever more further beliefs are introduced. The Lewis-Carroll-
Problem for the psychological view is generated if one endorses the following
three claims:
Insufficiency of (a*): It makes sense to ask for more than the beliefs in
(1) and (2). Something more than the dependence on beliefs in (1) and
(2) is needed to explain the belief in (3) in a satisfactory manner.
Necessity of (b*): This something more is a dependence on the belief in
L.
Level confusion: The impression that the introduction of L helps explain
the belief in (3) is due to the fact that we illicitly think of the reflective
inferential step from (1) and (2) and L to (3). But to explain such an
inferential step L was introduced in the first place.
is based on inference. At other times my belief is not the result of conscious
inference, although I would mention the abstract inference i if asked to justify
or defend my belief in p; and now this explains how my belief is based on
inference.[emphasis is mine]
Harman then goes on to develop a third sense in which belief can be based on inference.
His third sense roughly corresponds to the dispositional account. I am here interested in
his second sense in which a belief is “based on inference”. Adapted to the current example,
it suggests a different condition in place of (b*):
(b+) the subject would appeal to (1) and (2), if asked to justify or defend her belief in
(3)
In fact, the citation suggests an account of believing for a(n) (inferential) reason that
replaces both (a*) and (b*) with (b+), making it the only condition on believing (3) for
the reason provided by the justified beliefs in (1) and (2). But it is equally a not too
implausible alternative to (b*) in an account which in addition requires that the beliefs in
the premises are sustaining causes.
It has been argued that an appeal to dispositions to justify a belief in certain ways
cannot help account for what it is to believe for a reason. The main problem that has
been identified is the problem of rationalization. The idea is that subjects who rationalize
do not believe for the reason they would cite as their reason. Now, this critique applies to
an account which appeals to (b+) as unique condition. It is not obvious that it applies to
(b+) as an additional condition besides (a*). Leite [2004] is a recent defense of an account
of believing for a reason that appeals to how the subject would justify her belief.
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I have claimed in 2.3 that the third claim is far from obviously true. Why
should it be assumed that L’s role in the explanation of the belief in (3) is that
of a belief in a premise in a reflective inference? The dispositional account
provided an instance of an account that appeals at least to a sort of belief
in L, but that does not ascribe a premise-like role to that (sort of) belief.
But the belief-proper account appeals to a proper belief. In addition, on the
dispositional account the dependence of the belief in (3) on the disposition
is of an altogether different kind than the dependence on the premises. But
on the belief-proper account the dependence between the beliefs in (3) and
in L is not required to be of a different kind than the dependence between
the beliefs in (3) and in the premises. So, the suspicion might arise that it
cannot avoid the Lewis-Carroll-Problem. In order to be free of that suspicion,
a proponent of the belief-proper account must show that what motivates his
introducing the belief in L in addition to the beliefs in (1) and (2) does not
motivate introducing beliefs in higher-level L-propositions.
Something can be noted from the start. It is not part of the belief-proper
account that the dependence of the belief in (3) on the beliefs in (1)-(2) is
mediated by the belief in L. If the subject abandons (1) or (2) this may
have a direct effect on the belief in (3). It is not the case that the subject
has to reason reflectively involving L to come to abandon (3) once she has
abandoned (1) or (2). If the belief-proper account attempted to specify the
dependence of (3) on (1)-(2) by appeal to a belief in L, this would arguably
be an inferential dependence, i.e. a dependence in which L, (1) or (2) and
(3) are inferentially brought to bear on one another. And in this case, the
inferential dependence of (3) on (1)-(2) has been circularly specified. This
is the Lewis-Carroll-Problem. But, in contrast to the dispositional account,
as said before, the belief-proper account does not appeal to L in order to
specify the dependence of (3) on (1)-(2). It allows this dependence to be
simply causal. The additional dependence of (3) on L is merely to ensure
that the subject is in some sense aware of the fact that (1) and (2) provides
her with her reason to believe (3). Even more can be said. The belief in L
partially determines that the beliefs in (1)-(2) provide the reason for which
the subject believes (3). I will develop this claim in what follows.
It is not necessary to come back on the insufficiency of (a*) here. One point
is worth developing, though. (B) is an account of believing (3) for the reason
provided by the beliefs in (1) and (2). So, when it is claimed that (a*) is
insufficient or that (a*) and (b*) are jointly sufficient, then it is meant that
these conditions are insufficient (jointly sufficient) for believing (3) for the
reason provided by the beliefs in (1) and (2). It does not mean that they are
conditions on believing either for
82 CHAPTER 3. THE PSYCHOLOGICAL VIEW
(i) a reason provided by the beliefs in (1) and (2) and further beliefs, or
(ii) a reason provided by some but not all of (1) and (2).
I will give an illustration of the two cases (i) and (ii). This will allow to specify
the role assigned to the belief in L. Consider a variation on The Evening gets
Worse as follows:
The Evening gets Worse*: The case is as before, except that
Paul’s expectation that the evening will get worse is in a propo-
sitional form and we can ascribe to him the belief in The evening
will get worse. In fact, Paul reasons in the following way:
(1*) It rains.
(2*) If it rains, the roads will get wet.
(3*) If the roads will get wet, then the evening will get worse.
(4*) If the evening will get worse, then the roads will get wet.
(5*) The roads will get wet.
Paul uses the conclusion (3)=(5*) as an intermediary step to
reach the evening will get worse and from there he reaches the
conclusion (3) again via (4*). Somehow he fails to realize that
his intermediary conclusion (3) is the conclusion in the end.
Intuitively, this could24 be a case of believing for a reason, although an un-
necessarily complicated reason. But it is not a case of believing for the
deductive reasons provided by the the beliefs in (1) and (2). Further beliefs
are involved. So, this is an example where the belief in (3) does depend on
the beliefs in (1) and (2) as specified by clause (a*). But the belief in (3)
depends on further beliefs too. If the subject were to cease to believe either
(3*) or (4*) she would cease to believe (3). The Evening Gets Worse*, is
an example of a case in which although (a*) obtains, the subject does not
believe for the reason provided by (1) and (2). Depending on further facts
(differing according to the adopted account) this is a case of believing for a
24According to the belief-proper account The Evening Gets Worse* is a case of believing
for a reason, if the linking propositions for the different inferential steps are believed and
causally efficacious.
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reason. But even if it is, it is not for the reason provided by (1) and (2), but
for the reason provided by (1)–(2) and further beliefs, that Paul believes (3).
Thus it is a case of kind (i).
In the present context the more interesting case is (ii), i.e. when the reason is
provided by fewer beliefs than (1) and (2). It was said, during the discussion
of the restriction strategy of the dispositional account, that the conditional
form of (2) allows to see the subject as “tracing back” her commitment to (3)
to (1).25 At the same time it was said that the subject does not trace back
her commitment to (3) to what provides a good reason in N , namely the
justified beliefs in both (1) and (2). But these points suggest that one could
see the case where L does not play any role as a case where the subject traces
back her commitment to a different reason, i.e. the reason provided solely
by her justified belief in (1). Accordingly such a case can be seen as a case
of believing for the reason provided by (1). That is, it can be granted that
if the belief in (3) merely depended on the beliefs in (1) and (2), the subject
would believe for a reason, but not for the reason provided by (1) and (2).
In particular, she would believe for the reason provided by (1) alone. That
is, the case should be described as follows:
(BLO) (3) is believed for the reason provided by (1), if and only if
(a**) the subject is disposed to abandon the belief in (3), if she aban-
dons belief in (1) and
(b**) the subject is disposed to abandon the belief in (3), if she aban-
dons belief in (2).
A proponent of the belief-proper account should probably claim that this is
a case of believing for a reason, because the belief in (2) satisfies the tracing-
back intuition in the same way that he claims the belief in L does in the
deduction Wet Roads.26 I call the corresponding inference the “lower-order”
inference, because the linking proposition, (2), is of a lower-order than the
linking proposition in Wet Roads which is L.
The belief in L thus plays the role of determining which beliefs provide the
reason for which the subject believes (3). It is obvious that if this is the
25I discuss below the difference between linking-propositions that are mere conditionals,
such as (2), and linking-propositions that involve concepts such as entailment or necessar-
ily, such as L.
26Can the reason for which the subject believes according to (BLO) be a good epistemic
reason? That is, does justification transmit from (1) to (3)? It seems to me that it does
not. Justifiably believing (1) is not sufficient to have justification (to have a good epistemic
reason) for believing (3)
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role assigned to the linking-belief, there is no reason whatsoever to think
that a further linking-belief is required to link (1)-(2) and L to (3). Indeed,
according to the belief-proper account, if there were such a further linking-
belief, the reason for which the subject would believe (3) would not be the
one provided by the beliefs in (1)-(2). In that case the reason for which the
subject believes (3) is provided by (1)-(2) and L. This is precisely the case
when (3) is believed as the result of a reflective or higher-order inference.
Again, believing for the reason provided by (1)-(2) and L, is accounted for
by the belief-proper account in the following way:
(BHO) (3) is believed for the deductive reasons provided by (1), (2) and L,
if and only if
(a***) the subject is disposed to abandon the belief in (3), if she aban-
dons belief in (1), (2) or L and
(b***) the subject is disposed to abandon the belief in (3), if she aban-
dons belief in (1), (2) and L together entail (3).
So, although (b*) is also a condition on the reflective (or “higher-order”)
deduction, for it is contained in (a***), (b***) is not a condition on the
first-order deduction.
The belief-proper account does not make the distinction between the role of
the premises and the role of the linking proposition by appeal to different
kinds of dependences, as the dispositional account did. But this does not
mean that the role played by the belief in the linking proposition is the same
as that played by the beliefs in the premises. The role of the premise-beliefs is
to provide a reason. The role of the linking-belief is to (partially)27 determine
which beliefs provide the reason for which the subject believes. The role of
the linking-belief is always played by the highest-order linking-proposition
believed by the subject on which the belief in the conclusion depends. If it
is (2), then (BLO) accounts for the case. If it is L, then (B) applies. And if
it is the proposition specified in (b***), then we have the reflective inference
(BHO). But this move does by no means imply that the account is only
plausible because it confuses levels. Thus, claim 3.3 above (Level confusion)
is false and the Lewis-Carroll-Problem does not arise.
If this account of the difference between levels, e.g. the first order inference
Wet Roads and the reflective inference, is correct, then one believes for a
different reason when one makes a reflective inference to the same conclusion.
27The dependence of conclusion on the premise-beliefs as in (a*) is a further necessary
condition.
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I think this result is supported by intuitions. The following seems to be true
of reasons in general:
(RD) If two reasons are different, they have different defeaters.
As said, a defeater d for a reason r (for believing p) is a proposition such
that if the subject has a sufficiently good reason to believe d, then the subject
does not have r that she would otherwise have. In chapter it was said that
¬L is a defeater for the reason provided by the justified beliefs in (1) and (2).
Accordingly, it seems unavoidable to claim that the negation of the higher-
order linking proposition (1), (2) and L together entail (3) is a defeater for
the reason provided by justified beliefs in (1)-(2) and L. Any negation of a
premise is always a defeater for the reason partially provided by it. So, L is
a defeater both of the higher-order and of the first-order inference. But (1),
(2) and L together entail (3) is not a defeater for the reason provided in Wet
Roads.
This result is intuitively plausible. When I deduce according to Wet Roads,
I am permitted to be pretty much indifferent to evidence against (1), (2)
and L together entail (3). There might be conditions —and these are the
conditions of which one would normally think— under which such evidence
should worry me. This is because such evidence might (and normally would)
constitute evidence against L. For instance, if someone competent tells me
that MPP is invalid, then I would have evidence against both L and (1), (2)
and L together entail (3). But if the evidence is merely against the latter
proposition, e.g. someone competent tells me that the higher-order linking
proposition is false but that L is true, then I am right to be indifferent to
such evidence. This is because my reason for believing (3) is not partially
provided by a justified belief in L and therefore the relation of the set of
propositions {L, (1), (2)} to my conclusion (3) is not in itself relevant to
whether I have a reason.
Intellectualism
In the preceding discussion I have developed the idea that the role of the order
of the linking-proposition is to partially determine the beliefs that provide the
reason for which the conclusion is believed. In what follows I will introduce
the idea that the specific linking-concept involved in the linking proposition,
e.g. entailment in L, partially determines the kind of reason for which the
subject believes the conclusion. I will do this by discussing a very obvious
objection to the belief proper-account. Roughly, the objection is that there
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are many cases that we intuitively consider to be cases of deduction, but in
which the subject lacks the conceptual sophistication to grasp the linking-
proposition. In order to assess and respond to this objection it is necessary
to know precisely which concepts this proposition is built off.
In the course of the preceding two discussions I have drawn a distinction
between the belief-proper account of deduction and the belief-proper account
of believing for an inferential reason, or of inferential reasoning. The latter,
(BI) is thought to be more general than the former, (B), in the sense that
deduction is one kind of inferential reasoning. This fact is represented in
(B) and (BI) by a difference in the specification of the linking-proposition.
More precisely the first contains the concept entailment, whereas the second
was said to contain just any concept similar to makes probable. We can
read “makes probable” in (BI) as denoting a group of concepts containing
probably among others confirms, justifies, probabilistically implies, entails,
explains, evidences, indicates, is a reason for, implies.
The belief-proper account has it that the characteristically deductive feature
of Wet Roads is that the linking proposition is of the form [premises] entail
[conclusion], while non-deductive inferences allow for other linking proposi-
tions, such as the indicative of the form If [premises], then [conclusion]. So,
according to the belief-proper account as developed here, a subject cannot
deduce without having the concept entailment. For, unless he is able to grasp
the proposition L, he cannot believe it. But this gives raise to the following
objection. I first heard of entailment in my first year at University. So, didn’t
I deduce before?28
Paul Boghossian [2001] raises this objection, not against something like the
belief-proper account, but against the following more general requirement
discussed in chapter 2.1: In order to justifiably deduce (3) from (1)-(2) I
must justifiably believe L. This requirement is not part of the belief-proper
account as such, and I have not yet discussed whether it should be endorsed
by a proponent of the belief-proper account.29 In contrast this requirement
is an integral part of strong inferential internalism. The objection, however,
concerns a component of this requirement that is certainly endorsed by the
belief-proper account, namely the requirement that I must believe L. Here is
28Besides the people mentioned in the text, this objection against a condition such
as (b*) is raised in Korcz [1997, 186-87]. Intellectualism objections in connection with
requirements for inferential justification are very old. For instance, Hume [1999, 118]
argues (besides his more important points) that induction cannot depend on a justified
belief in the principle of the uniformity of nature, because a child could not understand
such a principle.
29I do this in section 3.4.
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the objection: Boghossian [2001]
[the requirement that in order to justifiably infer (3) from (1)-(2),
one must justifiably believe L] is far too sophisticated a require-
ment. A child who reasoned:
• If he were hiding behind that treee, he wouldn’t have left
his bicycle leaning on it
• But it is leaning on it
• So, he must be hiding behind some other tree
would, other conditions permitting, have reasoned his way to
a justified conclusion. But such a child would not have beliefs
about logical entailment. He wouldn’t even have the ingredient
(meta-)logical concepts.
Audi [1993, chap. 8, 241] who defends a belief-proper account (of believing
for an inferential reason) also considers this problem:
[In requiring a belief in the linking proposition] we must avoid
[. . . ] attributing to S [the subject] concepts beyond the grasp of
the least conceptually developed creatures capable of believing
for a reason.
In response on the same page Audi takes, as I understand him, the following
two measures. He allows a range of propositions with different concepts to
play the linking role. Thus besides the proposition that (1)-(2) entail (3),
all sorts of propositions ascribing different relations to (1)-(3) can play the
linking role. He mentions the following concepts: confirms, justifies, prob-
abilistically implies, entails, explains, evidences, indicates, is a reason for,
implies. The second measure is to distinguish between the belief that (1)-(2)
entail (3) (or more generally, the belief that a “support relation” between the
premises and the conclusion obtains) from the belief of the entailment rela-
tion that it obtains between (1)-(2) and (3) (or more generally, the belief of
the “support relation” that it obtains between (1)-(2) and (3). The intended
sense of the second expression “believing of the relation that it holds” is
such that the subject need not in this case, as he says, “conceptualize” the
relation.
Discussing Audi’s first measure will take some time, since this seems to collide
with the idea that the precise concept involved determines the kind of belief-
formation. At first sight this measure is not available to a proponent of the
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belief-proper account as a response to the Hide-and-Seek case. For the kind
of relation the subject thinks is holding between (1)-(3) determines what
kind of reasoning she employs. Thus if the relation the subject is thinking of
is explanation instead of entailment then she is not deducing (but plausibly
making an inference to the best explanation). But in the Hide-and-Seek case
the child is intuitively deducing and not involved in drawing any other form
of inference. I will come back to this below.
The second measure is an interesting option. Unfortunately Audi does not
develop it in more detail, so that it is difficult to say, whether the measure is
successful. It would be good if one could give an example of a thought which
is a thought of the entailment relation that it holds but not a thought that
the entailment relation holds. I think it is very plausible that even before I
heard of entailment I had a notion of a distinction between different kinds
of relations. I had some notion while sitting in the math lesson that the
reasoning by which I tried to follow the calculations on the blackboard was
of a different kind than the reasoning by which I estimated what will happen
during the next break. So, this might be an example of a situation in which
I was, without being able to conceptualize, aware of the entailment-relation
that it holds between the propositions about numbers, without also believing
that entailment holds between them. Thus it is plausible that some notion,
i.e. some pre-conceptual awareness of a distinction, of necessitation, can be
ascribed to subjects even before they possess the concept of entailment.30
Even so, one plays Hide-and-Seek before one does calculations. And the
example above seems to be a perfectly possible reasoning of a child before
school age. So, it is questionable whether ascribing notions as primitive
predecessors of concepts allows to satisfyingly respond to the intellectualism
objection.
However, there is a further possible measure which Audi does not consider.
One could bite the bullet and agree that the child does not believe for a
reason. Her belief in the conclusion is independent of a belief in a linking
proposition (which she does not have the conceptual sophistication to grasp),
hence it is not held for the reason provided by her beliefs in the premises.
So, we cannot say that the child believes for a good epistemic reason. But
this does not exclude, the answer continues, that the child’s belief in the
conclusion can be in some other way positively epistemically evaluated. She
does seem to have a reason —partially at least in virtue of her justified beliefs
in the premises and because the inference pattern is valid. Furthermore
30In a thorough discussion of this measure one would have to discuss and endorse specific
accounts of concept possession. I cannot do this here.
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her belief in the conclusion does depend at least on parts of these reason-
providing facts. Condition (a*) can be supposed to be fulfilled. If she gave
up the premises, she would give up the conclusion. And one could perhaps
say that it is partially in virtue of the fact that the pattern is valid that
the child has learned to reason in this way. Perhaps she even has the kind
of disposition to which the dispositional account appeals. So, we can say
of such a child that she is responding to the presence of a good epistemic
reason. But the belief-proper account puts high-demands on believing for a
reason. It does not consider this responding to a reason to sufficiently trace
back the commitments to qualify as believing for a reason. However, it can
admit, that responding to a good epistemic reason in the way the child does
is a good thing from an epistemic point of view. It is not as good as believing
for that reason, but it is good to some extent.31
Believing for a reason of a certain kind
The belief proper-account of inference as developed here purveys the following
roles to the linking-proposition, as said before:
(i) The linking-proposition singles out the beliefs that provide the reason
for which one believes.
31This response takes up recent ideas to distinguish between animal knowledge and a
more sophisticated kind of knowledge. See Bonjour’s contribution in Bonjour and Sosa
[2003] and Sosa [1991a]. A similar answer is given to the intellectualism objection as
raised by Boghossian in the response to that paper by Wright [2001]. Sosa [1991a, 240]
distinguishes the two kinds of knowledge as follows:
One has animal knowledge about one’s environment, one’s past, and one’s
own experience if one’s judgments and beliefs about these are direct responses
to their impact — e.g., through perception or memory — with little or no
benefit of reflection or understanding.
One has reflective knowledge if one’s judgment or belief manifests not only
such direct response to the fact known but also understanding of its place in
a wider whole that includes one’s belief and knowledge of it and how these
come about.
Some draw a related distinction between “entitlement” and “justification” or “reason”, for
instance Burge [2003, 504] and Dretske [2000a]. But Sosa leaves open whether one and
the same individual can have both kinds of knowledge, whereas Burge and Dretske take
sophisticated adult humans to have both entitlement and justification. For the present
response to intellectualism it is sufficient that there are both kinds of knowledge or jus-
tification in different individuals. Thus it may be impossible for sophisticated adults to
merely respond to a reason.
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(ii) The linking-concept determines the kind of reason for which one be-
lieves.
The first role has been explained in the discussion of the Lewis-Carroll-
Problem. The second role must now be further elucidated. (ii) raises some
questions. One can believe for a bad reason. But what happens if one believes
for a deductive reason, while the (justified) beliefs provide a non-deductive
reason? Or if one believes for a non-deductive reason, while the beliefs (sin-
gled out by the linking-proposition) provide a deductive reason? Does one
believe for a bad reason in these cases? I will address these questions and
others by defending a certain reply to the intellectualism objection.
There is a strategy for the belief-proper account as developed here which
roughly corresponds to Audi’s first measure above. The idea is to ascribe to
the child a linking-proposition with a different concept in place of entailment.
As said, on the belief-proper account of deduction this has the consequence
that the child’s belief-formation is not a deduction. But perhaps it could
be said that the child’s belief-formation (or preservation) is still a case of
believing for a(n) (inferential) reason. This would constitute a less extreme
response than the last one considered above, according to which the child
does not believe for a reason, but merely responds to one. Perhaps this is
the appropriate description for the case of a child who is sufficiently com-
putationally sophisticated to grasp propositions with the complexity of a
linking-proposition, but who does not yet have the concept or notion of ne-
cessity required to grasp L. In any case, discussion of this strategy will lead
to the clarification of a further aspects of the belief-proper account, namely
how the concept involved in the linking proposition determines the kind of
reason for which the conclusion is believed.
The child in the Hide-and-Seek example is justified. We therefore do not
want to say that she believes for a kind of reason that she does not have. So,
if the child believes for a good non-deductive reason, she must have a good
non-deductive reason. But does she? There are many non-deductive reasons
that she does not have in the circumstance. For instance, it is clear that the
justified beliefs in the premises do not provide a good reason in an inference
to the best explanation. The conclusion is not the best explanation for the
fact that the premises obtain. So, if the child’s linking-proposition was of the
form [conclusion] explains [premises], she would believe for a kind of reason
that she does not have. The child’s linking-concept cannot be an alternative
to entailment such as explanation. The idea must rather be that the child’s
linking-concept is a determinable of which entailment is a determinate.
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On the present proposal we are to see the case as a broadly inferential,
although not specifically deductive belief-formation. Therefore, we are to
think of the child as believing some less specific linking proposition. Consider
the following scenario to which I will refer as “the child–parent situation” or
“Child-Parent”:
Child-Parent: Suppose32 that the child’s linking proposition is as
follows:
IL If If he were hiding behind that tree, he wouldn’t have left
his bicycle leaning on it and But it is leaning on it, then He
hides behind some other tree.
Next to the child stands one of his parents who goes through
roughly the same “reasoning”, but ends up believing for the de-
ductive reason provided by the beliefs in the premises. Both
child and parent justifiably believe the same premises and the
same conclusion. But they believe different linking propositions,
the child the indicative IL above, the parent L (adapted to the
case).
According to the belief-proper account they believe for different kinds of
reasons, hence for different reasons.
There is something very unintuitive about saying that they believe for dif-
ferent reasons. For consider the question why they each have a reason for
believing the conclusion. I still want to remain as far as possible neutral on
general questions about when one has a reason for believing something. But
it seems fairly uncontroversial that for both, the child and the parent, this
has something to do with the same fact, i.e. that they justifiably believe the
premises and that the sequence of propositions satisfies a valid pattern, i.e.
modus tollens.33 And it is partially in virtue of these same facts that they
are justified in believing the conclusion. This suggests that parent and child
believe for the same reason.34
32This implies that the child has the computational capacity to grasp such complex
propositions. If she does not have this capacity, then one would be forced to say that she
merely responds to a reason.
33But according to the view called “strong inferential internalism” in chapter 2 the sec-
ond fact may not be relevant. On this view it is rather that the subject justifiably believes
that the propositions satisfy a valid pattern. Since I have presented the psychological
view as an alternative to strong inferential internalism, it does not matter here that the
discussion supposes strong inferential internalism to be false.
34At this point, one could modify the account in order to claim that they believe for
the same reason. The way to do this that suggests itself is as follows: One could step
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The challenge is to dispel the intuition that parent and child believe for the
same reason. The intuition is supported by the observation that the fact that
parent and child are both justified, to a large extent at least, depends on the
same facts, namely that the premisses are justified and that the pattern is
valid. But one can say the following: It seems that they believe for the same
reason, because the two reasons differ merely in determinacy. It is clear that
the child’s inference does not correspond to any of the allowed non-deductive
inference-forms such as inference to the best-explanation. Surely, the child
and his parent do not believe for two unrelated or independent reasons. The
child believes for a more indeterminate reason than the parent.
It must not be granted, the response continues, that the parent and the child
believe for the reason they partially have in virtue of exactly the same facts.
The parent’s reason obtains partially in virtue of the fact that L is true, which
is true in virtue of the fact that MPP is valid. The child’s reason obtains
partially in virtue of the fact that IL is true, which is also true in virtue
of the fact that MPP is valid. So, while in a sense both reasons ultimately
depend on the same fact, namely that the pattern is valid, they immediately
depend on different consequences of it. Moreover the consequence in virtue
of which the child has a reason, IL, follows from the consequence in virtue of
which the parent has a reason, L.
But, if as claimed above, having the same reason implies having the same
defeaters, then if two reasons differ, they must have different defeaters. ¬L
is a defeater for the parent’s reason. But is ¬L also a defeater for the child’s
reason? I will first make a case that it is not. I will then discuss an objection
to this and finally defuse this objection. If ¬L is not a defeater for the child’s
reason, then, of course, the child’s and the parent’s reason differ.
back from the formulation “believing for a certain kind of reason” and instead propose
“believing in a certain way (for a certain reason)”, i.e. move from “not believing for a
deductive reason” to “not believing deductively for a reason”. These two expression suggest
two very different versions of the belief-proper account. In the first expression “deductive”
is an adjectival modifier of “reason”, whereas in the second expression “deductively” is an
adverbial modifier on “believing for a (certain) reason”. According to the first expression
the account states what it is to believe for a certain kind of reason, namely the deductive
kind. According to the second expression it is an account of what it is to believe in a
certain way for a reason, namely the deductive way. The second account leaves open the
possibility that one believes deductively for a reason for which one could (in principle)
believe non-deductively. One could refer to the first version as the “adjectival version”, to
the second as the “adverbial version” of the belief-proper account.
In the text I argue that parent and child believe for different reasons. Hence, if these
arguments are correct, the adverbial version is not needed. In fact, it is false, if it implies
that parent and child believe for the same reason.
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If the child’s and the parent’s reasons differ, we can add circumstantial fea-
tures such that the two beliefs in the conclusion are subject to diverging
epistemic evaluations. Consider the following variation on the child-parent
situation. I will refer to this scenario as the “the situation with the logician”
or “The Logician”:
The Logician: Suppose that a logician comes along and tells them
that MPP is invalid and suppose, that in the circumstance this
constitutes for the parent a sufficient reason to believe ¬L. In
this circumstance the parent’s belief in the conclusion becomes
unjustified. The child however would not understand what the
logician tells them.
The intuition in this case is perhaps not crystal-clear, but I at least have
the tendency to say that the child’s belief in the conclusion does not simply
thereby become unjustified. This diverging assessment gives raise to a prob-
lem to which I turn in a moment: It is easier to be justified for someone who
is less conceptually sophisticated! Here the point is merely that the child’s
and the parent’s reason have different defeaters and are hence distinct.35
But this point might be contested. Even if the assessment differs, this merely
implies that different circumstantial features defeat the reason. It does not
imply that the defeaters are different. Indeed, that the child is not unjus-
tified on hearing the logician, does not mean that her reason for believing
the conclusion has different defeaters than the reason of the parent. For a
defeater, as defined, is merely a certain proposition. Actually defeated is the
reason only in case the subject has a reason to believe that proposition. So,
it is perfectly possible that the child’s reason has the defeater ¬L. The child
simply lacks a reason to believe that defeater.36
In fact, a point could be made that ¬L is a defeater of the child’s reason.
For defeaters have two features:
35I say that the belief of the child does not become thereby unjustified, meaning that it
does not become unjustified upon hearing the incomprehensible utterance of the logician.
The child may well become unjustified in virtue of the fact that some authority, the parent
or the logician, contests the conclusion. The point is that in that case the child has a good
reason for some other defeater than ¬L, for instance ¬[conclusion].
36Given it is accepted that the epistemic evaluation of parent and child differ, it is
plausible that the question whether a given subject has a good reason or not depends
on the question whether she is in principle able to believe for that reason. This can be
extracted from Williams [1981b]. Now, it is not exactly clear in what sense the subject
must be “in principle able” to believe for that reason. But it is not implausible that if the
subject does not have the concepts necessary to believe for that reason, then she is not
“in principle able” to believe for that reason.
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(i) If the subject has a sufficiently good reason for believing the defeater,
the reason for the conclusion is undermined.
(ii) If the defeater is true, the subject will not acquire knowledge.
And, it seems that if L is indeed false, then not even the child will acquire
knowledge of the conclusion of her inference. For instance, in the following
scenario, although the child does not have a reason to believe the defeater,
she does not acquire knowledge:
Community in Error Suppose one of the basic inferential pat-
terns to which the reasoning of a community corresponds —one
of which educated adults in that community think that the pre-
misses logically entail the conclusion— is in fact invalid. Suppose
that assuming the validity of the pattern yields some serious in-
consistencies; and that the best dissolution of these inconsisten-
cies implies giving up (belief in) the validity of the pattern. By a
cosmic coincidence inferring according to this pattern has not led
to many false conclusion; nor have the logicians of that commu-
nity had occasion to notice its invalidity by their a priori methods.
Children learn to bring their reasoning in accordance with that
pattern, although they do not have the concepts necessary to
grasp the linking proposition corresponding to L. Furthermore,
the children’s beliefs (in the conclusions of such reasoning) de-
pend on a belief in IL.
It seems that neither the children nor the adults of that community acquire
knowledge by means of such reasoning. They are in a sceptical scenario
corresponding to the dream-hypothesis (in which by cosmic coincidence the
dream corresponds to reality).37
According to this objection, Community in Error shows that ¬L is a defeater
for both child and parent. Hence, ¬L is not the defeater by which the child’s
reason can be distinguished from the parent’s. And since there is no other
distinguishing defeater in sight, it must be wrong to claim that child and
parent believe for different reasons.
37How should we describe the situation of the child? Perhaps we must say that she does
not have a good reason in this context, for L is false and knowledge undermined. But
then, the parent’s case can not be described as one in which the parent’s good reason is
undermined by the reason to believe ¬L. It would be a bad reason which in addition is
undermined. Alternatively we could say that the parent and child have the same (oth-
erwise) good reason, the parent’s is undermined, the child’s not; but both fail to acquire
knowledge. Thus, the child would be gettierized.
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However rethinking the example more carefully suggests that ¬L is not really
what is responsible for the fact that the child does not acquire knowledge.
It was implicitly assumed that the invalidity of the pattern results in the
falsehood of L, and that this results in the falsehood of IL. This implicit as-
sumption is explainable by the fact that we think of the pattern as something
like MPP. And we believe that it is in virtue of the validity of MPP that L
is true, and that it is in virtue of the truth of L that IL is true. But we can
imagine a situation in which this is otherwise.38 For instance, suppose that
MPP is invalid, but that a large subclass of cases that satisfy that pattern
satisfy a truly valid pattern. In that case, although MPP is invalid, L may be
true (It is true if L in that situation falls in the subclass of cases that satisfy a
different valid pattern). But suppose instead now that the case at hand does
not correspond to any valid pattern. In that case L is false. But suppose
that the child’s premises make the conclusion probable. As it happens the
child’s reasoning about bicycles, trees and where his friend hides is reasoning
of a reliable kind, although, just as in inductive reasoning, the premises do
not entail the conclusion. Thus, IL is true —not in virtue of a logical fact,
but in virtue perhaps of some laws of nature or in virtue of some objective
probability (distribution of events).39 In this scenario, it would seem that
38Some might contest the claim that we can imagine such a scenario. For instance,
there is no possible world, arguably (e.g. if we adopt S5), in which L is false. But I
think we do not have to imagine the kind of possible world to which we appeal when
judging the metaphysical possibility of ¬L. I suggest we imagine a scenario in which a
community (in the case our own) has adopted inadequate concepts. Their judgments
about modality, in particular L, are thus misguided. I suppose here that one’s concepts
influence one’s judgments about modality, just as they influence any other judgment. I
do not thereby suppose that these are judgments about concepts. They may well be
about mind-independent modal reality. So, we have to imagine a scenario in which modal
judgments are misguided. Such scenarios are metaphysically possible. We thus do not
have to imagine the metaphysically impossible.
39The probabilistic relation can perhaps already be read into the conditional IL. If the
conditional IL is interpreted as nothing more than material implication, then there is no
further connection between premises and conclusion than that either the premises are false
or the conclusion is true. However, IL can also be interpreted in such a way that it’s truth
condition involves a more substantial, e.g. probabilistic, relation between the premises
and the conclusion. However, it is not clear that the child could already have a notion
of such a substantial connection. What the child believe is perhaps merely the material
conditional. Views on inferential justification which involve linking propositions, either in
the manner of strong inferential internalism or in the manner of the psychological view,
to my knowledge normally exclude that this role be played by a material conditional. See
for instance Fumerton [1995, 88], Audi [1993, chap. 8, 241]. Their worry is that the
material implication does not express the fact that the premises support the conclusion.
This worry does not seem to me to apply to the version of the belief-proper account as
developed here. For the way in which the belief-proper account is supposed to do justice
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only the parent’s belief in the conclusion does not constitute knowledge. The
truth of ¬L undermines the parent’s knowledge, but, if at the same time, IL
is true, it does not undermine the child’s knowledge.
I conclude that child and parent have different defeaters and thus differ-
ent reasons for believing the same conclusion. Furthermore, the defeater by
which the two reasons are distinguished is ¬L. This means that to the psy-
chological difference between child and parent, namely the difference in the
linking-proposition, corresponds a difference in defeaters. However it is not
the difference in the linking-concept which determines which reason each one
has. This is determined partially by conceptual sophistication, hence by the
linking-concepts which the subject possesses, but not by the linking-belief
they actually have. Thus, if the parent’s linking-proposition is IL, she still
has a deductive reason (for which she does not believe).
In sum, my response to the intellectualism objection to the belief-proper
account of deduction, is that it is an account of believing for a pretty sophis-
ticated kind of reason. It is possible to believe for less determinate kinds of
inferential reasons that are less demanding. And even believing for an in-
ferential reason is itself already a rather sophisticated matter. I make room
for other normative appraisals, besides “believing for a good epistemic rea-
son”, of held beliefs that do not suppose such a demanding relation between
thinker and reason. This is the appraisal of a subject as “responding” to a
good epistemic reason.
I must now return to a claim relied on all along the foregoing discussion. It
is not unproblematic to claim that conceptual sophistication of a subject is
relevant for how her belief is epistemically evaluated. When we consider a
variant of Community in Error where L is false, but IL true, we also feel some
resistance to saying that the child has knowledge while the parent has not.
Similarly, in the situation with the logician, we are uneasy with the claim
that the parent’s reason is defeated while the child’s reason is not. Both
assessments were claimed to be supported by intuition. It might be objected
that there is merely an intuition that something different is wrong with the
parent believing for her reason than what is wrong with the child believing
for her reason. Do we really want to say that nothing is wrong with the
child’s belief? And if we do, does not this yield the result that it is better, at
least on the occasion at hand, to believe for the more indeterminate reason
of the child than for the more determinate reason of the parent?
to the tracing-back intuition does not require that the subject believes that the premises
support the conclusion. It is sufficient that the subject to a large extent behaves as if she
believed this. And a belief in the material conditional has this result.
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It seems clear that there are costs for believing for a more determinate reason.
There is an imaginable circumstance in which the parent’s reason is defeated,
but not the child’s. And the parent might be misled in more ways. Even if
¬L is false, the parent might still have a reason for it, and thus her deductive
reason for the conclusion might be undermined. In this circumstance the
child, believing for the more indeterminate reason, could be justified. Thus,
the child ends up with one more justified true belief than the parent. On the
assumption that having more true justified beliefs is better, this means that
the child is better off. And, thus, we are led to draw the absurd conclusion
that it is generally better to ask for the opinion of a child than for an adult!
So there must be outweighing gains for the parent. It is intuitively better to
believe for more determinate reasons. One idea is that the parent is able to
say more determinate things in response to the question why she believes or
why she is right to believe the conclusion. What she will cite (after having
cited the premises), namely L, implies what the child will cite, namely the
indicative IL, but not vice versa. The parent is able to say more determinate
things and knows more about what information is relevant and so on. But
the question remains: What good does it to her to be able to take more
things into account, when this results, on some occasion, in her having fewer
justified true beliefs?
It is not possible to fully address this question without providing an account
of good epistemic reasons. I therefore content myself with some general in-
dications why believing for a more determinate reason could be better than
believing for a less determinate reason. If we take seriously the idea of deter-
minable and determinate reasons, then the following can be said. Believing
for a determinable reason in the whole augments the number of circumstances
where the reason is defeated. Suppose I believe something because I believe
that some object X is red (the determinable) without believing that it is this
or that determinate shade of red. In that case, evidence that X is not crimson
will defeat that reason, as long as the subject has not acquired the belief that
it is some other shade of red. Similarly, if I believe for a determinably inferen-
tial reason, evidence that some specific kind of inference fails, will defeat my
determinably inferential reason. If, however, I believe for a deductive reason,
evidence that some other kind of inference fails, will not be relevant. These
are only some vague indications that would have to be fully worked out in
order to properly address the issue. Any view which relativizes reasons to the
conceptual sophistication of the subject in question must somehow explain
why it is valuable to be more conceptually sophisticated.
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3.4 Problems for the belief-proper account
The belief proper-account of the subject’s believing (3) for the deductive
reason provided by (1)-(2) implies that she believes L. Some further questions
concerning this belief must be asked. First, a psychological question: Must
the belief in L be believed for a (whether good or bad) reason, in order for
the subject to believe (3) for the reason provided by her justified belief in
(1)-(2). Second a normative question: Must the subject justifiably believe L
in order to be justified in believing (3) in this circumstance, i.e. N ?
The belief-proper account and foundations
I will begin by the psychological question. Is the linking-proposition always
believed for a reason? In order to have the means to address this question,
it is necessary to ask what kinds of believing for a reason there are. So far I
have discussed only accounts of believing for a deductive, and, to some extent
at least, accounts of believing for an inferential reason. But what should a
proponent of the belief-proper account say about, for instance, believing for
a perceptual reason, or believing for a non-inferential a priori reason? That
is, what kind of general theory of belief-formation (that can in principle lead
to justified belief) is a proponent of the belief-proper account of deduction
to defend? In order to address the intellectualism objection, a proponent of
the belief-proper account admits two sorts of belief-formations that can in
principle lead to a justified belief, namely believing for a reason and respond-
ing to a reason. There are further belief-formations that are of neither kind,
beliefs that spontaneously arise etc. Let us call the kind of belief-formation
that can in principle result in a justified belief “reacting to a reason”. It is
a purely psychological question whether someone is reacting to a reason or
not, since the reason may be good or bad.
Coherentism and foundationalism are views on good reasons. So they are
not directly relevant to the present discussion. However, it is useful to define
psychological coherentism and psychological foundationalism as follows:
psychological coherentism: All reasons to which epistemic agents are ca-
pable to react are provided by at least one other belief.
psychological foundationalism: Some reasons to which epistemic agents
are capable to react are not provided by other beliefs.
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Psychological coherentism will be combined with coherentism simpliciter (co-
herentism about good epistemic reasons). For if no justified belief is a reac-
tion to a reason not provided by any other belief, then there is no point in
affirming that there are good epistemic reasons not provided by other beliefs.
For such a reason would always be irrelevant to actually held beliefs. I will
refer to reasons not provided by other beliefs as foundational reasons. Psy-
chological foundationalism is incompatible with coherentism simpliciter. For
all belief-formations counting as reactions to reasons are in principle capable
of yielding justified beliefs. Thus, if it is possible to react to a foundational
reason, then it is possible to have a justified belief as the result of such a
belief-formation. Hence, there are possible good epistemic reasons not pro-
vided by other beliefs.
Psychological coherentism does not pose a problem for the belief-proper ac-
count for it entails the following claim:
coherentism about reasons for the sophisticated (CS): All reasons for
which it is possible to believe are provided by other beliefs.
This means that all believing for a reason is believing for an inferential reason.
Hence (BI) covers all cases of believing for a reason.
Psychological foundationalism is compatible with (CS). It is thus compatible
with the claim that (BI) covers all instances of believing for a reason. In that
case it would have to adopt the following claim:
(FR) All reacting to foundational reasons is merely responding to a reason.40
This means that the foundations, i.e. the beliefs that are reactions to a
reason that is not provided by other beliefs, are not believed for a reason.
The foundations are justified, if they are,41 in virtue of the fact that there
is a good reason to believe them and that the subject is responding to this
reason in the less intellectually demanding way alluded to above.
Let us illustrate the kind of foundationalism that endorses (FR) with an
example. On most recent foundationalist views perceptual beliefs are foun-
dations. Suppose a subject has a good epistemic reason for a perceptual
40In other words: It is impossible to believe for a foundational reason.
41Notice that my use of “foundation” here is not the same as a foundationalist about
good epistemic reasons uses them. For here a belief can be a foundation, even if it is
unjustified. It is merely a belief that is a reaction to a reason, whether good or bad, that
is not provided by any further belief. Thus, “foundation” is a psychological description,
not a normative one.
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belief, e.g. a belief about some middle-sized material object in the subject’s
visual field. This reason is not provided by any other belief of the subject.
The presence of this good perceptual reason has plausibly something to do
with the fact that the subject has a visual experience. According to (FR)
the subject does not believe for that good perceptual reason, but it merely
responds to it.
In contrast a foundationalism that denies (CS) could say that the subject
in that case believes for a non-inferential reason. A proponent of this view
must provide some account of believing for a reason besides (BI), namely an
account of believing for a non-inferential reason. The account of believing
for a reason provided by (BI) must be extended so that it can apply to
foundations. In providing such an account one must do justice to the tracing-
back intuition. For this is a general intuition about believing for a reason.
But a proponent of the belief-proper account is hard pressed to provide such
an account that does justice to the tracing-back intuition. She could not
simply deny that the tracing-back intuition applies to foundations. For the
intuition is that when on believes for a reason, no matter what kind of reason,
then one is able to trace-back one’s commitments. Assuming foundational-
ism, having perceptual justification does not depend on a further justified
belief. Does this mean that there are no commitments to which the subject
could trace back her perceptually justified belief? It is clear that having a
perceptual reason does depend on some further facts, for instance on the
fact that one has a perceptual seeming. Shouldn’t the subject trace-back
her belief to the perceptual seeming then? If yes, wouldn’t a proponent of
the belief-proper account have to say that the subject does trace back by
having a linking-belief. But what are in this case the linked contents and
by which concept are they linked? This question brings with it a lot of dif-
ficulties. For instance, on some views the content of the perceptual state
is non-conceptual. But how could non-conceptual content be partially the
content of a linking-belief? Claiming that the content I have a perceptual
seeming with non-conceptual content C is linked to the content of the per-
ceptual belief will not help. For either this content is non-conceptual and
then it cannot be linked, or it is conceptual, but then is the content of a
propositional attitude about what perceptual state I am in. And in this
case, the perceptual belief is not a foundation for its justification depends on
the justification of this attitude.
It is not clear that these are insurmountable problems. One could adopt
the view that perceptual states have conceptual content and try to argue
that there can be a linking-belief. Or one could introduce some further ways
(besides linking-beliefs) to trace back one’s commitment. But this risks to
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undermine the motivation for the belief-proper account of believing for an
inferential reason.
However, at this point there are a few further options available for a pro-
ponent of the belief proper account. The simplest is to adopt psychological
coherentism. However, since this is incompatible with foundationalism sim-
pliciter, one thereby excludes one very prominent and plausible theory of
good epistemic reasons. It would clearly be better, if the view were com-
patible with the kind of moderate foundationalism that is held by many
people.42 The remaining option is psychological foundationalism that adopts
(FR). This is the view on which the foundations are mere responses to rea-
sons, but not believed for a reason.
But this option brings with it a “slumping problem”: Believing for a reason is
supposed to be more valuable than merely responding to a reason. Consider
againWet Roads. It is said that (3) can be believed for the reason provided by
the justified beliefs in (1)-(2), or (3) can be believed as a result of responding
to the reason provided by (1)-(2), as when a sufficiently young child comes
to believe (3). But believing (3) for a reason is better than believing (3) as a
result of responding to a reason. Suppose that the belief in (1) is perceptually
justified. Now, if that means that (1) is not believed for a reason but merely
believed as a result of responding to a reason, this seems to imply that the
relative value of believing (3) for a reason compared to merely responding to
a reason is slumped. Perhaps there is a good argument that it is still better
in a relevant way. Again, let us take note of this problem without excluding
that it can be solved.43
Thus, it must be noted that the belief-proper account is not altogether at
ease with foundations. If it allows that foundations are believed for a reason,
then it risks to undermine the motivation for the linking-belief requirement
on holding non-foundational beliefs for a reason. If it adopts the view that
all foundations are merely responses to reasons, then it faces the slumping-
problem. And if it excludes foundations altogether, then it excludes a very
plausible epistemological view.
42“moderate” because it allows the foundations to be defeasibly justified. Classical
foundationalism, in contrast, postulates indefeasible, self-evident foundations.
43Such a slumping-problem is considered by Wright [2004b] against his own appeal to
“entitlement”, a lower kind of justification.
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An infinite regress of beliefs
But let us return to the (psychological) question whether the linking-proposition
is always believed for a reason. This question hints at the possibility of a
regress of beliefs as follows:
(I) The linking-proposition is always believed for a reason.
(II) Believing for a reason always implies believing some linking-
proposition.
(III) If one believes for a reason, then one has an infinity of beliefs
and one single belief depends on an infinity of further beliefs.
We can now apply the discussion of foundations to the case of the linking-
belief. In fact, we find the proponent of the belief-proper account in a sim-
ilarly uneasy position. For it might initially seem that if the linking-belief,
at least at some point, were a foundation, then the regress could be halted.
However, this move merely brings again the problems with foundations to
the fore.
It was said that it is hard to see how foundations could be believed for a
reason where this involves a linking-proposition. But even if this idea could
be made plausible, such foundations of course would not help avoiding the
regress. If the linking-belief were such a foundation believed for a reason
(thus assuming (I)), it would still imply that there is a further linking-belief
(thus implying (II)).
However, if the linking-belief is a foundation believed for a reason where this
does not involve a linking-proposition, we could deny (II). But then, as said,
a new kind of believing for a reason must be introduced. Furthermore this
puts at risk the motivation for introducing the linking-belief requirement in
the first place. In general the belief-proper account seems to be ill-motivated
if believing for a reason is in some cases not in virtue of a linking-belief. This
would mean one has to accept (II). The linking-belief cannot be a foundation
believed for a reason in a way not involving a further linking-belief.
Again if the linking-belief is a foundation not believed for a reason we face
the slumping problem. In general, if one does not accept (I), then one seems
to face a variant of the slumping-problem. For instance, if the linking-belief
is not even a reaction to a reason, then one must ask: How worthy can it
be to believe for a reason as opposed to responding to a reason, if believing
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for a reason involves a belief that is not even a response to a reason? And if
the linking-belief is a reaction to a reason but merely a response, a similar
question can be asked: How worthy can it be to believe for a reason as
opposed to responding to a reason, if believing for a reason involves a belief
that is no more than a response to a reason?
It is not too implausible, at least not for the case of deduction, that the
linking-belief is a foundation. Of course, it can be excluded that linking-
beliefs are perceptual foundations. They do not have the sort of content that
can be directly perceptually supported. The question is whether they could
be some other sort of foundation. In particular, on some theories of justifica-
tion a priori intuitions can support belief. A priori intuitions are (defeasible)
direct, i.e. non-inferential, insights into certain truths. There are two ways
in which a proponent of the belief-proper account could incorporate a priori
intuitions in order for the linking-proposition to play the role of a founda-
tion.44 She could take them to be seemings, i.e. perhaps non-propositional
experiential (non-sensory) states which (perhaps partially) provide a reason
to believe the linking proposition —a bit like (according to some at least)
non-propositional perceptual states provide a reason for perceptual belief.
Or, she could take them to be a kind of propositional attitude and claim
that the linking-proposition must not be believed properly, but “intuited”
(thus rendering the name “belief-proper account of deduction” somewhat
inappropriate).45
But the problem is that even if the linking-belief is a foundation, this must be
in either one of the three ways alluded to above:(i) A foundation believed for a
reason where this involves a further linking-belief. (ii) A foundation believed
for a reason where this does not involve a linking-belief. (iii) A foundation
not believed for a reason. The first does not avoid the regress. The second
undermines the belief-proper account. The third faces the slumping problem.
So foundations do not seem to bring the solution to the regress.
But if the linking-beliefs are always believed for an inferential reason, then
we have in fact not only an infinity of linking-beliefs, but also an infinity of
beliefs providing the reasons for the infinitely many linking-beliefs. For each
linking-proposition is believed for a reason, where this reason is provided
by a further belief and believing for this reason therefore involves a further
linking-proposition.
44That there are a priori foundations is a very traditional and influential idea. In
recent times it has been endorsed among many others by Chisholm, Bonjour [1998, 2003,
2005],Burge [1993],Bealer [1992], Goldman [1999a].
45For accounts of a priori intuitions, see Goldman and Pust [1998], Bealer [1998, 1999,
2004], Sosa [1998].
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In summary, a proponent of the belief-proper account faces a trilemma.
(i) Either the beliefs in the linking propositions are not foundations, then
they are believed for an inferential reason, and then there is a regress
of linking beliefs as well as of linked (supporting) beliefs;
(ii) or they are (at some point) foundations and foundations are not believed
for a reason, and then we face the slumping-problem;
(iii) or they are foundations and foundations are believed for a reason. But
it is hard to explain how foundations could be believed for a reason, in
a way that takes the tracing-back intuition on board. And if this means
that there must be a linking proposition, then there is an infinite regress
of linking-propositions.
It is to be noted that this trilemma does not depend on adopting psycho-
logical foundationalism. For the first horn is the problem as it arises for a
psychological coherentist.
It is not my aim to present this dilemma as a fatal argument against the
belief-proper account. It is here rather meant as an indication that there
is no obviously unproblematic path to accounting for the manner in which
the linking-belief is psychologically embedded with the subject’s other states.
Perhaps one or more of the horns of the trilemma turns out on scrutiny not
to be so worrisome.
For instance, it is not clear that horn (ii) is so problematic. For the slumping
problem mentioned before in the discussion of foundations is not exactly the
slumping problem that arises in connection with the linking-belief. We can
call the former problem “the slumping problem for foundations”, the latter
“the slumping problem for the linking-belief”. As said, a given “foundation”
in the psychological sense I use this term can be justified or unjustified. But
foundations can in principle be justified. And for a foundationalist about
good epistemic reasons, some foundations are justified. Furthermore he holds
that the justification of all non-foundational beliefs rests on the justification
of the foundations. Thus, for him the slumping problem arises as follows.
The kind of justified belief one has, when one believes for a good epistemic
reason, is better than the kind of justified belief one has, when one responds
to a good reason. So, suppose a given justified foundation is not believed
for a good reason (as none are on the view under consideration). If now
someone believes for a reason partially provided by that justified foundation,
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the justification obtained by her belief rests on an instance of the lower-
kind of justification obtained by the foundation. That the belief is held46
for a reason ensures that the subject traces back her commitments. But, if
foundations are not believed for a reason, she traces back these commitments
to beliefs that are crucial for her justification and there stops to trace further
back. This seems not to be a much more responsible behavior than when one
does not trace back one’s commitments from the start. This is the slumping
problem that arises for this way of dealing with foundations.
The slumping problem for the linking-belief is not exactly the same. For
suppose the linking-belief is such a foundation not believed for a reason.
Suppose it is justified in virtue of being a response to a good reason. Does in
this case the justification obtained by the the belief in the conclusion rest on
the lower kind of justification obtained by the linking-belief? No, for the good
reason for which the conclusion is believed is not provided by the justified
linking-belief at all. This is different from the case where the foundation
provides the reason for which one believes. In fact, it is not even clear that
the linking-belief must be justified in the first place. This is the question to
which I now turn.
The justificatory status of the linking-belief
The second questioned asked at the beginning of this section was whether
the linking-belief must be believed for a good reason. Or we can now ask,
whether it must be believed for a good reason, or at least “be a response to”
a good reason.
We have already seen a way in which the psychological view imposes con-
straints on N that can be qualified as “normative”. If believing for a deduc-
tive reason involves having some propositional attitude, e.g. as according to
the psychological view, an attitude towards L, then the subject must not have
conflicting attitudes, e.g., as seen, disbelieving L. When this happens a (nor-
mative) rational requirement is violated. This was claimed in chapter 2.4.
The questioned asked here is whether the attitude towards L postulated by
the psychological view must in addition to not violating a rational require-
ment be supported by reasons.47
Believing (3) for the reason provided by (1) and (2) implies that
the subject believes a linking-proposition L. Suppose that the be-
46I use “held for a reason” as a stylistic variant of “believed for a reason”.
47For the distinction between support by reasons and rational requirement, see there in
chapter 2.4.
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lief in L is completely unjustified, for instance because the subject
has strong evidence against L. It sounds false to say that in that
circumstance the belief in (3) is justified. Hence, the linking-belief
must be justified.
However, it is not clear that this describes a coherent situation. For evidence
against L will defeat the otherwise good epistemic reason. Thus, the subject
does not believe for a good epistemic reason. What we must imagine is rather
a situation in which the linking-belief L is unjustified, but not because there
is evidence against it, but because either there is no reason in favor of it
or because it is not believed as a response to such a reason. Only in this
circumstance could the reason for (3) provided by (1) and (2) be good, i.e.
remain undefeated.
It seems that in such a situation the belief in (3) is unjustified, in spite of
the fact that there is a good reason for it and in spite of the fact that it is
believed for that reason. This means that believing for a reason has or lacks
an evaluative property which is relevant for the epistemic evaluation of the
belief held for that reason, e.g. the belief in (3). As argued in chapter 2.4,
it can have the evaluative property of violating a rational requirement. Now
it can be claimed in addition that the linking-belief must be justified. And
this even though the reason for believing (3) does not depend on the reason
for believing L. And even though the reason for L does not even seem to be
required for the subject to be in the psychological state of believing (3) for
the reason provided by (1) and (2). Even if the linking-belief is unjustified,
according to the belief-proper account if the belief in (3) depends on it in the
way specified in (B), then it is believed for the reason provided by (1) and
(2).
This either means that it is believed for a good epistemic reason, or that it
is held in mere response to a good epistemic reason. Again, the proponent of
the belief-proper account faces a dilemma: Either the linking-belief (at some
point) is a mere response to a good reason and this risks to slump the status
of the belief held for a reason (believed for a reason). Or it is believed for
a reason throughout and there must then be an infinity of good epistemic
reasons. I will allude to the first horn as the “slumping problem with the
linking-belief”, to the second as the “linking-belief regress-objection”.
However, even if
L must have positive status: i.e. being justified in believing (3) for the
reason provided by (1) and (2) implies being justified in believing L
(for a reason or in response to a reason) (implication-claim),
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the justification for (3) does not rest on the justification for L. Here is again
the strong inferential internalist’s dependence-claim from page 39:
J(3) rests on J(L): If S didn’t have her justification for L, then S wouldn’t
have her justification for (3), but not vice versa.
The belief-proper account does not imply the dependence claim. This means
that the belief proper account leaves it open that the justification for L rests
on the justification for (3). Because the reason for (3) does not depend on
the reason for L, it is possible that the reason for (3) supports the reason for
L. Perhaps there does not happen to be a reason provided partially by the
deduced belief in (3) supporting the belief in L, but the implication-claim
leaves it open. Such a justification of L would not beg the question, for the
justification for (3) does not rest on the justification for L.
That the belief-proper account does not imply the dependence-claim has im-
portant consequences for the present problem. With respect to the linking-
belief regress-objection the following can be said: Even if there is an infinite
number of justified linking-beliefs, this does not entail that there is an infinite
number of reasons. The reasons for the linking-beliefs or the linked premises
do not rest on one another. Thus reasons used earlier in the chain of reasons
can reappear at a later stage. The implication-claim together with the claim
that each linking-belief is believed for a good epistemic reason does not en-
tail a structure of reasons such that each reason obtains only if an infinity
of further reasons obtains. Rather there could be reasons (themselves not
depending on any further reason) supporting the structure of infinitely many
beliefs at various points.
In general, the implication-claim obtains more as a matter of internal coher-
ence than as a matter of there being something bad about the reason for
believing (3) when the linking-belief is unjustified. One could say that when
the linking-belief is unjustified, then the way the subject believes for a (let
us suppose) good epistemic reason produces some “collateral damage”. The
implication-claim thus points to a collateral requirement on believing for a
good epistemic reason.
This collateral status of the implication-claim not only shows the alleged
regress in a more benign light, I think that it also supports the view that the
slumping problem with the linking-belief is much less of a problem than it
might appear. For that the linking-belief is a mere response to a reason is
not obviously as bad as when the belief in (1) or (2) that provides the reason
for believing (3) is a mere response to a reason. The justification for L in
N is a justification for a belief with a very specific function. Namely, the
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function of establishing for which reason the subject believes (3). Whether
the reason is good or bad does not depend on the justification for that belief
(although if it’s negation is justified, then the reason is defeated). It seems
to me plausible to claim that when the justification for a belief with this
function is of a lower kind, this does not lower the justification for the belief
for which a reason is provided.
I think of the two horns of the dilemma, I prefer the slumping problem with
the linking-belief. Intuitively the idea is this —expressed in terms reminiscent
of the quotation from Boghossian [2001] in chapter 2.1:
In believing for a reason one has to start with taking some things
to be reasons. One has to take certain linking-contents for granted.
One cannot indefinitely take things for epistemic reasons only be-
cause one takes some other things to be reasons for thinking that
the first things are reasons. At some point one has to start with
taking things for reasons.
Against taking the regress route speaks here simply the fact that I would
have an infinity of linking-beliefs. (As suggested, the infinity of beliefs could
perhaps be supported by a finite number of reasons.) It is true that passages
such as these illicitly suggest that there would have to be ever a temporally
antecedent linking-belief and this might be partially responsible for the im-
pression that there can not be infinitely many (for that would take an infinite
amount of time). The belief-proper account does not imply that the linking-
beliefs are temporally antecedent. Still the mere fact that the subject must
believe an infinity of contents, where there does not appear to be a clear way
how the beliefs are extended from a finite set of beliefs —as it is the case with
beliefs about numbers— does speak against there being an infinite number
of linking-beliefs.
So, if we take the slumping-horn, then one somehow “starts” with certain
linking-beliefs without believing them for a reason. This does not mean that
it is completely arbitrary which linking-beliefs one has. One is by certain
factors such as one’s psychological make-up, one’s upbringing in a certain
community etc. lead to taking certain things for reasons. Furthermore, these
factors happen to shape one in such a manner that one starts with taking
certain things for reasons in response to the actual presence of a reason (for
believing the relevant linking-proposition). The fact that one does not believe
the linking-proposition for these reasons does not lower one’s justification.
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3.5 Sensitivity to defeaters
In this section I propose a version of the psychological view which I think
avoids at least one of the problems mentioned in section 3.4. In particular, it
is a version that can be extended to yield an account of foundational believing
for a reason. Thus it avoids the serious slumping problem that arises on the
belief-proper account when the premises of an inference are foundations; i.e.
the problem called the “slumping problem for foundations”.
Here is the sketch of an alternative to (B). I will call the alternative “the
sensitivity account of deduction”.
(S) (3) is believed for the deductive reasons provided by (1) and (2), if and
only if
(a°) the subject is disposed to abandon the belief in (3), if she abandons
belief in (1) or (2), and
(b°) the subject is disposed to abandon the belief in (3), if she obtains
evidence against L.48
In order to sketch a defense of the sensitivity-account I will address in turn
the following questions: (i) How does (b°) allows to distinguish the sensitivity
account from minimalism? (ii) How does (b°) account for what I have called
the “tracing-back-intuition”? (iii) Why does (b°) warrant the ascription of
an attitude towards L? (iv) How can the account be extended to founda-
tional believing for a reason? (v) What does the account imply about the
justificatory status of L?
(i) The clause that differs from (B) is (b°). This clause states that the
subject is sensitive to evidence in favor of a certain defeater, i.e. ¬L. This is
not simply the statement that ¬L is a defeater. What is and what is not a
defeater is not obviously49 a question about the subject’s psychology. Some
proposition could be a defeater for a given reason without the subject being
sensitive to evidence in favor of it. For instance, suppose I have a perceptual
reason for believing that I wear grey socks. A defeater with respect to this
48It was said in chapter 2.1 that “evidence” can be conceived of in many different ways.
Here I am not completely neutral between these conceptions. The sensitivity in question
is a sensitivity to certain mental states. Thus in this section when I speak of evidence,
certain mental states are meant. However, if another conception of evidence is preferred,
one could characterize the relevant sensitivity in terms of states which provide or could
provide evidence against L. This is a similar move as when it was said that the beliefs in
(1) and (2) “provide” a reason for believing (3).
49See note 50.
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reason is the proposition Under current lighting-conditions blue objects appear
grey. This is true independently of the question whether I actually believe
that my socks are grey, or whether if I were to believe it, I would be sensitive
to evidence in favor of that defeater. That is, it is independent of how I
psychologically stand with respect to the proposition Under current lighting-
conditions blue objects appear grey. Whether I am sensitive to a certain
defeater, in contrast, is a purely psychological question.50
This means that the sensitivity account still requires more than minimalism.
On both views ¬L is a defeater. But on the sensitivity account it is a require-
ment on N that the subject is sensitive to that defeater, while according to
minimalism it is not.
(ii) How does the sensitivity account deal with the tracing-back intuition?
Again, the most literal way to understand the locution “tracing back one’s
commitment” would warrant ascription of a belief in My reason for believing
(3) depends on my reasons for believing (1)-(2). But as the belief-proper
account, so too the sensitivity account ascribes to the subject a psychology
that in it’s result in belief-revising behavior resembles a subject who would
believe My reason for believing (3) depends on my reasons for believing (1)-
(2). But the sensitivity account ascribes only what is barely necessary for
showing this belief-revising behavior. Thus, on the belief-proper account
evidence against L was relevant because in a rational subject it would lead
to abandoning L, which would lead by clause (b*) to abandoning (3). On
the sensitivity account, the “middle event”, i.e. abandoning belief in L is cut
out. Still that evidence against L leads to abandoning (3) is the result which
would obtain if the subject believed My reason for believing (3) depends on
my reasons for believing (1)-(2) for a reason provided by L. Thus, in this
sense, the belief-revising behavior of the subject is as if she “traced back
her commitment to (1) and (3)” in the full sense of having beliefs about her
reasons or commitments.
(iii) Why does (b°) warrant the ascription of an attitude towards L? In a sim-
ilar sense in which it can be said that the “subject traces back her commit-
ment” one can also ascribe an attitude towards L. Again, the belief-forming
50On some accounts of having a reason, whether I have a reason and whether something
is a defeater for a given reason depends on my psychology in the following way: I have a
reason to act or believe in a certain way, if and only if, an idealized self, an idealized exten-
sion of my current psychology, would act or believe in that way. Similarly D is a defeater,
only if an idealized self would when given the information that D, not act or believe in
a certain way (it would otherwise act or believe). But even on such an account whether
something is a defeater does not solely depend on my current non-idealized psychology,
whereas whether I am sensitive to D solely depends on my current psychology.
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behavior is as if the subject believed L. More specifically, the belief-revising
behavior (the conditions under which the subject would revise her belief in
(3)) is as if the subject relied on a belief in L. Let us call the attitude ascribed
in virtue of this similarity to belief “confidence in L”. Confidence, just as be-
lief, is a mode of entertaining a proposition. Other modes are supposing,
imagining, wondering etc. But confidence is more similar to belief than these
other modes.51
But this gives immediately rise to the next question. If the behavior is as
if she believed L, why do we not ascribe to the subject a belief in L, i.e.
a non-occurrent belief. After all, belief is plausibly seen as a psychological
state individuated by a very complex disposition (or the material basis typ-
ically resulting in such a disposition)52 to behave in certain ways —where
the “behavior” in question has to be taken in a broad sense including hap-
penings in conscious thought. Some beliefs are non-occurrent and they are
probably ascribed partially in virtue of a certain disposition to behave in
certain ways and form certain occurrent conscious thoughts.53 For all their
similarity, the state of having confidence in L must also be dissimilar to the
51Following Cohen [1989] there is some literature on distinguishing some belief-like state,
referred to most often as “acceptance” from belief. Unfortunately I cannot discuss here in
detail how confidence stands with respect to this distinction (which appeals among other
things to a difference in voluntariness). I use the designation “confidence” by reference to
“rational trust” from Wright [2004b]. The principal feature of “trust” is that it can be
reasonable in the absence of evidence in favor of the proposition in which one trusts. I claim
later something similar about confidence. However, confidence is different from “trust”
(and Cohen’s “acceptance”) in that, as I claim later in this and the next chapter, confidence
does not provide a reason for a belief. For instance, being (reasonably) confident in L does
not provide a reason for believing L or any other proposition. According to Wright, as I
understand him, “trust” in L supports “a claim to being warranted”. Thus, “trust” in L
provides a reason for claiming (believing) (1) and (2) provide a good reason for believing
(3).
52See note 53
53 Partially individuating belief in this way does not commit one to a functional theory
of the mind, or, even worse, a behaviorist theory of the mind. Furthermore, since I merely
individuate the mode ‘belief’ functionally, I do not thereby individuate the content held
in this mode functionally. Furthermore, I want to allow for the possibility that belief is
individuated by the material basis of the disposition. A certain physical state (type) could
typically be the basis for such a disposition. Then, a token state of this type may be a
belief, even though in the given case, due to circumstantial factors, it does not form the
material basis for a disposition. This is a possibility I do not intend to exclude, when I
say that the belief is ascribed in virtue of the subject’s being in a certain disposition. In
this case the state is indirectly individuated by the disposition.
In fact, even the disposition need not be individuated by how the subject would act
on a given occasion. “Disposition” could be designation of the material state making the
counterfactual usually true.
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state of believing L, unless they are one and the same type of state.
An important difference lies in the typical way one comes to be in one or
the other type of state. Typically one comes to entertain a proposition in
the mode ‘belief’, when one acquires evidence for the proposition and when
one is interested in whether it is true. In contrast, one comes to entertain
a proposition in the mode ‘confidence’, typically when one is interested in
whether some other proposition is true and when one has evidence for some
other proposition. This is a very salient difference. Another, less important,
one is that a proposition that is entertained in the mode ‘belief’, is more
readily “at hand” than if one confides in it. For instance, the subject would
more promptly assert it. A further difference is perhaps that a sophisticated
thinker who believes some proposition will often be able to say why she thinks
it is true. This will not be the case when the same thinker has confidence in
a proposition (see below).54 These differences allow for a distinction between
the mode ‘belief’ and the mode ‘confidence’.
Another very important difference between the modes ‘belief’ and ‘confi-
dence’ is that belief is flexible (psychologically) with respect to countervailing
evidence. Evidence against the entertained proposition can render a belief in
it unjustified. So, one does violate some norms when one believes a proposi-
tion against which one has strong evidence. But this does not prevent it from
being psychologically possible to believe a proposition against which one has
strong evidence. In contrast, the sensitivity to evidence against proposition
L constitutes the state of having confidence in L. Thus, if one has evidence
against L one either is sensitive and gives up belief in (3), or one is not
and thus does not have confidence in L in the first place. It is thus not
psychologically possible to have confidence in L, and have evidence against
L.55
54I point here to psychological differences. There are plausibly also some differences
concerning the norms governing belief and confidence. Thus a belief which is not sup-
ported by evidence is (usually) unjustified. But one can argue that one can justifiably
have confidence in a proposition without having evidence in favor of it. When states are
governed by different norms, there will usually also be a difference how psychologically
the subject will behave in adopting and revising these states. In particular, there will be
a difference in the behavior the subject shows when she reflects whether she should have
the attitude towards these propositions. In characterizing the difference between belief
and “trust”, it is to these differences in governing norms that Wright [2004b] appeals. I
draw on these same normative differences below in the text.
55One could develop a more flexible version of the sensitivity account. As belief could
be individuated rather by the physical state that ordinarily grounds a certain disposition,
so one could individuate the sensitivity as that physical state that ordinarily grounds the
respective disposition. In that case, it could happen that the subject is in that physical
state and has evidence against L, without abandoning belief in (3). I prefer the inflexible
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(iv) How can the sensitivity-account be extended to foundational beliefs? I
have argued that the belief-proper account faces a problem when it is com-
bined with foundationalism. For the belief-proper account cannot readily
be extended to cover foundations, i.e. beliefs that are justified, although the
good epistemic reason is not provided by further beliefs. The problem for the
belief-proper account is that it is far from evident that believing for founda-
tional reasons involves linking-beliefs; and that if it does not, then how could
commitments be traced-back in foundational beliefs. The sensitivity-account
can be extended in such a way, as I will try to make plausible in the following.
On the sensitivity account the commitments are not traced-back in virtue of
a linking-belief, but in virtue of a sensitivity to a certain kind of evidence.
It is noteworthy that the evidence against L to which the subject must be
sensitive according to (b°) is evidence for a defeater, namely ¬L. Similarly,
if the account is again extended to inference in general, the negations of
the various possible linking-beliefs are defeaters for each kind of inference.
The question then arises whether we could not for e.g. perceptual reasons
find characteristic defeaters such that being sensitive to this defeater would
determine that it is for this kind of reason (e.g. a perceptual reason) that
one holds the (perceptually justified) belief.
On moderate versions of foundationalism the reasons for foundational beliefs
are defeasible. Thus, my perceptually justified belief that the wall behind
my computer-screen is light-green is defeasible by considerations to the effect
that lighting conditions are in certain ways abnormal. (This does not imply,
as insisted on several times before, that my perceptual reason is partially pro-
vided by a justified belief that the lighting-conditions are normal.) So, given
there are defeaters for foundational reasons too, could not the sensitivity to
some or all of these defeaters account for the fact that one believes for this
reason? Foundational reasons also carry commitments. In an inference the
commitments are to the truth of the premises and to the truth-transmitting
relation between premises and conclusion. In visual perception I am for in-
stance committed to the claim that the lighting-conditions are normal, that
I have a certain perceptual experience, and other things. And if sensitivity
to evidence for ¬L is sufficient to trace back commitment to the claim that
L, then sensitivity to evidence for the typical defeaters of perception will be
sufficient to trace back commitments to these claims.
So, the foregoing considerations suggest the following general account of be-
version. The reason is that I think that if on a given occasion the subject is not able
to “trace back her commitment”, i.e. is not sensitive, then on that occasion she does
not believe for a reason. The intuition is not that the subject should trace back her
commitment most of the time, but on any occasion on which she believes for a reason.
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lieving for a reason:
(SG) p is believed for the reason R, if and only if the subject is disposed to
abandon the belief in p, if she obtains evidence for some defeater d of
R.
Thus for instance, I believe The wall is light-green, and I am at the same
time disposed to abandon that belief, if I obtain evidence for The lighting-
conditions are abnormal. The idea of (SG) is that I believe for my percep-
tual reason in virtue of being sensitive to a certain set of defeaters. Just as
whether a subject is sensitive to ¬L or ¬IL determines whether she believes
for a deductive or an indeterminately inferential reason, so the specific set of
defeaters to which the subject is sensitive determines for which specific rea-
son she believes. Some defeaters (or aspects of defeaters)56 will characterize
the kinds of the reason: whether it is visual, auditory, inferential, deductive,
abductive, and so on. Some defeaters (or aspects of defeaters) will deter-
mine the reason in a more fine-grained manner: whether it is provided by
this or that belief or perceptual state. Each reason is provided in a certain
circumstance of the subject. The specific defeaters to which the subject is
sensitive will also determine the range of the reason-providing circumstance:
For instance if the subject is sensitive to evidence that some barns up to a
certain distance are fakes, then it is this sensitivity which determines that
the reason for which the subject believes can be defeated by evidence about
fake-barns in this range.5758
56Such as which linking-concept is involved
57I can here only provide a sketch of the sensitivity-account. I here therefore merely
suggest that different kinds of defeaters play different kinds of roles in determining for
which reason a given belief is held. All this has to be investigated and argued for in much
more detail.
58No clause in (SG) corresponds to (a°): the dependence on the premise-beliefs. Un-
fortunately I cannot discuss in the required length the necessity of clauses (a) to (a°). I
here introduced it as a natural view —accepted almost unanimously— that the belief in
the conclusion must depend on the beliefs in the premises. However, this is not really
relevant for the tracing-back intuition and the other main issues that I connected with the
concept of believing for a reason. It seems to me to be a defensible view that (a)-clauses
are not necessary. In the spirit of the sensitivity-account, one could replace it by requiring
sensitivity to evidence against the premises, for the negations of the premises are defeaters
for the reason for (3) provided by (1) and (2). Perhaps when the belief in (1) and (2) are
not held, then the problem is not that the subject does not believe for a reason provided by
(1) and (2), but rather that the reason is not good, because (1) and (2) are not believed.
Both options, i.e. (i) replacing (a) by a sensitivity-requirement or (ii) insisting on (a),
have parallels for the case of perception. One could require that the belief depends on the
presence of a perceptual state in the way (a) requires a dependence on the beliefs in the
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Consider again foundational perceptual reasons. Arguably, none of the de-
featers to which the subject is sensitive negates a linking-content, i.e. a
content linking the content of my perceptual experience to the content of
my perceptual belief, in the way ¬L negates a linking-content. Thus, the
problem of finding a linking-content for foundational beliefs mentioned in
section 3.4 does not arise. Since I take the slumping problem for founda-
tional beliefs to be worrying, I think that this presents a major advantage
for the sensitivity-account over the belief-proper account.
(v) What does the sensitivity-account imply about the justificatory status of L?
The fact that the attitude towards L to which the sensitivity account appeals
is not an attitude of the mode ‘belief’, but of the mode ‘confidence’, has some
important consequences on the requirement on the justificatory status of L.
In section 3.4 it was said that the belief in the linking-proposition cannot be
unjustified, if the belief in (3) is to be justified. In chapter 2.2 it was said
that justificatory status of a proposition must be relativized to an attitude:
justificatory status relative to attitude-mode: L has positive justifica-
tory status relative to attitude of mode ‘M’, if and only if a potential
attitude of mode ‘M’ towards L (which is rightly based) would be jus-
tified.
This means that it is in principle possible that reasons for being confident in
L are different from reasons for believing L. And I think that this is precisely
the case.
Under what conditions is it reasonable to be confident in L? It is plausible
that these reasons (for being confident) are provided by much less evidence
in favor of L than the reasons for believing L. Confidence in L has a different
cognitive role than belief in L. Confidence in L does not provide an inferential
reason for anything which can be inferred from L. Confidence cannot provide
inferential premises. Confidence neither supports belief in L, nor does it
support (perhaps together with other (justified) beliefs) belief in anything
else. It is therefore plausible that confidence is reasonable under conditions
in which the corresponding belief would not be reasonable. This means that
confidence in L does not require a reason for believing L.59
premises. Or one could claim that it is possible to believe for a bad perceptual reason,
without being in a perceptual state at all. This would occur when one is sensitive to the
specific defeaters for perceptual reasons without being in the perceptual state.
59It is natural to say that confidence in L would be unreasonable, if there were evidence
against L. However, this cannot be said, if “confidence in L” is understood in the specific
way this state is defined here. If one has evidence against L, then one cannot unreasonably
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Why is it reasonable to be confident in L in the absence of a reason for
believing L? In response we can draw upon an idea enunciated in Wright
[2004b] and in Dretske [2000a]. The regress-problem itself provides a reason
for merely being confident! Believing each defeater to be false for a reason
would involve a new set of defeaters corresponding to this new reason. And
if these new defeaters must be believed to be false for a reason, then there
are new defeaters again, and so on. Thus, if you want, the best way to
construct an epistemic agent that can believe for defeasible reasons is to give
her confidence in the falsehood of what she takes to be defeaters. An agent
who would try to settle that each defeater is false would never achieve being
in the state of believing for a reason. Respective to the aim of believing
for a good epistemic reason, being merely confident in some propositions is
instrumentally more valuable than trying to believe everything for a reason.
This explains why it is reasonable to be confident in L instead of believing L
for a reason. How do we get from there to the claim that it is reasonable to
be confident in the absence of a reason for believing L. Could one not claim
that one is reasonably confident in L only if one so responds to a reason for
believing L? I think this is implausible. For consider how few it requires to
defeat a reason. Quite indeterminate and vague doubt about the falsehood
of a defeater is sufficient to defeat a reason. But if one were confident in the
falsehood of the defeater in response to a reason for believing it to be false,
then the defeating evidence against its falsehood would have to overpower
the reason in favor it’s falsehood. It seems to be the character of defeasible
believing for a reason that the subject need not possess evidence in favor of
the falsehood of the defeater.
So, it is reasonable to be confident in some propositions instead of believing
them for or in response to a reason. However, can one not also ask whether
it is reasonable to be confident in precisely these defeaters and not in others?
On the sensitivity-account the precise contents of the defeaters to which a
subject is sensitive determine the reason for which it believes. Let us call
the sensitivity to the given set of defeaters “the subject’s conception of her
reason”. The question to be asked now is whether the subject’s conception
of her reason must not be reasonable. And if yes, by what kind of reason:
reasons for believing that such is the reason, or some other kind of reason?
Some evidence appears to render confidence unreasonable. This would be
evidence to the effect that ¬L is not a defeater for my present reason for
be confident in L. One is in the state of being confident in L, only when one believes (3)
while being sensitive to evidence against L. Thus, it is impossible to be confident in L
while having evidence against L. This diverges from how we would naturally speak of
“confidence” in a proposition.
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believing (3). If I had such evidence, it would be unreasonable to be sensitive
to L. Does this mean that I must have a reason for believing ¬L is a defeater
for my present reason to believe (3)? I do not think so. For the negation of
¬L is a defeater for my reason, and more generally any proposition which
supports I misconceive my reason for believing (3) is also a defeater for my
reason to believe (3) in N . These propositions are “higher-order defeaters”
of my reason for believing (3). But according to the sensitivity-account this
means that I must be sensitive to the higher-order defeaters, if I believe for
the reason provided in N . But this means that confidence in ¬L is a defeater
for my reason is also enough, if it is enough for L.60
And by the same considerations pertaining to the aim of being at all capable
of believing for a good epistemic reason it is reasonable to be merely confident
that one’s conception of one’s reason is right —in the absence of reasons for
believing that this is so. If I were to believe for a reason that my conception
of the present reason is right, I would have to rely on the proposition that the
conception of the latter reason is right, and so on. Thus, epistemic agents
capable of believing for a reason must be confident, at some point at least,
that they conceive of their reason correctly.61
I therefore think that the sensitivity account of believing for a reason promises
not only to account for foundational believing for a reason, but also avoids the
belief-proper account’s problems with the justificatory status of the linking-
belief.
60Indeterminate reasons for unsophisticated subjects are not defeasible by evidence for
higher-order defeaters, since such subjects are incapable of grasping the the higher-order
proposition. But I suppose that the subject in N is sophisticated.
61But that one does not need a reason for believing that one conceives correctly in
order to be reasonably confident does not mean that one’s being sensitive to these rather
than other defeaters cannot be evaluated. In general, various factors explain why in a
given circumstance a subject is sensitive to these (and not other) defeaters. These include
upbringing and learning, initial psychological set-up, some beliefs about the mechanisms of
belief-formation. And some features are circumstantial, for instance, perhaps the presence
of the good epistemic reason itself is partly responsible for the fact that the subject’s
sensitivity determines this reason (as the one for which the subject believes). Perhaps
the perceptual experience which partially provides a perceptual reason also triggers the
subject’s sensitivity to the relevant defeaters. In some cases the wrong sensitivity will be
triggered and as a consequence the subject will not believe for a good epistemic reason. Or
perhaps something is wrong with the factors which give rise to the sensitivity, although
they determine a good epistemic reason. For instance, if the sensitivity is shaped by
unjustified but true beliefs, then it seems that something is wrong with my believing for
a good epistemic reason. In any case, the evaluation of “appropriateness” of sensitivity
to these and not other defeaters is independent of reasons for believing that they are
appropriate. Perhaps one can say that of the features which explain the subject’s being
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4.1 Introduction
I have introduced a “normal context” N in which Wet Roads leads to a
justified belief in (3). Wet Roads is the following sequence of beliefs:
(1) It is raining outside.
(2) If it rains outside, the roads are wet.
(3) The roads are wet.
The discussion of N was so far aimed at explaining some aspects of the
following two features:
(a) The subject has a good epistemic reason to believe (3).
(b) The subject believes (3) for this reason.
In chapter 2 it was asked whether and how these two features involve some
attitude of the subject towards the proposition L, i.e.
L (1) and (2) entail (3)
In chapter 3 a certain view of the second feature, (b), was presented on the
background of taking a minimalistic stance towards the relevance of L for the
first feature, (a). In the present chapter this discussion will be placed in the
context of a broader issue concerning the justification of deductive inference,
and, to some extent, concerning justification in general. Strong inferential
internalism and minimalism as introduced in chapter 2 each falls under a
broader kind of view to be introduced shortly.
Taking a step back from the distinction between (a) and (b), we can say that
in N the subject is justified in believing (3), where this implies both (a) and
(b). Concerning being justified in believing (3) in N , i.e. being justified in
taking the inferential step from (1)-(3),1 two broad views can be distinguished
1I talk here as elsewhere as if the primary focus was the process of inference or even
the activity of consciously inferring. But as explained in chapter 3, the primary focus is
on what sustains the belief in (3). The precise formulation I used is “believing (3) for the
good epistemic reason provided by (1)-(2)”. But speaking in terms of a justified inferential
step is stylistically better. As long as it is clear that
(i) the issue is not so much the coming to believe than how the belief is sustained, and
(ii) that “taking the step” does not mean intentionally taking an action,
I believe this use does no harm.
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as follows:
Inferential Internalism: According to Inferential Internalism such a step is
justified, only if the reasoner is in a position to defend taking the step, or she
is in a position to assess taking the step as something right. For instance, the
thinker’s justifiably believing that the step is an instance of a valid pattern
could provide her with something to defend her taking the step or with
something justifying her believing that taking the step is justified. Thus, the
subject’s assessment from her own point of view, or her capacity to do so, is
relevant for the fact that she justifiably believes (3).
Inferential Externalism: This is the view that such an inferential step has
some property, such as being a step of a reliable kind, that explains why
the subject is justified in taking the step, without this property being in
any special way accessible to the thinker: neither must the thinker be able
to assess e.g. the reliability nor must he be able to see the reliability as
something that justifies his taking the step.
These are here intended as rough characterizations. What does it mean
exactly “to be in a position to assess”? Section 4.2 is devoted to clarify the
distinction. There the characterization will also be compared to other ways
the distinction between epistemological “internalism” and “externalism” can
be drawn. For there are many different ways to make that divide. What I
have here in mind is sometimes characterized as “access internalism” and its
denial.
Still it is as yet possible to relate the two characterizations to the views
introduced before. Strong inferential internalism is a kind of Inferential In-
ternalism. In virtue of the justified belief in L, required according to strong
inferential internalism, the subject is plausibly “in a position to assess that
it is justified in believing the conclusion on the basis of the premises” in the
relevant sense. Even more, it is not simply an accident that strong infer-
ential internalism implies Inferential internalism. Rather strong inferential
internalism is motivated, at least partially, by whatever motivates Inferential
Internalism. As to the psychological view, it may well be that in some sense
of “being in a position to assess taking the step” the requirements of the
psychological view do imply that the subject is in such a position. Minimal-
ism does not properly imply Inferential Externalism, for there may be ways
to assess that one is justified that are independent of whether one believes
L or not. But, again, it is best conceived as being motivated by whatever
motivates Inferential Externalism.
However, Inferential Internalism is a more general view than the ones in-
troduced before. In particular, it is more general than strong inferential
122 CHAPTER 4. INTERNALISM ABOUT DEDUCTION
internalism. A (justified) belief in L can plausibly play some role in assessing
for oneself whether one is justified in believing (3). But it is far from clear
that such a belief must be involved in any way one could so asses whether
one is justified. That is, it is not clear that (justifiably) believing L is a
necessary condition on being in a position to assess that taking the inferen-
tial step is right. So, even if strong inferential internalism proves untenable,
this does not automatically mean that no position is tenable, according to
which some other mental state or states play roughly the role purveyed to
the justified belief in L by strong inferential internalism. For instance, it is
perhaps possible to asses that one is justified in believing (3) by some direct,
intuitive insight into the fact that one is justified without having to compute
some belief. Or perhaps beliefs in other contents than L can bring one in a
position to evaluate one’s epistemic standing. Of course, these views will be
variants of Inferential Internalism to the extent that the kind of assessment
they allow for is the kind of assessment required in the locution “being in a
position to assess that taking the step is justified”.
Even once one particular meaning has been given to the locution “being in
a position to assess that taking the step is justified” Inferential Internalism
allows for different versions. Two respects in which there will be variations
can be noted. First, as will be clear from the preceding chapters, the require-
ment to be in a position to assess can obtain as a matter of (a) or (b). Either
it is because the subject has a good epistemic reason, that she must be in
a position to asses that taking the inferential step is right. Or it is because
the subject believes for that reason that she is in such a position. Second,
as formulated the requirement merely states that the subject will not be jus-
tified in believing (3), unless she is in such a position. But this could be a
consequence of the much stronger claim that it is in virtue of being in such
a position that the subject is justified in believing (3). In connection with
such variation some distinctions from chapter 2 will again become relevant.
Variants of Inferential Externalism will principally vary according to the fea-
tures that explain why the subject is justified in believing (3) on the basis of
(1)-(2). In fact, some views here classified as Inferential Externalism will not
take the locution “explains why the subject is justified” to be appropriate. A
particularly strong kind of non-reductive view about justification would hold
that it is an unanalyzable normative fact that one is justified in believing (3)
in a circumstance such as N —or at least, that once the psychological mat-
ter of believing for a reason, i.e. (b), has been settled, it is an unanalyzable
fact that the subject has a good epistemic reason for believing (3). Other
views may hold that it is analyzable to some extent, but without eliminating
the normative notion epistemic justification. Still others may hold that it is
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reducible to some notion of justification that is non-epistemic, such as prac-
tical justification.2 Then there will be full-blown reductive views which will
explain the epistemic justification by some naturalistic property such as the
reliability of the involved process.3 But in order for any of these views to be
externalist in the intended sense, it must not explain the justification of the
belief in (3) in terms of features that underly the subject’s capacity to assess
whether she is justified in believing (3).
Variants of Inferential Internalism also vary according to the property which
explains why the subject is justified in believing (3). Again the fact that
the subject is justified in believing (3) is the combination of the justification-
conferring fact in N (the reason for believing (3)) and the fact that the
belief in (3) is “based on” this justification-conferring fact. On all variants
of Inferential Internalism this combined fact implies that the subject is in a
position to justifiably assess that she is justified. A typical internalist view
will either claim that the justification conferring-fact is identical with the
fact that the subject is in such a position, or that the justification-conferring
fact implies that the subject is in such a position. However there will still
be the fact that the (potential) assessment is justified. Thus with respect
to the normative property of the assessment the internalist will eventually
also have a story what this property is: Perhaps an irreducible explanatorily
fundamental normative property. Or perhaps the property that the assess-
ment is in some practical sense justified. Even a view is imaginable on which
the relevant normative property of the assessment can be naturalistically
reduced.
A last point to be noted is that Inferential Externalism and Internalism can
be associated with the corresponding views on justification (i.e. being jus-
tified) in general. Thus, general internalism (in this sense) is the view that
for every of her justified beliefs, a subject must be in a position to appre-
ciate that it is justified. Take the case of perception. Some claim that the
2For such an account of inferential justification, see Enoch and Schechter [2008].
3Other naturalistic properties have been suggested. For instance Boghossian [2003]
attempts to explain deductive justification by appeal to the claim that the inferential
step is meaning-constituting. It is the fact that taking an inferential step such as Wet
Roads is responsible for the fact the subject possesses the concept if . . . then that explains
why taking the step is justified. Boghossian is an Inferential Externalist, for the fact
that the step is meaning-constituting does not imply that the subject is in a position
to reflectively assess that the step is justified. Facts about meaning-constitution are not
generally reflectively accessible. And it is (presumably) not reflectively assessable by every
justified reasoner that if it is meaning-constituting, then the step is justified.
For critique of Boghossian’s view, see Williamson [2003] who criticizes the underlying
account of concept-possession, and Enoch and Schechter [2006] who criticize the claim
that meaning-constitution can in itself account for the normative property of justification.
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justification of perceptual belief is at bottom inferential. On such a view
a perceptual state gives rise to a epistemic justification (for the perceptual
belief), only insofar as here are other justified beliefs, perhaps partly about
the perceptual state. Non-inferential views, on the contrary, have it, for ex-
ample, that the perceptual4 state in itself gives rise to facts about what one
epistemically ought to believe. But non-regarding this distinction, one can
hold that the perceptual belief is justified, only if theses states and whatever
is responsible for their eventual positive epistemic status bring the subject
in a position to assess that she is justified. Thus on an inferential view of
perceptual justification, the other justified beliefs are such that they allow
such an assessment. For instance these include beliefs about the reliability
of perception and similar “higher-order” beliefs that reflectively support the
belief that the perceptual belief is justified (see later for the “higher-order”
and “reflective support”). But even the non-inferential view is compatible
with internalism. It is in principle possible to claim that the perceptual state
that provides the justification for the perceptual belief also allows for the
further assessment. One could claim for example that the affirmative char-
acter that distinguishes the perceptual experience from a case of imagining,
supports the higher-order judgment that things are as they appear -which
in turn arguably supports the judgment that one is justified to believe on
the basis of this perceptual states. Of course, these are highly speculative
claims. I merely want to show that internalism in the sense intended here
can be applied in may variations to many views on particular kinds of jus-
tification. In addition this provides an illustration of the kind of question
about the assessment that the subject is according to internalism required to
be able to make.
In section 4.2 I will further clarify the distinction between Inferential Exter-
nalism and Internalism. In sections 4.3 and 4.4 I will present two arguments
against Inferential Internalism. The first is a sceptical argument, the second
is a generalization of the Lewis-Carroll-Problem from chapter 3. And in sec-
tion 4.5 I will discuss whether the psychological view is a kind of Inferential
Internalism that avoids these objections.
4Where on some views a perceptual state capable to yield justification is factive in the
sense that it implies the truth of its content. On other views illusory perceptual states
can equally give rise to justification. These and related distinctions do not matter here.
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4.2 Inferential externalism and internalism
Of the different ways to draw the distinction between epistemological “in-
ternalism” and “externalism” perhaps most well known are those appealing
to the following distinguishing feature: According to internalism epistemic
justification supervenes on the subject’s mental properties. According to ex-
ternalism it does not and, thus, justification partially depends on facts about
the subject’s environment.5 Mental properties are properties that are acces-
sible in a first-person way, properties to which the subject has privileged
access. Thus that I have a visual experience is a mental property of mine,
that it is caused by certain objects in my visual field is not a mental property.
An “externalist” in this sense could hold the following view of the justifica-
tion of inference:6 Whether an inference is justified or not depends on the
(non-mental) question whether the inference is conditionally reliable. An in-
ference is conditionally reliable, if and only if the beliefs produced by this
inference have “a sufficiently high truth-ratio for those cases in which the
input beliefs (premises) are all true”7. So, deductive inference is justified
because often enough, if the input beliefs are true, then the conclusion is
true. An “internalist” in the corresponding sense would instead hold that
no non-mental property such as conditional reliability is relevant for the fact
that deductive inference is justified. Necessarily, if the mental properties in-
volved in deduction (e.g. the premise-beliefs) obtain, then the belief in the
conclusion is justified. Contingent environmental facts about the truth-ratio
of the output of deduction are irrelevant.8
5But many versions of externalism try to accommodate some sort of supervenience.
On these versions a brain in a vat may be justified, even though the experiences do not
depend in the required way on the environment. The externalist feature is then that
the supervenience obtains in virtue of environmental facts. This kind of externalism is
called “norm externalism” in Pollock and Cruz [1999, 131ff]. The idea is that it is an
epistemic norm that the experiences of the brain in a vat yield justification. But this is a
norm only in virtue of the fact that the experiences are actually reliable. The distinction
between externalism and internalism is then best drawn in terms of the contingency (ex-
ternalism) vs. necessity (internalism) of facts about what justifies what (i.e. the epistemic
norms or epistemic principles). For developments of this idea and associated semantics of
“justification”, see Goldman [1992, 1999c], Chase [2004].
6In the present section, I disregard differences between deductive and other kinds of
inferential justification.
7Goldman [1999c, 12]. Goldman introduces conditional reliability in Goldman [1979].
8The case of deduction is a bit special. For one might think that deduction has nec-
essarily a high truth-ratio for cases where the inputs are true. For, necessarily, if the
premises are true, so is the conclusion. In that case, it is not a contingent environmental
fact that deduction is conditionally reliable. Goldman [1999c, 13], at least, seems to think
just that. But in fact, whether deduction is necessarily conditionally reliable depends
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But in discussions of inferential justification a different distinction between
“internalism” and “externalism” is predominant. There the focus is not so
much the supervenience-thesis as a thesis about access to the support-relation
between premises and conclusion.
For instance, Fumerton [1995, 36] endorses what he calls the “Principle of
Inferential Justification”:
Principle of Inferential Justification (PIJ): When S’ belief in P on the
basis of belief in E is justified, then (i) S must be justified in believing
E, and (ii) S must be justified in believing that E makes probable P.9
He draws the distinction between inferential internalism and inferential ex-
ternalism according to the willingness to endorse clause (ii). This is a more
specific claim than that inferential justification supervenes on mental prop-
erties. Furthermore, it is in itself compatible with the denial of such a super-
venience. (PIJ) could be motivated (although it is implausible that anyone
would actually do this) by the claim that only if (ii) obtains, then the infer-
ence will be conditionally reliable. Thus, one could still hold that inferential
justification depends on non-mental facts.
Boghossian [2003, 229] gives the following characterization of inferential in-
ternalism:
(Simple Inferential Internalism): A deductive inference performed by S
is warrant-transferring just in case (i) S is justified in believing its
on how the process of deduction is individuated. If, indeed deduction is individuated
by the relations between propositions, then it makes sense to claim that it is necessarily
conditionally reliable:
Deductive inference is the process leading from propositions to a proposition
logically entailed, inductive inference is the process leading from propositions
to an inductively related proposition, for instance via probabilistic relations
(Goldman [1999c, 13]), and unjustified steps connect unrelated propositions.
But I have argued in chapter 3 against individuating deduction in this way. Thus I take
it to be a contingent fact that deduction is conditionally reliable. This does not presume
against strong inferential internalism or the psychological view, of course. For even if
deduction is merely contingently reliable, this does not exclude that each time a subject
deduces she has a good reason to think Necessarily, if the premises are true, then the
conclusion is true. The psychological view as developed in chapter 3 precisely partially
individuates deduction by appeal to whether the subject thinks Necessarily, if the premises
are true, then the conclusion is true.
9We can assume that the same principle holds for having justification in place of being
justified.
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premises (ii) S’s justification for believing its premises is suitable inde-
pendent of his justification for believing the conclusion, and (iii) S is
able to know by reflection alone that his premises provide him with a
good reason for believing the conclusion.
Boghossian [2003, Fn 3] claims that these conditions are meant to specify “by
virtue of what facts a deductive inference transfers warrant [yields a justified
belief]”. So, this perhaps excludes a further dependence on non-mental prop-
erties. But let us concentrate for the moment on the characterizations at
hand and ask the question how they relate to the internalist supervenience-
thesis later.
Lastly10, here is a characterization extracted from a passage of an unpub-
lished draft by Crispin Wright [cited by Boghossian, 2001, 40]:
An account of the justification of an inferential step is internalist,
if and only if it appeals to a “reflectively appreciable warrant” for
taking the inferential step.
Let us quickly compare the three quotes. The first two explicitly mention a
content that the subject has to justifiably believe or know, in order to obtain
inferential justification. But there is a difference. The content mentioned by
Fumerton is not normative. E makes probable P, at least when “probable”
is interpreted as meaning “objectively probable”, is a non-normative state of
affairs. The content mentioned by Boghossian, The premises provide a good
reason for believing the conclusion, is normative in the sense that it states
something about what ought to be believed. In the quote from Wright, I
suggest there is implicit appeal to a similar content. If we read “appreciable
warrant” as “appreciable as warrant”, then the requirement seems to be
again that the subject must be able to reflectively appreciate (justifiably
come to believe) that she is warranted (has an epistemic reason) to take the
inferential step. Thus Boghossian’s and Wright’s requirement are very similar
(unsurprisingly, since Wright’s is from a comment to an earlier developement
of Boghossian’s views on inferential justification). Let us isolate the relevant
content as applied to Wet Roads:11
10Further examples could be given. E.g. Pryor [2001, 106-107].
11But there is prima facie a difference between H and the following content extractable
from Wright’s requirement:
W It is justified to take the inferential step from E to P.
For H does not seem to imply that the premises are justified, while W does. But in fact, it
seems to me we can read both in either way. Both can be taken to imply that the premises
are justified and both can be taken not to imply this. See below in the main text.
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H (1) and (2) provide a reason for believing (3).
Again, we need not take H to commit to a specific view on reasons. “(1)
and (2) provide a reason” is meant to be neutral on whether “the reason” is
the fact that (1) and (2) or whether it is the (justified) beliefs that (1) and
(2) or the propositions (1) and (2) or still something else. Different views on
reasons will yield slightly different propositions that roughly correspond to H.
But for the most part of what follows these differences are not relevant. I will
refer to propositions such as H which states that inferential premises support
an inferential conclusion as “H” or as “normative linking propositions” —in
contrast to the “linking proposition” such as L which is not normative.
I suggest that Fumerton’s requirement implies the other. In fact, as men-
tioned shortly, if “makes probable” means “makes subjectively probable”, i.e.
“makes it reasonable for the subject to accept”, then there wouldn’t be much
difference between the contents. Still, Fumerton would require that the sub-
ject has a justified belief in H, while Boghossian and Wright would merely
require that the subject be in a position to come to justifiably believe H in
a certain way. And since having a justified belief implies being in a position
to acquire such a justified belief, Fumerton’s requirement could be subsumed
under the other. Anyway, if we read “makes probable” as meaning “makes
objectively probable”, then Fumerton’s requirement seems to be a way to
satisfy the other requirement too. For if the subject justifiably believes E
makes probable P, then she seems to be in a position to reflectively appreci-
ate that her premises support her conclusion. Indeed, she can infer from E
makes probable P that E provides a good reason to believe P, i.e. H. And
the content E makes probable P is reflectively available to the subject, since
she already has a belief in this (more on this below).
Under what conditions is the subject “in a position to reflectively appreciate
that her premises support the conclusion”? The subject must be capable by
drawing only on certain of her cognitive resources to form a justified belief in
the content. As said, these resources include inferring from an antecedently
justified belief. It is not permitted to acquire a new justified belief by per-
ception, testimony or memory (if memory involves more than drawing upon
stored beliefs). But it is permitted to form new justified beliefs by introspec-
tion. Introspection yields justified beliefs about one’s mental states. Thus in
a reflective appreciation the subject may reason from antecedently justified
contents and from contents she can justify introspectively.12 Furthermore,
12May she in addition form new beliefs by a priori reasoning? In his critique of internal-
ism, Goldman [1999b] seems to allow additional a priori justified beliefs. I am reluctant
to do so, but I think the issue depends on the precise conception of a priori justification
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the belief in H can, at least on some theories, be justified non-inferentially.
For instance, the presence of an a priori intuition (where this is some mental
state that has a content) could allow the subject to justifiably come to believe
H ; a bit like, —again, on some theories only— a perceptual state can allow to
justifiably come to believe some perceptual content. But again, such a state
should not be a newly acquired sensorial state such as a perceptual state. In
sum, the subject is in a position to reflectively justifiably believe H, either
(i) if there is a good reflective inference or (ii) a good reflective non-inferential
route to that belief. And an inference is reflective if all the premises are ei-
ther antecedently justified, or introspectively justified. And a non-inferential
route is reflective if the states which provide the non-inferential reason are
antecedent to the reflective appreciation. I will motivate these constraints
on reflection and thus Inferential Internalism soon. Let us first state the
requirement and return to the question how it relates to the supervenience
thesis:
higher-order requirement (HO-R): If subject S is justified in believing
(3) for a good deductive reason provided by (1) and (2), then S is in a
position to reflectively justifiably come to believe H.
It might at first seem that (HO-R) implies the supervenience-thesis. For
introspectively accessible states as well as antecedently held beliefs are mental
properties in the sense that the subject has privileged access to them. So, one
might think, first, that reflection is reflection on mental properties; second,
that since the reflection yields a justified belief about justification and takes
only mental properties into account, justification must be determined by
mental properties.
But both ideas are false. First, if reflection can take antecedently justified
beliefs as premises, these premises are the content on which one reflects. And
such premises can have all sorts of contents, for instance typical empirically
justified contents such as Induction has proved reliable. So, reflection is not
only on mental properties.13
one adopts. Something which I cannot provide here. See below in the text for how these
constraints on reflection are motivated.
13There is an additional requirement which would yield the result that reflection is
only on mental properties. Suppose in addition to (HO-R) the following more general
higher-order requirement:
general higher-order requirement (HO-G): Every belief is justified, only if the sub-
ject is in a position to reflectively justifiably come to believe that it is justified.
Since antecedent beliefs used in reflection have to be justified, every antecedently justified
130 CHAPTER 4. INTERNALISM ABOUT DEDUCTION
Second, even if reflection were only on mental properties, this wouldn’t mean
that justification must be determined by mental properties. That evidence
about something is of a certain kind, does not obviously yield conclusions
about what determines that something. Thus, even if reflectively justified
beliefs about justification were always inferred from beliefs about mental
properties, this wouldn’t imply that it is mental properties that determine
justification.14
Why reflection, but not acquisition of evidence in the usual empirical ways,
perception, for example? Here is a possible underlying idea. It can be spelled
out tentatively and to a large extent metaphorically in the following way:
Higher-order judgments are instruments of control of the belief-formation by
the subject. It is phenomenologically implausible (as well as perhaps giv-
ing rise to a regress) that all belief-formation is in this manner controlled
by occurrent higher-order judgments. But if the higher-order judgment is
available by reflection, though not actually formed, then the belief-formation
does not wholly “float free”. For in that case there is a well-working sub-
personal mechanism of control taking over, a mechanism the well-working of
which can be assessed on the personal level by reflection. The subpersonal
mechanism needs the same information as would the occurrent higher-order
belief implies that the subject is in a position to reflectively justify that the antecedent
belief is justified. Since one cannot draw on infinitely many antecedent beliefs (let us
suppose), the ultimate reflective reasons are provided by introspection and a priori intu-
ition. (In fact, the requirement, as is widely believed, can not avoid the regress anyway,
for the introspective, as well as the reflectively justified beliefs are under the very same re-
quirement.) This would have the result that facts about justification would be ultimately
known by appeal to reasons provided by introspection and a priori intuition. Some have
been happy to endorse this claim, e.g. Russell [1997].
14Again, with the right further assumptions it would follow that if facts about jus-
tification are exclusively known from knowledge of facts about one’s mental properties,
then facts about justification are determined by facts about one’s mental properties. A
traditionally influential route would lead via the following thesis:
Rationalism: If one has a reflectively justified belief about justification (such as a belief
in H ), then it is true.
This does not mean that such beliefs are infallible, but only that if they are justified, then
they are true. Rationalism excludes that what provides the reflective reason for believ-
ing H obtains without the justification-determining facts for the inferential justification
obtaining. What provides the reflective reason for H must be what determines that the
subject has an inferential reason (e.g. for (3)). Thus, if reflective reasons were provided
by contents of introspection and thus by contents about mental properties, then mental
properties must be what determines the justification of the inferential step. But endors-
ing rationalism would make inferential internalism unnecessarily vulnerable. However,
the thesis I call “rationalism” is an integral part of what Plantinga [1990] calls “Classical
Internalism” (ascribed to Descartes and Locke).
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judgment. Therefore this information is present on the subpersonal level and
processed on that level, but it can be accessed by reflection. By contrast,
if the information is available by further perception only, no subpersonal
mechanism of control could be in the process of using it. But the point is
not merely that the information is available to subpersonal mechanisms if it
is available to reflection, for, then, why should the information not be merely
subpersonal and not all available to reflection, one must ask. Rather the sub-
personal mechanisms which are somewhat stable dispositions are themselves
under potential (and from time to time under actual) control on the personal
level, something which is only guaranteed if the information they process is
available to reflection. This is admittedly all very rough and somewhat too
complicated to underlie the intuitive attraction of (HO-R) and it may also be
too mechanistic a picture. But I think that it is at least one way of making
the connection between control (resp. responsibility which presupposes some
sort of control) and principle (HO-R) and it seems to me that the attraction
of the principle stems from this connection, although perhaps it has to be
made in another way. It is important to note that, if that was the view
underlying (HO-R), then it would be irrelevant to (HO-R) how good exactly
reflection was. The irrelevance of the availability of perceptions as opposed
to reflective states as introspections is not claimed to depend on a superior
certainty or reliability of introspection. It’s rather because the objects of
introspection are already “in the head” and hence liable to play some role on
the subpersonal level, whereas the objects of perception do not.
In order for the requirement to be at all plausible, one needs to be a bit more
precise on the content of the higher-order judgment, in particular concerning
the concept of justification which is applied in the higher-order judgment.
An obvious objection15 is that an HO-requirement is indefensible, because it
15This objection is raised in a number of places, normally when philosophers want
to dismiss quickly higher-order requirements in order to pursue some other issue. For
instance, Pryor [2001, 106]:
One might feel that this [Access Internalism for all kinds of justification]
is too strong, especially for basic, unreflective kinds of justification like we
get in perception. Access Internalism seems to say that our perceptual be-
liefs are justified only if we’re justified in believing that they are justified.
But whether and how our perceptual beliefs are justified is a matter that
epistemologists are constantly investigating. It seems harsh to say that no
one’s perceptual beliefs are justified unless he has a justified position on that
matter.
Similarly, Klein [1999, 309]
This [inferential internalism] amounts to requiring that S not only be an
epistemologist, but also that S have a well-reasoned epistemology in order to
132 CHAPTER 4. INTERNALISM ABOUT DEDUCTION
is rhetorically asked, when even epistemologists are unsure what is required
for justification, how could a non-philosopher have justification for the belief
that the step fulfills these requirements. Doesn’t the higher-order require-
ment implausibly impose that the subject justifiably applies a concept, the
concept of justification, which is a highly theoretical epistemological concept
the application-conditions of which are furthermore much disputed? Fur-
thermore, does not the requirement impose on every so justified subject to
already have the correct theory of inferential justification, the present object
of investigation? 16
There are three things to be said against this. First, the subject need not have
any concept associated with the word “justification”. The required ability is
merely that the subject justifiably judges on reflection that she ought to
believe something or ought to hold on believing something. So, the subject
does not need to have the theoretical concept of justification.
Second, the ability to apply a concept does not imply that the subject is
able to state the fully general correct application conditions for the concept.
A subject can, so to speak, justifiably believe of the application conditions
of a concept, whichever they are, that they obtain, without justifiably be-
lieving that such-and-such application conditions obtain. So, a subject can
justifiably believe that her belief is justified without having found the correct
general characterization of justification. It is a substantial question whether
one can have justified beliefs about what is justified without knowing any
general principles. I think that inferential internalists should be “particular-
ist” on that matter.17
be justified in believing, for instance, that a thunderstorm is likely. Episte-
mology is important, but having a justified epistemology is not required in
order to have justified beliefs.
Goldman [1999a, 287-288] presents a similar worry.
16There are two distinct objections which reproach inferential internalists to impose
a much too intellectual requirement. The first one, discussed here, objects that if that
is the requirement, then no one except the most careful of philosophers has inferential
justification. The second, discussed chapter 3, objects that if that is the requirement, then
some beings which intuitively have inferential justification, such as very young children
and higher mammals, cannot have it.
17Goldman [1999a, 287-288] raises a similar objection against internalism as the one
under consideration here. He objects to Chisholm’s view that epistemic principles can be
known by reflection and a priori reasoning alone (at least not by the “common man”),
and goes on from there to deny the internalist thesis that one (or at least the “common
man”) can know whether he is justified purely by reflection and a priori reasoning. But I
think the internalist should reply by endorsing particularism about judgments of epistemic
justification. In order to know, even by reflection, whether one justified, one need not
appeal to a general principle. It is clear that the issue merits a more thorough discussion
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Third, the fact that there is disagreement about the application conditions
of a concept, does not imply that as long as the disagreement is unresolved,
the concept cannot be justifiably applied. One source of disagreement can
stem from the attempt to find a fully general application condition, or a truly
explanatory characterization of the concept. So, in some cases epistemolo-
gists disagree on the general application condition without disagreeing about
whether such-and-such a case is justified.18 However, typically if they dis-
agree on the general application condition, then there are normally at least
hypothetical cases on which they disagree. Thus they disagree on whether
the brain in the typical brain-in-a-vat-scenario is justified.19 But the dis-
agreement can be much more radical, as when the sceptic disagrees that any
number of the most usual cases are cases of justified belief. Here the dis-
agreement comes from the role attributed to some property, e.g. certainty,
which is associated with justification, without it being necessarily extrapo-
lated from commonly accepted cases. In all cases however, the arguments for
the one or the other position are quite subtle and it is not necessary to deny
(except, of course, for the sceptic) that one can be justified in believing one
case to be justified, at least before having considered the subtle argument
which disqualifies that case. In sum, disagreeing epistemologists can all be
justified, given that they have different information. 20
4.3 The sceptical argument against internal-
ism
The sceptical argument I am going to present is an attempted reductio of
a particular version of Inferential In ternalism. I will begin by isolating the
specific claim to which the sceptical argument applies.
than I am able to provide here.
18This is the case in the disagreement between epistemological internalists and norm-
externalists. Norm-externalists need not deny that application conditions for “justifica-
tion” involve only the internal state of the subject, so they agree on the extension of
“justification” as given by the internalists. But they claim that what explains why such
and such an internal state yields justification is the (internally unaccessible) reliability (in
the evolution of the species) of a belief based on these internal states.
19As when the classical (not norm-) externalist disagrees with the internalist.
20Klein and Pryor acknowledge in the cited passages that the epistemology must not be
true, but only justified.
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Explanatory inferential internalism
“Strong inferential internalism” is the name given in chapter 2 to the thesis
that a justified belief in L explains why the subject in N has a reason to
believe (3). As said, (HO-R) allows for strengthening if we pass from the
simple implication to stronger relations between antecedent and consequent.
Thus we can construct a corresponding version of Inferential Internalism. Let
us also focus again only on (a), i.e. that the subject has a reason to believe
(3) in N :
Explanatory requirement (E-R): The subject has a reason to believe (3)
provided by (1) and (2) partly in virtue of the fact that she is in a
position to reflectively justifiably come to believe H.
Here again “in virtue of” is meant to designate an explanatory connection.
Her reflective capacity at least partially explains why (1) and (2) provide a
reason for the subject to believe (3).
Now let us add an assumption about being in a position to reflectively assess
H :
(A) One is in a position to reflectively justifiably believe H, only if one has
justification for H.
This amounts to saying that the subject has a good epistemic reason to be-
lieve H, whenever she is in a position to reflectively justifiably assess H. This
seems to be a plausible assumption. The difference between having a reflec-
tively justified belief in H and being merely in a position to obtain it consists
largely in the fact that the reflective belief in H is not actually formed on the
basis of whatever provides the reflective reason. For instance, if reflectively
forming the belief involves drawing upon antecedently justified beliefs, then
these beliefs provide their contribution to the reflective reason antecedently to
the reflective belief-formation. Also, if the reflection involves introspectively
justified beliefs, we may assume that the introspected mental properties pro-
vide their contribution to the reflective reason antecedently to the reflective
belief-formation, i.e. antecedently to being actually introspected.
Taking (A) and (E-R) together, we obtain:
Explanatory HO-requirement (EHO-R) The subject has a reason to
believe (3) provided by (1) and (2) partly in virtue of the fact that she
has a reflective reason to believe H.
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I call endorsement of (EHO-R) from now on “explanatory inferential inter-
nalism”. Strong inferential internalism as introduced in chapter 2, i.e. the
view that the deductive justification in N is partially explained by appeal to
an epistemically antecedent justification for L, underlies the same idea. The
idea is this:
The fact that from the subject’s own justified point of view there
is a supporting inferential relation between the premises and the
conclusion is supposed to explain why she is right to take the
inferential step.
The two thesis merely put the accent on different aspects of the subject’s
justified point of view. If you want, the former thesis which involves L puts
the accent on the starting point of the subject’s reflective assessment, whereas
the latter thesis which involves H puts the accent on the end-result of that
assessment.21
Finally we can again connect the issue of explanation to the issue of having
antecedent justification. As argued in chapter 2, if the justification of (3)
rested on the justification of some other proposition, say L or H, then the
justification of (3) could be at least partially explained by appeal to the
justification for this other proposition. Perhaps there are other dependence
relations than the resting-on relation that could play an explanatory role.
In particular, there are perhaps coherentist ways to conceive a dependence
that would allow the one justification to be explained by the other. But the
resting-on relation is a very good candidate. So, here then is the claim which
will be used in the sceptical reductio argument against the particular version
of Inferential Internalism that commits itself to this claim:
(A1) The subject’s justification for believing (3) in N rests on her justifica-
tion for believing H.
21It is a widely accepted thesis about reflection that in reflection the question whether
one ought to believe p becomes the question whether p is true. Similarly, one could argue
that the question whether my premises support my conclusion, i.e. the question whether
H, becomes the question whether if my premises are true, then my conclusion is true, i.e.
something deducible from L. So, L is relevant for the subject only because she is about
to settle whether H. On the relation between truth and the question what one ought to
believe in reflection, see Shah [2003].
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A reductio of explanatory inferential internalism
Here is the outline of the reductio-argument against explanatory inferential
internalism:
(A1) The subject’s, S’, justification for believing (3) in N rests on her
justification for believing H.
(A2) Given (corresponding) (A1) applies to every deductive justification,
it is impossible for S to have justification for believing H.
(A3) S does not have justification for (3).
(A4) But S has justification for (3) in N by assumption.
(A5) Hence, (A1) is false.
It has been explained above that (A1) is a plausible part of explanatory in-
ferential internalism. The main task here will be to argue for (A2). However,
I will first point out how this reductio relates to classical sceptical arguments
such as the argument of the inductive sceptic.22 The main part of the argu-
ment, namely (A1) to (A3) strongly resembles a classical sceptical argument.
In such arguments it is first argued that the justification obtained by some
method, e.g. induction or perception, rests on the justification for some
other proposition. The upshot is a premise similar to (A1) (I come to the
dissimilarities below). Next it is argued that such justification is impossible
to obtain. This makes for a premise similar to (A2). And from these two
premises, it follows that one can not obtain justification by such a method,
hence something like (A3).23
There are three important dissimilarities between the reductio above and
such classical sceptical arguments. First of all, sceptical reasoning as em-
ployed traditionally is open to the possibility that the sceptical conclusion
—something like (A3)— is what we have most reason to believe. Descartes
does not appear to start his investigation from the point of view of someone
who is already certain that his beliefs in the external world, say, are justified.
And Hume endorses the sceptical conclusion that induction is unjustified, al-
though later in the text he comes to relativize this result. Still, it has recently
become customary to treat the traditional sceptical argument as a challenge
22In the discussion that follows I particularly draw on the versions of the sceptical
argument in Stroud [1984], Wright [1991, 2004b], Pryor [2000].
23See below for the difference between “lower-” and “higher-order scepticism”.
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to our conception of justification. It has been treated as an argument show-
ing that several individually intuitively convincing claims about justification
are incompatible. Even so, one option would appear to be to endorse the
sceptical conclusion.24 So, traditional sceptical arguments are not presented
on the background of agreed acceptance that we have justification in the
case at hand. But it is clear that this is more a difference in the role the
central steps (A1) to (A3) are meant to play in a particular epistemological
enterprise.
The second difference, again perhaps more in presentation than in substance,
is that traditional sceptical arguments motivate acceptance of (A1) in a dif-
ferent manner. The explanatory inferential internalist’s endorsment of (A1)
is motivated by his answer to the following question: What explains why (1)
and (2) provide a reason for believing (3)? The answer involves the claim
that this has to do with the subject’s having a reason for thinking that (1)
and (2) provide a reason for believing (3). From this the explanatory inferen-
tial internalism concludes that the justification for (3) rests on the subject’s
justification for H. In contrast, traditional sceptical arguments (applied to
deduction) may be seen as starting from the following observation:
(A0) If a certain metaphysical possibility, the “sceptical scenario”, obtains,
then we do not acquire knowledge by going through Wet Roads.
(A0) is then taken to support something similar to (A1) (again, I come to
to the dissimilarities in a moment), namely that in order to have justifica-
tion for (3), the subject must have justification for excluding the sceptical
scenario. The further assumption on which (A0) supports (A1) could be the
following:25
24And again, it has sometimes be endorsed. For instance, Popper accepted the claim
that induction does not yield justification. And Berkeley accepted the claim that we do
not have justification to believe in the external, mind-independent world.
25On two weaker assumption (A0) would also support (A1), namely:
(AD’) In order to have justification for (3), the subject must justifiably rule out what she
has reason to believe to be a condition that undermines knowledge.
(AD”) The subject in N (or we, at least) has good reason to believe that in the sceptical
scenario she (we) wouldn’t acquire knowledge by going through Wet Roads.
(AD’) roughly corresponds to what is called “Descarte’s principle” in Wright [1991] (the
latter is entirely in terms of knowledge, though). (AD’) imposes weaker constraints on
justification than (AD). For if the subject in question does not have a reason to believe
that in the sceptical scenario knowledge is undermined, then she needn’t justifiably rule it
out. But it has the consequence that it is easier to have justification, when one has fewer
knowledge or justified beliefs about what conditions undermine knowledge. This might
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(AD) In order to have justification for (3), the subject must justifiably rule
out (or have justification for ruling out) that a condition obtains in
which she wouldn’t acquire knowledge by going through Wet Roads.
Thus the sceptic’s endorsement of (A1) is not motivated by a certain view of
what explains why (1) and (2) provide a reason for (3). Rather, it is moti-
vated by what in itself appear to be plausible conditions on justification. This
does not exclude that these conditions (A0) and (AD) have the appearance
of plausibility in virtue of an underlying intuitive acceptance of explanatory
inferential internalism. In that case, the difference between the sceptical ar-
gument and the reductio of explanatory inferential internalism would again
be more a difference in presentation than in substance. However, this does
not seem to me to be the case, and I do not want to argue for it.26
I now turn to the main difference between traditional sceptical arguments
and the reductio above. This is the difference between the proposition for
which in the sceptic’s argument the subject must have justification and ¬H
used in the reductio. Above I have alluded to the proposition relevant for the
sceptic as the “sceptical scenario”. For scepticism about perception this is the
dreaming-hypothesis or the envatted-brain-hypothesis or something similar.
For scepticism about induction this is the hypothesis that “nature is not
uniform”, that the unobserved does not resemble the observed or something
similar. Unlike ¬H these propositions are (i) not about reasons and (ii) they
are general in the following sense: they are no more about any particular
instance of perception or induction than any other. But ¬H is about (1) and
(2) and (3) in particular.
There is also an important similarity between the propositions ¬H and the
sceptical scenarios. Both are defeaters. Thus the truth of either of these
propositions implies that the subject doesn”t acquire knowledge. And if the
subject had a good reason to believe either of them, her justification would
be undermined. ¬H undermines knowledge acquired by Wet Roads, since
knowledge implies (I assume) having a good epistemic reason. And evidence
in favor of ¬H would undermine the subject’s justification in N .
Defeaters generally fall into different classes. Some are about the particular
circumstance of the belief-formation. For example, I am presently too tired
to deduce in a conditionally reliable manner from more than one premise is
be problematic. I cannot discuss this issue here, as it is not relevant for the reductio of
explanatory inferential internalism.
26However, if there is a motivation independent of explanatory inferential internalism for
adoptiong (A2), then any theory of deductive justification, even non-internalist theories,
must somehow have an answer to the sceptical challenge.
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such a circumstantial defeater in N . In contrast, some defeaters are about
the belief-forming method in general. For example, Deduction is no more
reliable than reading tea leaves, is such a generalized defeater which could
be called “method-defeater”. At the face of it ¬H is rather a circumstantial
defeater, as it mentions the particular premises (1)-(2). However, there is a
similar general defeater as follows:
¬H ’ p and if p, then q do not provide a good reason for q.
Here the particular propositions (1)-(3) are replaced by proposition-constants
and ¬H ’ is thus a generalized defeater. ¬H ’ implies ¬H and evidence for
¬H ’ constitutes evidence for ¬H, but not vice versa. It makes therefore
sense to take the circumstantial defeater to be more fundamental. Any re-
quirement to the effect that the subject must have a reason to believe H
would seem to imply a corresponding requirement for H ’.27 It seems then
that the difference between sceptical scenario and ¬H with respect to the
27In fact the issue is more delicate than I present it here. H implies H ’. But H ’ might
be what Dretske [2005] calls a “heavyweight implication” of H. That is, there are good
reasons to believe H that are not good reasons to believe H ’. Here is one of Dretske’s
example of a heavyweight implication: I have a good perceptual reason to believe There
are cookies in the jar. I can see that there are cookies in the jar. There are cookies in
the jar implies Idealism is false. But I can not see that idealism is false. Thus my good
perceptual reason for believing There are cookies in the jar is not a good reason to believe
Idealism is false. It is a controversial issue whether there are heavyweight implications.
People who adopt what is called the “Moorean” response to scepticism deny that I can not
see that idealism is false. Anyway, someone could argue that I can have a good reason for
believing H without having a good reason for believing H ’. On this view, it would not be
true that a requirement to the effect that I must have a good reason to believe H implies a
similar requirement about H ’. Thus I could have a reason to believe that (1)-(2) provide a
reason to believe (3) without having a reason to believe that this is an instance of a good
belief-forming method.
I should stress that taking a requirement on H to lead to a requirement on H ’ does
by no means presuppose “Mooreanism”. First there is the option to accept that there are
heavyweight implications, but deny that H ’ is a heavyweight implication of H. Second, one
could accept that in some sense of “reason” one can have a “reason” for H without having a
reason for H ’, but that in order for the “reason” to be in some specified sense to be “really
good” or “defensible” or “claimable”, the subject having such a really good reason for H
must have an additional reason for H ’. This second option would correspond to the manner
in which Wright [2004b] treats heavyweight implications (called “cornerstones”): In order
to have a “claimable warrant” (means a “defensible reason”) for my belief in There are
cookies in the jar, I need to have some sort of reason (an “entitlement”) to believe Idealism
is false in addition and antecedently to the perceptual warrant. My perceptual warrant for
There are cookies in the jar does not provide such a reason for believing Idealism is false.
There is some additional antecedent reason (“entitlement”) for the latter proposition.
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circumstantial-method-defeater-divide is not a very consequential dissimilar-
ity.
The other dissimilarity was said to be that ¬H is about reasons while scep-
tical scenarios normally describe a possible world in non-normative terms.
A first question one might want to ask is whether there is anything similar
to the inductive sceptic’s scenario, say, for the case of deduction. Is there
a metaphysically possible condition under which deduction generally does
not yield knowledge? It is true that one encounters very rarely scepticism
about deduction.28 I think the reason is that people implicitly individuate
deduction as the process leading exclusively from premises to a conclusion
where the relation between them is in every instance logical entailment. But
given deduction is individuated in this manner, it is metaphysically impos-
sible that it is conditionally unreliable. There is no possible world in which
such premises are true and such conclusions false. Thus the scenario is meta-
physically impossible. And if that is the case, then, at least in traditional
epistemology, it is obvious how to respond to the sceptic: We have perfectly
good reasons provided by rational intuition that that scenario does not ob-
tain. We know it insofar as we are able to have non-inferential direct insight
into some modal facts. Thus the sceptic’s premise similar to (A2) would be
false. But, as said, I think this is the wrong way to individuate deduction.
Perhaps a sceptical scenario for deduction can be devised —especially if de-
duction is individuated in the way proposed in chapter 3. We only need to
generalize one of the defeaters for deduction. For instance, if subjects were
psychologically so that equivocation would be so widespread, that it was
the normal case, then deductive inference would be generally undermined,
i.e. not lead to knowledge. We can even imagine that we are in this situ-
ation. It is metaphysically possible that the different equivocations are so
combined (by cosmic coincidence) that we never had occasion to notice these
failings. At first sight, there seem to be metaphysically possible worlds in
which deduction is generally undermined. So, there is a method-defeater for
deduction which could play the role of the sceptical scenario in a sceptical
argument for deduction.29 30
28An exception is Haack [1976]. In her case it is higher-order scepticism.
29That there is such an imaginable situation for deduction, does not mean that deduction
and induction can be undermined in exactly the same way: For instance an enumerative
induction to the conclusion All F’s are G can be undermined by evidence for Some F is
G. But the latter defeater is compatible with the inductive premise All F’s observed up to
time t are G. For deduction there is no such defeater compatible with the premises, but
incompatible with the conclusion.
30Still, one might deny the metaphysical possibility for other reasons. One could perhaps
argue that it is constitutive of belief that it enters in inferential reasoning in such a manner
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Let us assume that such a sceptical scenario, “SC” for deduction can be
devised. The sceptic’s argument to the effect that we do not have deductive
justification could then run as follows:
(S1) The subject’s justification for believing (3) in N rests on her
justification for believing ¬SC.
(S2) Given (S1) applies to every deductive justification, it is impos-
sible for S to have justification for believing ¬SC.
(S3) The subject does not have justification for (3) in N , nor for
any other instance of deductive reasoning.
How does SC it relate to H? Or more to the point, how does the premise
(A1) in the reductio relate to the corresponding (S1)? An initially plausible
thesis is the following:
(SH1) The subject’s reflective justification for believing H in N rests on her
justification for believing ¬SC.
With (SH1) in place, (S1) appears to be a consequence of (A1): Because the
subject must have reflective justification for H, she must have justification
for ¬SC.
In fact, it has been argued that the sceptic’s argument should anyway rather
be construed with (SH1) instead of (S1). On this view, the sceptic does
not challenge the claim that we have justification for (3), but the claim that
we are justified in believing that we have justification. This “higher-order”
sceptical argument would run as follows:
that such reasoning is generally truth-preserving. That is in the sceptical scenario the
subjects would not be believers at all. We would misdescribe those subject’s as making
deductive inferences at all, for they do not even have beliefs. This is certainly a way to
respond to the sceptic’s argument, although, at first sight, I am not sure whether the
sceptic could not describe a worrying sceptical scenario in a manner which does not make
use of the notion of belief or deductive inference. In any case, such a conceptual connection
between belief and the truth-preservingness or truth-directedness of inference seems not
wholly implausible. One could also argue that to suppose that we are in such a scenario
is to suppose that we are incapable of reasoning anyway. And this is a scenario we have
every right to discard, since it makes no sense to ask a question, e.g. about justification,
without assuming that we are in a position to say something sensible about it. [Cf. Adam
and Tannery, 1996 (1645), First meditation]
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(SH1) The subject’s justification for reflectively believing H in N
rests on her justification for believing ¬SC.
(SH2) It is impossible for S to have justification for believing ¬SC
under this circumstance.
(SH3) The subject does not have reflective justification for H in
N , nor for a corresponding H for any other instance of de-
ductive reasoning.
(SH2) states that in the context of reflectively investigating whether H, it is
not possible to have justification for ¬SC. I will discuss the different versions
of the second premise in a moment. With the higher-order sceptical argument
vindicated, the falsehood of explanatory inferential internalism would follow.
For from (SH3) and (A1) it follows that the subject does not have justification
for believing (3) in N . In fact, (SH3) roughly corresponds to (A1).
So, on the one hand there is a structural similarity between the sceptic’s
argument and the reductio of explanatory inferential internalism. A first
premise states that the justification in question, e.g. for (3), rests on the
justification for some other proposition, e.g. SC or H. The second premise
states that it is under the relevant conditions impossible to have justifica-
tion for this other proposition. On the other hand, there are some relations
between the respective premises. Strong inferential internalism (here (A1))
can be seen as a possible motivation for the sceptic’s first premise (S1). And
the higher-order sceptical argument supports the second premise in the re-
ductio. Both relations depend on the claim (SH1), i.e. the claim that the
reflective justification for H rests on the justification for the negation of the
sceptical scenario. I hope that this comparison helps prepare the ground for
the following discussion of the second premise of the reductio.
The argument for the second premise
Again, the second premise is the following:
(A2) Given (corresponding) (A1) applies to every deductive justification, it
is impossible for S to have justification for believing H.
As said ¬H is a defeater for the reason for (3) provided by (1) and (2). The
requirement (A1) can be spelled out in terms of this notion: The justification
for (3) rests on the justification for believing that ¬H does not obtain. The
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reason I turn it this way is that the argument is slightly different whether
we consider ¬H which, as said, is a circumstantial defeater, or whether we
consider ¬H ’ which is a method-defeater. The argument for the method-
defeater is more similar to the classical anti-induction argument. It runs as
follows:
(D1) The justification for H ’ must be partially deductively inferential.a
(D2) The subject’s justification for believing H ’ rests on her justification
for believing H ’.
(D3) Such a justification is viciously circular, hence the subject does not
have justification for H ’.
aI omit the qualifier “reflective” on “justification” for ease of exposition.
(D2) follows from the fact that a requirement corresponding to (A1) ob-
tains for every deductive justification —according to explanatory inferential
internalism— and (D1). In contrast to H the proposition H ’ is about de-
ductive reasons in general. Since N is a typical favorable context for the
deductive inference to (3), if the justification for (3) rests on the justification
for H ’, then any other deductive inference must rest on the justification for
H ’ too. Thus, given (D1), the deductive inference to H ’ rests on the justifi-
cation for H ’. But since it is impossible to have justification for a proposition
antecedently to having it, it is thus impossible to have such justification.
The circularity involved is not merely “rule-circularity”: a rule-circular jus-
tification is a justification for the proposition Method m generally provides
reasons by method m itself. By (D2), the problem with the reflective deduc-
tion is not merely that it is a deduction, but that it rests (as a premise) on
a justification for the conclusion for which it is to provide a justification.
The most problematic part of the argument is obviously (D1). Why should
the reflective justification for H ’ be deductively inferential? Is there no other
way to justifiably believe that deductive premises provide reasons for de-
ductive conclusions? In particular, can one not rationally intuit in a non-
inferential manner that deductive premises provide good reasons? Do we
not know directly that it is generally reasonable to deduce? This response
resembles the apriorist response to the inductive sceptic. On one version of
this response, it is possible to non-inferentially intuit that it is reasonable to
believe the conclusion of the best inductive arguments. This has yielded the
objection that, even if we could thus know that these arguments are reason-
able, without knowledge of the substantial empirical question whether the
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unobserved resembles the observed, there is no way to non-inferentially know
that what we judge to be reasonable really has a good chance to lead to the
truth. For if the unobserved does not resemble the observed, the truth of
the inductive conclusion is not even (objectively) probable on the assumption
that the inductive premises are true.
With (SH1) it seems that (D1) can be vindicated. According to (SH1) the
justification for H ’ rests on the justification for believing that the sceptical
scenario is false. And then it is overwhelmingly plausible that the justifica-
tion for the falsehood of the sceptical scenario ¬SC rests on further deductive
reasons. It does not seem possible simply to intuit that equivocation is not
the normal case. Or, to take another possible sceptical scenario, that there is
no large number of tonk-like inadequate concepts among our currently em-
ployed logical concepts. There are, I would think, good reasons for thinking
that this is not the case, but these reasons involve some reasoning. In gen-
eral, some of the possible sceptical scenarios for deduction seem to be possible
worlds rather like the world in which the unobserved does not resemble the
observed. That is, worlds that we cannot directly, with no amount of reason-
ing, exclude. Our non-inferential ways of coming to know fundamental logical
or modal facts seem not to be applicable. Furthermore, if the justification
for H ’ rests on the justification of other propositions such as ¬SC, then it
could well be that the supporting propositions provide precisely deductive
reasons for believing H ’. Thus the threat of further deductive reasons does
not only intervene in the justification for ¬SC, but also for the justification
of H ’ from ¬SC. This is a very important point that can be generalized as
follows.
If the reflective justification for H ’ rests on the justification of any other
proposition (not only ¬SC !) and the support the other proposition provides
is deductive, then the justification will be circular. For instance, the following
initially plausible claims have this result: The justification for H ’ rests on
the justification for MPP is valid. The justification for the latter proposition
is provided by non-inferential logical intuition. But even if the justification
for MPP is valid is non-inferential, it is plausible that MPP is valid provides
together with some other proposition, e.g. If an inference pattern is valid,
then the premises generally provide a reason for the conclusion., a deductive
reason for believing H ’. But in that case, (D2) is vindicated and the circularity
obtains. A similar point will apply with respect to the justification for H to
be considered in the following.31
31This is essentially the point made in Boghossian [2003, 2001]. I will consider his precise
point below in the main text.
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The corresponding argument (A2) with H instead of H ’, is structurally dif-
ferent:
(C1) The justification for H must be partially deductively inferential.
(C2) The subject’s justification for believing H rests on her justification
for believing a corresponding proposition H 1 for the reflective in-
ference.
(C3) The justification for H 1 must be partially deductively inferential,
hence it rests on a justification for H 2, and so on.
(C4) There is no infinite chain of (epistemically) antecedent justification,
hence the subject does not have justification for H.
It is to be noted that (C1) can be weakened in a certain way without much
consequence. Strong inferential internalism is here taken as a thesis about
deduction. But it seems clear that a proponent of explanatory inferential
internalism about deduction would hold a similar view about any kind of
inference. (In fact, in section 4.2 I explained inferential internalism as a view
on inference in general.) This means that even if the inference to H is e.g. an
inference to the best explanation, a explanatory inferential internalism would
hold that its justification rests on the justification for a corresponding H 1
linking the abductive premise to the abductive conclusion. This would lead
to the same regress, no matter what kind of inferences are further involved.
Since (C2) is the explanatory inferential internalist’s claim, the argument
can come under attack by (C1) or (C3) and by (C4). One can either claim
that the justification for H or one of its “successors” H 1, H 2 etc. is non-
inferential or that there is an infinite chain of justifiers. It seems to me that
the case for (C4) is prima-facie weaker than the case for (D3). It is less
controversial that the involved kind of circularity in (D3) is bad, than that
there can not be an infinite chain of justifiers as claimed in (C4). However, it
is clear that infinitism is initially problematic. In particular, it appears to me
to be intitially more problematic than not adopting explanatory inferential
internalism, i.e. (C2).32
32Furthermore, infinitism can avoid the circularity only on the following condition:
(GP) The justification for H does not rest on the justification for any proposition about
inference generally, i.e. H ’ extended to all kinds of inference.
For in that case, the circularity with respect to the justification for the generalized H ’
obtains again (on the assumption that the justification for the generalized H ’ is inferential).
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So the weakest links seems again to be (C1) or (C3). Even in the remote
past people have thought that on a particular instance of inference, it is
possible to non-inferentially justifiably come to rationally intuit that in this
particular instance one has a reason.33 In the recent past, this response
has been considered and endorsed precisely in response to a version of the
foregoing argument (C1)-(C4).
Boghossian [2003] develops an argument against (A2) as follows: The justifi-
cation for H cannot rest on an inferential justification for some other propo-
sition. Thus, if it rests on some other proposition this proposition must be
non-inferentially intuited. For instance, one could perhaps non-inferentially
intuit L, i.e. (1) and (2) entail (3). However, L can support H only in a
further deduction, namely from L and something like If my premises entail
the conclusion, then they support my conclusion. Thus, according to (A2)
this deduction requires it’s own justification for a corresponding H 1, and so
on.34 35
But Bonjour [2005, 100] who can be interpreted as endorsing (A2) recently
says the following:36
For a variety of reasons, but most fundamentally because of the
role that such [a priori] insights are supposed to play in deduc-
tive inference, it is often and quite possibly always a mistake to
construe them as propositional in form. The problem here is es-
sentially the one pointed out long ago by Lewis Carroll: at least
in the most fundamental sorts of cases (think of modus ponens),
the application of a propositional insight concerning the cogency
of such an inference would require either a further inference of the
very sort in question or one equally fundamental, thereby lead-
ing to a vicious regress. Instead, I suggest, the relevant logical
insight must be construed as non-propositional in character, as a
direct grasping of the way in which the conclusion is related to
the premises and validly flows from them.37
33For instance Goodman [1955]. However the immediate judgment is according to him
further supported by some general judgment (which is in turn inductively supported by
the different instance-judgments. He thus adopts some form of holistic coherentism. Still
the (first) instance-judgment must have some initial justifying force by itself.
34Boghossian does not focus on H but rather on The conclusion is justified. I come to
this question below.
35To my knowledge the first version of a similar argument is Van Cleve [1984].
36To my knowledge the suggestion to appeal to non-propositional states in connection
with the kind of problem exposed here was first made by Wright [2001].
37Bonjour [2005] and Boghossian [2001, 2003] both claim that the argument stems from
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We can interpret this passage as proposing a way to deny (C1): the reflective
justification for H is non-inferential. Bonjour thinks that if the reflective
reason for H is provided by a non-propositional state, then it will not be an
inferential reason. This seems very plausible. For it is plausible that non-
propositional states do not enter into computational processes. They are
not combined with and compared to propositional states, rather they give
directly rise to propositional states.
Let us first sum up what I call the “sceptical argument” against explanatory
inferential internalism, and then give an overview of the options with which
the argument leaves a proponent of this view.
• First, a certain claim is ascribed to explanatory inferential internalism:
the justification of a deductive conclusion rests on the reflective justifi-
cation for the normative linking-proposition H. Then, it is argued that
from this assumption —absurdly— scepticism follows.
• The sceptical conclusion is reached via the claim that the reflective
justification for H is inferential. In that case a regress of justification
for normative linking-propositions H 1, H 2 etc. obtains.
• If the reflective justification for H rests on the inferential justification
of a proposition about inference in general, then the justification is not
merely regressive, but even viciously circular.
If this argument is sound, then there appear to be only three options for
rebutting it. A proponent of explanatory inferential internalism could claim
some of the following:
• That he is not committed to the claim that the justification for a de-
ductive conclusion rests on the reflective justification for H.
But in that case he is hard pressed to give his explanation of the deductive
justification by appeal to the reflective justification for H. Strong inferential
internalism is the view that the fact that (1) and (2) provide a reason to
believe (3) in N can be explained by appeal to the fact that the subject
has a reflective reason to believe H. How else could such an explanation go
than by claiming that H antecedently supports believing (3) on the basis of
believing (1) and (2).38 Or, he could claim:
Lewis Carroll. I call “Carrollian argument” the distinct argument of section 4.4. For the
differences see below in the text.
38One might perhaps think that there could be some holistic support relation between
H and (3), so that the deductive justification for (3) does not asymmetrically depend on
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• That the reflective justification for H is non-inferential.
Finally, his claim could be:
• That infinitism is true, and that the inferential justification for H does
not rest on an inferential justification of a proposition about inference
in general.
I think the case against against explanatory inferential internalism can be
strengthened. In section 4.5 I present an argument that focuses directly
on the explanatory claim, thus avoiding the need to argue that explanatory
inferential internalism implies the resting-on claim (A2). Furthermore the ar-
gument does not depend so much on the claim that the reflective justification
for H is inferential.
4.4 Tortoise’ argument against explanatory
internalism
Here is again the defining thesis of explanatory inferential internalism:
Explanatory inferential internalism: That (1) and (2) provide a reason
for believing (3) is partly explained by the fact that there is a reflective
reason to believe H.
As mentioned this closely resembles the thesis of strong inferential inter-
nalism. The argument to be presented is a generalization of the argument
against strong inferential internalism form chapter 2.3. This was then called
the “Lewis-Carroll-Problem for strong inferential internalism” in virtue of
the fact that the argument can be read into a dialogue presented by Lewis
Carroll [1895]. I will here present the argument in close connection to the
original dialogue.
Roughly, the argument is that any way in which we could appeal to the
subject’s epistemic position towards H in an explanation of why she has
a reason to believe (3) provided by (1) and (2), would rely on our having
antecedently an explanation of why deductive reasons are good epistemic
reasons.
the justification for H. But if explanation is asymmetric, then the epistemic dependence
must plausibly be asymmetric too. And I conjecture that this is sufficient for the sceptical
argument.
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The original dialogue
In order to briefly summarize the note by Carroll, let us assume that it
is about Wet Roads instead of the inference involving propositions about
(simple) geometry given by him. Let us further call the following conditional
constructed out of the propositions involved in Wet Roads “the logically true
hypothetical”:
C If (1) and (2), then (3).
This proposition is logically true, although this is not part of its content. In
the latter respect it is to be distinguished from the proposition L which does
not play a role in Carroll’s dialogue.
The note by Carroll features a dialogue between Achilles and the Tortoise in
the course of which Achilles is lured into a regress. At the crucial stage of the
dialogue the Tortoise asks whether someone might not accept the premises of
Wet Roads and yet not be “logically forced” to draw the conclusion. In their
diagnosis of this possibility, they agree that the subject must therefore accept
the logically true hypothetical, in order to be forced to draw the conclusion.
However as the Tortoise is not forced into accepting the conclusion at the
start, accepting the logically true hypothetical no more “logicallly forces”
it to accept the conclusion. The initial premises entail the conclusion just
as well as the new set of premises including the logically true hypothetical.
At this point the dialogue continues potentially infinitely as ever new and
more complex hypotheticals are added to the initial premises in the hope of
reaching a point where the “logical force” is irresistible.
The dialogue exploits the fact that the two sets of premises bear the same
logical relation to the conclusion. Here is again the representation of Wet
Roads compared to its “enhanced version” (to stress that it is of the MPP
form also represented as a two-premise-inference):
(1) It is raining outside.
(2) If it rains outside, the roads are wet.
(3) The roads are wet.
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(1*) It is raining outside and If it rains outside, the roads are wet.
(2*) If It is raining outside and If it rains outside, the roads are wet,
then The roads are wet.
(3*) The roads are wet.
It is not immediately clear what lesson Carroll intends one to learn from the
dialogue. How should one understand the expression “logically forced” (to the
conclusion)? Depending on the interpretation, the dialogue raises somewhat
different general issues. On a first reading, the expression means the same as
“committed” or “epistemically required”. The dialogue could then be taken
as providing an argument against the view that one is epistemically required
to take the MPP-step, because one accepts —and only insofar as one does—
the logical principle, i.e. because one believes in the hypothetical which is a
logical truth. Against such a view the dialogue purportedly shows that the
commitment to the conclusion of the MPP is not in any sense stronger given
the hypothetical is added as a further premise. The conclusion is still no more
(!) than entailed by the premises. If one is committed to believing what is
entailed (or at least obviously entailed, see below) by what one believes,
then the initial MPP and the inference from the set of premises including
the hypothetical are on a par.39
On another plausible reading Carroll means by “logically forced” something
like “psychologically forced” in the sense that a subject can not psychologi-
cally avoid believing the conclusion. On this reading Achilles and the Tortoise
agree that it is psychologically possible for subjects to believe the premises
but not the entailed conclusion (while considering, understanding and so
on, all three propositions). They then conclude that what explains why the
subject believes in the conclusion when she does are not merely the beliefs
in the premises but a further belief in the logically true hypothetical, and
they are thus lead into trouble. It seems that if subject’s are psychologically
constituted in such a manner that believing the premises of an MPPnever
alone and in itself explains why she believes what follows from it, then she
is so constituted that believing the premises and in addition the logically
true hypothetical will never explain why she believes what follows from the
39In fact, according to many, one can distinguish between two sorts of epistemic com-
mitments: one corresponding to a commitment because one has a good epistemic reason,
the other to a commitment because one is rationally required. For the distinction, see
chapter 2.4.
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premises neither.40
But in fact, the two readings are not wholly independent, for (i) epistemic
commitments do not simply correspond to logical relations between propo-
sitions, but depend on some features of the (kind of) subjects which are
under the commitment, and (ii) the psychological explanation in question
(supposedly not applying to the recalcitrant subject) is a special sort of psy-
chological explanation, namely one in terms of motivation by reasons, which
is relevant to the question of normative commitment.41 On (i): No one is
held responsible for not believing, even when presented with the proposition,
something which is in a very non-obvious manner entailed by what one be-
lieves. Epistemic commitments, even those about deductive inference, do not
simply correspond to logical relations. 42 On (ii): If “logically forced” is not
concerned with motivation, it is not concerned with “real psychology”. The
problem is not simply to give any sort of psychological explanation (some-
how involving the beliefs in the premises) of the belief in the conclusion. The
point cannot be that belief in the premises and the logically true hypothetical
can no more explain the belief in the conclusion than simply the beliefs in
the premises. For as far as just any psychological processes are concerned,
nothing speaks against the view that there is a psychological process from
the first set of beliefs to the conclusion but not from the second set (perhaps
neither speaks anything in favor of that view). Rather when the concern is
motivation, then the psychology under consideration is ideal. Such a subject
fully considers, understands and believes the premises and considers one in
the light of the other(s), is not mislead by disturbing features, can deploy
enough resources to the task etc. The possibility Achilles and the Tortoise
envision is that such a subject would not be moved to the conclusion. The
issue, on this reading, is not whether the subject is committed to the belief.
That may be granted. What they do not grant is that the subject would
be forced to move to the conclusion, could not help but to be moved to it
—except some mistake in processing, understanding and so on. They then
proceed to exclude the possibility to be unmoved by ascribing further beliefs
to the subject.
The argument against explanatory inferential internalism is an adaptation
of the first reading. It is to be noted that Achilles and Tortoise are not
involved in the activity of justifying (3). Rather, on both readings they are
40This reading corresponds to what I have called the “Lewis-Carroll-Problem for the
psychological view” in the preceding chapters.
41“motivation” is often reserved for the practical case as motivation for action. I use it
freely for the move to a belief which one so comes to believe for a reason.
42This point is made by Gilbert Harman in a number of places.
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trying to explain something. This is the reason why I take the argument
to be provided to be closer to the dialogue by Carroll, than the sceptical
argument from section 4.3. The sceptical argument would better correspond
to a regressive dialogue in which someone is trying to justify his belief in
(3). But in the Carrollian dialogue Achilles is trying to give an explanation
from a third-person point of view of why the subject should or why she does
believe (3).
Explanatory circularity
On the explanation of the dialogue I am about to give, it can be divided in
three steps. In the first step, a successful explanation of why (1) provides a
reason to believe (3) is given by appeal to the subject’s justified belief in (2).
In the second step a similar explanation of why (1) and (2) provide a reason
for (3) is given by appeal to the subject’s justified belief in C. In the third
step it is made obvious that this explanation is regressive or circular. So, let
us give the argument in the form of a dialogue between two characters, A
and B. A is Tortoise, B is Achilles. They are talking about the subject S.
Here is Step 1:
A1: Why is S’ step from (1) to (3) justified? Why does (1) provide a reason
to believe (3) in N ?
B1: Because S justifiably believes (2), i.e. If (1), then (3).
A2: I see, S infers (3) from (1) and (2). This seems OK.
In Step 1 B’s answer is helpful. It allows A to better understand why S’ step
is justified. Given that S infers (3) from (1), one can say that S accords with
the following imperative:43
(!) Believe (3), if you justifiably believe (1)!
This imperative holds in N . It is true also that S accords with the following
imperative (or “principle” since it is more general in scope):
Rain-Wet-reasoning Believe the (3)-type proposition, if you justifiably
believe the (1)-type proposition!
43It is normally important to note whether someone merely accords with an imperative
or a rule or whether she follows the imperative or the rule.
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We can call the latter imperative a principle of which the former imperative is
an instance. The question to which S’ belief in the conditional C is relevant is
why, in the circumstance, it is right for S to accord with the first imperative.
This gives us an answer why S has the right to infer (3) in N . It gives
an answer to the question what about the circumstance it is that makes it
correct to accord to the imperative. The answer is that given S’ belief in the
conditional, in fact, S accords with an imperative that is an instance of a
more general principle, namely:
(!!) Believe (3), if you justifiably believe (1) and (2)!
which is an instance of a principle which could be called the principle of
MPP-reasoning:
MPP-reasoning: Believe the q-type proposition, if you justifiably believe
the p-type and the if p, then q-type propositions!
“q-type” (and accordingly “p-type”) designates in this principle a different
type than in the former principle. In the former principle it was any propo-
sition that it rains at t in place x (but at any place x and time t), this time,
it is any proposition related to another, the p-type, via a if p, then q-type.
Roughly, the propositions of one type correspond to each other only by be-
ing related with the particular “if, then”-connective in a complex proposition
connecting each of them to some other. So, with the help of the subject’s
belief in the conditional, she can be seen as according with a more general
principle. In this sense, it can be explained why according to the first im-
perative is in the circumstance the right thing to do. In the next step the
dialogue takes an unhappy turn; Step 2:
A3: But wait, thinking of it, why is S’ step from (1) and (2) to (3) justified?
B2: Oh, because S also justifiably believes that that step preserves the
truth, i.e. she justifiably believes C.
A4: I see, S infers (3) from (1), (2) and C.
Step 3 expresses the inevitable dead end into which the two characters have
manoeuvered themselves. Step 3:
A5: But I still don’t get it. Why is S justified in taking the last inferential
step?
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B3: (in a mood of despair) Because S believes that that last step preserves
the truth.
In Step 3, one must realize that the explanation B was giving up to line A4
is not successful. It assumes that S has the right to infer according to the
valid pattern of inference, MPP, a right which A wants to have explained.
So, A is perfectly right to ask her question in A5.
Any of the three lines in Step 2 may be criticized in order to avoid Step 3.
(i) One can criticize A’s question in A3 and deny that this is a legitimate
question to ask at all, resp. deny that anyone needs to be able to answer
that question.(ii) One can criticize B’s answer in B2, or (iii) one can criticize
A’s way of interpreting B’s answer in A4.
Someone who thinks that it is a primitive normative fact that (1) and (2)
provide a reason for believing (3) can deny that it makes sense to ask the
question on line A3. But an explanatory inferential internalist will not deny
this claim. Typical inferential externalist’s won’t deny the right to ask this
question either. For they think that something can be said in answer to it.
For instance it can be said that this is because the subject has a conditionally
reliable process leading from (1)-(3) at her disposal. Or one could say the
fact that (1)-(2) entail (3) plays a role. Or one could say that the fact that
the inference from (1)-(3) is meaning-constituting for the logical concept if
. . . , then is relevant, and so on.
Inferential externalists will typically claim that the mistake is on line B2.
The subject’s justification for believing C has nothing to do with the fact
that (1) and (2) provide a reason for (3). But the explanatory inferential
internalist can also claim that his view is not exactly captured by B2. He
could claim that B2 can be modified without abandoning explanatory infer-
ential internalism. In particular, he will claim that it is not C to which B
should appeal, but H.
Finally, the explanatory inferential internalist can claim that the answer
given in B2 is misunderstood on by A on line A4. He could claim that B2
does not say that C is a premise in an inference to (3).44
What is exactly the problem with the explanation on A4? Obviously it is
modeled on the one given on A2, that is, on the appeal to the implicit premise
(2). As argued, the introduction of the latter belief served to view S’ inference
as according to a more general principle. It allows one to see what feature
44Audi [1993] and Wright [2001] point to this distinction between the function of a
premise and another possible justifying function of such a belief connecting premises and
conclusion.
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of the circumstance made it circumstantially justified for S to accord to the
simpler imperative (!) (resp. the simpler principle). But the imperative that
is satisfied given the further belief in the logically true hypothetical, namely:
Believe (3), if you justifiably believe (1), (2) and C !
is not an instance of a more general principle. In fact, its only appeal comes
from the fact that it is an instance of the very same principle, i.e. MPP-
reasoning. But clearly, the explanation by appeal to a more general principle
that was successful in Step 1 cannot be iterated. We want to understand it
better.
But the explanatory inferential internalist will say the following: “Of course,
if you model the explanation on Step 1, you will not be able to invoke a
more general epistemic principle.” The problem for this response is to find a
way to in C could be responsible for the subject’s falling under some more
general principle.
The question then becomes “Could there be some more general principle
explaining why it is a good thing, from an epistemic point of view, to conform
to the principle of MPP-reasoning?”. Inferential internalists will want to
connect such a principle with the higher-order requirement. For, fulfilling
the higher-order requirement must somehow be relevant to the explanation.
So, it is natural for him to appeal to a principle involving higher-order beliefs.
The only principle for which it seems to me to be at all plausible to claim
greater generality (or more generally, more fundamental explanatory value)
than for MPP-reasoning is an adaptation of the following principle about
reasons:
Basic principle of reasons: If you justifiably believe you ought to do X
(all things considered), then do X!45
Following this principle seems to be constitutive of being a rational agent.
It seems to be so fundamental that if one could explain by appeal to it why
following the principle of MPP-reasoning is a good thing, then one would
45Again, principles about reasons must be distinguished from principles about rational-
ity. A similar principle of rationality could be the following:
Basic principle of rationality: If you believe you ought to do X (all things considered),
then do X! (Or else give up the belief!)
In fact, I am not even sure that my “basic principle of reasons” is true. In the practical
case, I might justifiably believe that I ought to do X, but still not have a reason to do X.
The “basic principle of rationality”, however, seems to me correct.
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have a true explanation of the latter. However, it needs to be applied to
theoretical reasons, as follows:
Basic principle of theoretical reasons: If you justifiably believe you ought
to believe p, then believe p!
If, somehow following the principle of MPP-reasoning in circumstance N
could be subsumed under the basic principle of theoretical reasons, then it
seems that we would have a more general explanation.
One could now think that H is exactly the belief that satisfies the antecedent
of that principle. In that case, the question of the kind of reason the subject
has for believing H comes again to the foreground. For instance, if the idea
is that C or L is involved in the justification for H, then it appears that some
inferential justification must be explained anyway. Thus, the explanatory
inferential internalist cannot appeal to a justified belief in C or L in order
subsume the subject’s situation in N under the basic principle of theoretical
reasons, without supposing that some instance of inferential justification has
already been explained.
This means that we reach the same conclusion as we reached by the sceptical
argument of section 4.3. The sceptical argument however, left the proponent
of explanatory inferential internalism with two options that are no longer
available if the Carrollian argument of this section is sound. These options
were: (i) Adopt infinitism, and (ii) deny that explanatory inferential inter-
nalism implies that the justification for (3) rests on the justification for H.
The first option is no longer available, for we needn’t assume that infinitism
is false for the purpose of the argument. The Lewis-Carroll-Problem exposed
here is not that each inferential step implies and antecedently justified other
inferential step. Infinitism in this sense would be compatible with it being ex-
plainable (i.e. it not being a primitive normative fact) why this infinite chain
of inferential dependence provides a reason to believe (3).46 The argument
here is that the explanation by appeal to inferentially justified H would be a
circular explanation of inferential justification. The second option, (ii) is not
available to the explanatory inferential internalist either. We are presently
considering an explanation of why an epistemic reason for (3) obtains that
appeals to there being an epistemic reason for H, and that the latter reason is
provided by propositional contents (resp. the justified beliefs in them). Per-
haps this explanation does not imply the claim that the justification for (3)
rests on the justification for H. But it would have to appeal to some kind of
46Klein [1999] argues against Sosa [1980] that infinitism is compatible with a reductive
naturalistic account of epistemic justification.
4.4. TORTOISE VS. INTERNALISM 157
support-relation between propositions, perhaps some sort of holistic support
by coherence among all believed contents. But even so, it is hard to see what
kind of more fundamental support-relation could play a role in an explana-
tion of the principle of MPP-reasoning. These considerations seem to leave
a proponent of explanatory inferential internalism with the only remaining
option: the reason for H is provided by a non-propositional seeming.
However, there is even a further problem with subsuming N under the basic
principle of theoretical reasons. This is that H is not really the proposi-
tion specified in the antecedent of that principle. H is a normative linking-
proposition. The proposition specified in the antecedent is the following:
H(3) There is a (an overall) good epistemic reason to believe (3).
And the problem now is that H(3) is inferentially justified from H. As said,
I have remained neutral on the exact content of H. It could be a norma-
tive hypothetical proposition linking the propositions (1),(2) and (3), or a
hypothetical proposition linking propositions about believing (1)-(3), i.e. a
proposition roughly corresponding to the (hypothetical) imperative (!!). But
these differences do not matter, for if H has hypothetical form, then H(3) is
reached by reasoning. But perhaps H is categorical, relating the fact that
(1) and (2) to the fact that (3), or the fact that (1) and (2) are justified to
(3). Perhaps something like this: “Given that (1) and (2), it must be right to
believe (3)” or “Given that belief in (1)-(2) is justified, I ought to believe (3)”.
But this does not help, for H(3) must be deduced from this by something
like ‘and’-Elimination.47
Even though the step is in that case not an instance of MPP-reasoning, but
“‘and’-Elimination-reasoning”, it is not an attractive view, that by this way
one can achieve an explanation of why it is epistemically good to conform
to MPP-reasoning. Intuitively principles such as MPP-reasoning and ‘and’-
Elimination are on a par with respect to their value in explaining why some
epistemic move is justified. So, an appeal to ‘and’-Elimination in explain-
ing why it is a good thing to conform to MPP-reasoning only prompts the
demand for an explanation of why it is a good thing to conform to ‘and’-
Elimination. And it does not seem that the basic principle could explain
‘and’-Elimination better than MPP-reasoning.
47And suggesting that it is H(3) rather than H of which inferential internalism should
claim that it is relevant for the justification for (3) seems to me to give up on the main
idea: The subject’s cognitive stand towards the support relation between premises and
conclusion is relevant for inferential justification.
158 CHAPTER 4. INTERNALISM ABOUT DEDUCTION
This means that not even the last option left open by the sceptical argument
of section 4.3 is available. For no matter whether the reason for H is infer-
ential or not, the appeal to H will in any case suppose that it has already
been explained why inferential reasons obtain.
At this point of the argument it seems to me safe to conclude that no principle
can stand with respect to principle of MPP-reasoning as this principle stands
with respect to the principle of Rain-Wet-reasoning. But even though this
conclusion seems safe, a proponent of (explanatory) inferential internalism
can claim that the relation between the principle of MPP-reasoning and the
principle of Rain-Wet-reasoning is not a good model for how he intends the
higher-order judgment (or that it is reflectively available) to explain why it
is a good thing to conform to MPP-reasoning. In particular, the explanatory
inferential internalist could appeal to a principle that does not appeal to
a justified belief or any other propositional state in the antecedent of the
principle. The model of such a principle would not be the basic principle of
reasons. Rather it would be a principle similar to principles which state that
given a certain emotion is appropriate, then a certain action is to be taken.
(An occurrent, episodical) fear of X does not only justify (according to some)
the belief that X is dangerous, but it also directly, without appeal to that
belief, justifies taking some action, for instance, running away. The action so
recommended is conditional on some feature of the circumstance. This can
be expressed by giving the following “principles (imperatives) of fear”:
(F!) If you (appropriately) fear x, run!
(F!!) If you (appropriately) fear x and your way out is blocked, attack!
Similarly there could be correct principles concerning a rational seeming or
intuition with a non-propositional content corresponding roughly to H. The
principle could then be the following
(S!) If it seems to you that H, then believe (3)!
(S!!) If it seems to you that H, but you can not move to (3) (because you
have strong evidence against it), give up (1) or (2)!
As in the case of fear, the action recommended by the same seeming depends
on the availability of actions. Furthermore, as in the case of fear, the avail-
ability of actions need not be assessed by the subject in the form of a belief.
That the way out is blocked is not something that must be entertained in the
form of a belief in order to justify attacking. Rather it is something assessed
4.4. TORTOISE VS. INTERNALISM 159
by the subject on a more immediate level, giving rise to the action without
reasoning. Similarly the assessment whether you can move to (3) or not, need
not be available in the form of a higher-order belief about the justificatory
status of conclusion or premises from which the subject must reason.
In order for a principle such as (S!) to be more fundamental than MPP-
reasoning, some conditions must obtain. I do not know in general form what
must obtain in order for an epistemic principle to be explained by another.
Probably the application of the latter must be broader than that of the
former. This would mean that all, or at least all inferential, belief-formation
would somehow have to be subsumed under principles involving such rational
seemings.
From a phenomenological point of view this picture seems to me not to be
wholly unattractive. There appears to be a phenomenological difference —
not stemming from a difference in belief— between moving to a conclusion
that one finds obviously entailed and half-heartedly moving to an entailed
conclusion where somehow that feeling is absent (e.g. because one believes
that the transition is correct without fully “seeing it”). A proponent of this
view agrees with Boghossian [2001, 37] from the citation in chapter 2:
What this Lewis Carroll-inspired argument shows, it seems to me,
is that at some point it must be possible to use a rule in reasoning
in order to arrive at a justified conclusion without this use needing
to be supported by some knowledge about the rule that one is
relying on. It must be possible simply to move between thoughts
in a way that generates justified belief, without this movement
being grounded in the thinker’s justified belief about the rule used
in reasoning.
In so far as the seeming does not constitute knowledge about the rule (resp.
the justifedness of a move) the use of the rule is not supported by knowledge
and the movement is not grounded in the thinker’s justified belief about the
rule. And it is also true, on such a picture, that at some point it must be
possible simply to move to the conclusion. But contrary to Boghossian’s
claim that move is “grounded” on this picture, namely it is grounded in the
non-propositional state. Still the subject is moving simply to the conclusion,
in the sense that just relying on a feeling or seeming is giving in to a pull
without having made sure in propositional form that it is the right thing to
do.
However, this picture is no longer clearly explanatory inferential internalist in
character. The problem is that, although the seeming (perhaps) justifies H,
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that it does so appears to be irrelevant to it’s justifiying taking the inferen-
tial step. It does not longer seem that taking the inferential step is justified,
because the higher-order judgment is reflectively available. Rather it seems
that what is (partially) responsible for it being right to take the inferential
step happens to reflectively support the higher-order judgment. Even if the
higher-order judgment weren’t supported by the seeming, it would still par-
tially explain why taking the step is justified. For it would do so in virtue of
(S!) which does not mention the fact that the seeming supports H.
4.5 Internalism and the psychological view
I take it that the sceptical argument from section 4.3 and the Carrollian argu-
ment from section 4.4 render explanatory inferential internalism implausible.
The latter argument directly discredits (EHO-R), i.e.
Explanatory HO-requirement (EHO-R) The subject has a reason to
believe (3) provided by (1) and (2) partly in virtue of the fact that she
has a reflective reason to believe H.
The former argument via discrediting the claim about one justification resting
on another:
(A1) The subject’s justification for believing (3) in N rests on her reflective
justification for believing H.
Of course, neither of these claims is entailed by Inferential Internalism itself,
i.e. by:
Higher-order requirement (HO-R): If subject S is justified in believing
(3) for a good deductive reason provided by (1) and (2), then S is in a
position to reflectively justifiably come to believe H.
One could now discuss different motivations for Inferential Internalism and
try to see what more specific requirement, if any, this motivation would sup-
port. The motivation for Inferential Internalism need not be an underlying
explanatory ambition as that of explanatory inferential internalism. How-
ever, I cannot at present fully engage with the wide-ranging issue of the
motivation for Inferential Internalism. The aim of this section will rather be
to discuss whether and in what sense the psychological view —more partic-
ularly the belief-proper account of chapter 3.3 and the sensitivity account
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of chapter 3.5— is a version of Inferential Internalism. I hope that these
accounts have been sufficiently motivated there.48
It seems that the belief-proper account implies Inferential Internalism, i.e.
(HO-R). As argued in chapter 3.4 it is a corollary of the belief-proper account
that the belief in L must be justified (this was called the “implication-claim”).
But a justified belief in L will provide a reason for believing H, perhaps
together with some other belief such as a belief in If (1) and (2) entail (3),
then (1) and (2) provide a reason for believing (3). The question is whether
these justified beliefs provide a reflective reason for H. To do this, it was said
that these beliefs would have to be antecedently justified, or the contents
would have to be open to introspection.
But “antecedently justified” is ambiguous. In the brief motivation of infer-
ential internalism in section 4.2 it was said that the introspectible states and
the antecedently justified beliefs must be capable of controlling the (first-
order) belief-formation at the sub-personal level. In the course of conscious
reflection on the first-order belief-formation these states provide a reason for
the occurrent thought that the belief-formation is justified. The reason why
the beliefs have to be antecedently justified is that they play a role before the
subject consciously reflects on the belief-formation. But then what is meant
here by “antecedently justified” is that the beliefs must be justifiably held
temporally before the reflective process starts. If the subject acquired the
justification for these beliefs in the reflective process, then their controlling
the first-order belief-formation antecedently would be illegitimate.
There is another sense of “antecedently justified” to which I have appealed
sometimes when expressing the fact that one justification rests on another.
In that sense if justification j0 for p is antecedent to justification j1 for q, q
cannot provide j0 on pain of begging the question. In that sense too, because
the antecedently justified beliefs provide a reason for H, their justification
cannot be provided by H.
However that L, if it is to provide reflective justification for H, must be an-
tecedently (in both senses) justified to H, does not imply that L must be
antecedently justified to (3) in either sense. The claim with respect to the
resting-on sense of “antecedent” would be a claim that I have insisted the
belief-proper account need not endorse. But how does antecedence fit with
the story by which Inferential Internalism was here motivated? Consider first
temporal antecedence: Would it not be strange to claim that the belief in
L controls the first-order belief-formation to (3), but could be justified tem-
48For the issue of the motivation of epistemological internalism, see for instance Goldman
[1999b], Leite [2005], both critical of internalism.
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porally either at the same time or later than (3)? This would not at all be
strange, for belief-formation is probably best not conceived in a linear man-
ner. The internal processes controlling belief are perhaps best conceived as
non-monotonous: Beliefs arrived at at a later time control beliefs that occur
earlier. And for resting-on antecedence: Imagine (it is somewhat difficult)
that (3) partially provides the reason for L. Would this mean that the belief
in L cannot control the belief in (3)? If the justification for L rests on (3),
then the reason for (3) cannot be provided by L. But why should one suppose
that only beliefs which partially provide a reason for (3) can control it?
Thus, the requirement on antecedence is the following: A belief can provide
a reflective reason for believing H, only if it is “antecedently justified” in
the sense of its justification not being provided by H, and it’s being justified
temporally before the reflective process starts. It does not need to be an-
tecedently justified in either sense with respect to (3). If this is correct, then
it seems to me that the belief-proper account may be seen as a weak version
of Inferential Internalism, one that neither implies (A), nor (EHO-R).49
According to the sensitivity account believing for a reason implies being sen-
sitive to a number of defeaters. For the case of deduction these contain ¬L
and, at least for subjects who have the concept of reason, ¬H. Another way,
adopted earlier, to express the fact that the subject is sensitive to these de-
featers was as follows: The subject is confident that the defeaters are false,
or is confident that L and H. The question then is whether reasonable confi-
dence in these propositions puts the subject in a position to reflectively assess
H. The question is not so much whether the propositions are appropriate for
providing a reflective reason for H —they obviously are appropriate, but
rather whether a reflective reason can be provided by the state of confidence
(in these propositions).
It seems to me that reasonable confidence (that H or any other proposition)
cannot provide a reason for believing H. The problem is not that confidence
is a merely dispositional state. For dispositional belief can provide a reason
for believing something. The problem is rather that the kind of consideration
(reason) which makes confidence that p reasonable, does not make belief in
p reasonable. We can parody the situation as follows:
We do not have evidence in favor of p. So we should not believe
p. But in the given circumstance it’s reasonable to be confident
that p without evidence. So, we are confident that p. But if it’s
49Whether it really is a version of Inferential Internalism depends on what in addition
to L provides the reflective reason for H and whether it is plausible that this is present in
a subject in context N .
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reasonable to be confident that p, then we can believe p. So, let
us believe p.
The point is that the reasonability of confidence depends on the fact that it
is in the circumstance more reasonable (from the point of view of the aim of
being capable of believing for a reason at all) to be merely confident than to
believe p. In the circumstance in which it is reasonable to be confident that p
it is reasonable not to try to find good reasons for believing p, as this would
engender a regress. It would be odd, if confidence would provide a reason for
believing p in a circumstance in which no reason for believing p is required.
But this is perhaps too quick. It is true that in the circumstance, namely the
first-order belief-formation, in which confidence that L or that H is reason-
able, it is reasonable while belief would not be reasonable and it would be
unreasonable to try to justifiably believe L or H. But Inferential Internalism
requires that there is a reason provided in reflection for H. The circumstance
of reflection is not the circumstance of the first-order belief-formation. So,
perhaps in the circumstance of reflection the antecedently reasonable confi-
dence that H provides a reason for believing H.
A first point to note about this proposal is that the reflection in question
would not be the typical case of reflection as it occurs every day. A typical
case of reflection is prompted by a specific doubt about the falsehood of a
defeater. The first-order belief, e.g. the belief in (3), is then endorsed or
rejected as the result of such a reflection. In the course of a reflection that
results in endorsement of the first-order belief, the doubtful defeater becomes,
in the ideal case, believed for a good epistemic reason. This belief in the
falsehood of the (antecedently) doubtful defeater partially provides a reason
for believing H. And H is believed for this reason in virtue of confidence
in a new set of defeaters, containing most of the defeaters for the first-order
believing for a reason (except the doubtful one) and additional defeaters that
are specifically reflective. In such a typical case of reflection the reflective
reason is not provided by the states of confidence. On the contrary, the
doubtful defeater has to become justifiably believed to be false, it cannot
remain the object of mere confidence.50
50It is to be noted that when speaking of “availability to reflection” in the characteri-
zation of Inferential Internalism “reflection” did not mean what is in this passage called
“typical case of reflection”. Here reflection can involve the acquisition of new evidence,
whereas before reflection is restricted to new introspective evidence and antecedently jus-
tified beliefs. Some “typical cases of reflection” are also cases of “reflection” in the former
sense, namely when the doubt can be settled by introspective evidence or by drawing upon
formerly justified beliefs.
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So, there would have to be a special kind of reflection in which mere confi-
dence provides a reflective reason. Perhaps it would be the kind of reflection
in which the sceptic is engaged —a reflection not prompted by specific doubt,
but rather by the quite general question “Are we really justified?”. Then,
perhaps, the idea could be that in such a reflective process one can draw on
one’s confidence that e.g. H, in order to justifiably come to believe H. And
if such a reflection were possible, then the subject would be in a position
to reflectively justifiably believe H while being confident that H during the
first-order belief-formation. In that case, the sensitivity-account would imply
Inferential Internalism.
I do not think that such a reflection could yield justified belief in H. First, the
state of confidence was introduced in order to fulfill a very specific role. And
the conditions under which confidence is reasonable is linked to that specific
role. One has the right to be confident in the falsehood of the defeater in the
course of the first-order belief-formation. One has this right in the absence
of evidence for the falsehood of the defeater, because to require evidence for
(or more generally a reason to believe) each defeater to be false would lead
to requiring evidence for the falsehood of ever new defeaters. But nothing
exactly similar can be said about the right to being confident in a reflection
where a reason for believing H is supposed to be provided by the confidence
that H.
There is another line of reasoning speaking against the possibility of confi-
dence playing this role in reflection.51 The idea is that the reason for being
confident that H is not of the right kind to be a reason for believing H. And
if the reason is of the wrong kind, then it is implausible that confidence that
H transmits its reason to belief in H.
As said, the reason why it is reasonable for the subject to be merely confident
in H in the first-order belief-formation is that she would otherwise be engaged
in a regress. This consideration does not speak in favor of the truth of H,
therefore it does not provide or constitute evidence (or an “evidential reason”)
in favor of H. In this respect the reasonability of confidence in H is a bit like
the reasonability for believing something derived from the practical utility of
believing it. For instance, for an applicant for a job in a tobacco-company, it
is useful (let us suppose) to believe that tobacco is harmless.52 In this sense it
is more reasonable to believe that tobacco is harmless for the applicant than
for someone for which believing it has no practical advantage. However, it is
a controversial issue, whether such practical utility can constitute a reason
51I take this consideration from an argument by Shah [2006] to the effect that there are
no pragmatic reasons for belief.
52I take the example from Harman [1999, 16].
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for belief. In fact, most people, even those moderately favorable to practical
considerations53 playing some role in providing reasons for belief, agree that
the applicant is unjustified in believing that tobacco is harmless (on the
assumption that he has no evidence that it is harmless, or even evidence
that it is harmful). But the reason for being confident in H is not exactly
of the same kind as the reason the applicant has. For the reason for being
confident is not derived from practical utility apart from the the expected
utility of having true beliefs. It is derived from the aim of believing the truth
about (3) that it is reasonable to merely be confident that H. So, perhaps
the reason for being confident that H, although it is not an evidential reason,
is in fact a good epistemic reason for H.
But if it is agreed with Shah [2006] that the following “deliberative constraint
on reasons to believe” holds, then it appears that the reason for being con-
fident that H cannot be a reason for believing H. I quote form Shah [2006,
487]:
(B3) [r] is a reason for [subject S] to believe that p only if [r] is
capable of disposing [S] towards believing that p in the way
characteristic of [r′s] functioning as a premise in doxastic
deliberation.
The sense in which [r] must be capable of disposing [S] to be-
lieve that p is that there must be no unalterable feature of [S’]
psychology that prevent r from disposing [S] to believe that p in
the way characteristic of r′s functioning as a premise in doxastic
deliberation.
By “doxastic deliberation” Shah means here a deliberation in which the sub-
ject engages in the intention of determining whether she should believe p.
The idea is thus roughly that some consideration can only be (or provide) a
reason for believing p, if it is in principle possible to reason in doxastic de-
liberation from that consideration to the conclusion that it is right to believe
p.
The “deliberative constraint” has in itself not yet the consequence that the
consideration supporting confidence in L cannot support belief in L. For this
Shah needs to appeal to a psychological phenomenon called “transparency”
expressed in the following quote:
When we ask ourselves the deliberative question whether to be-
lieve that p, this question gives way to the question whether p is
53E.g. Harman [1999], Owens [2000].
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true, and so the only way for us to answer the former question is
by answering the latter.
Taking the “deliberative constraint” and “transparency” together, it follows
that no consideration not pertaining to the truth of p can provide a reason for
believing p. This is the epistemological thesis of evidentialism. It seems that
we can test the claims on the case of the consideration in favor of confidence in
H. Could one reason in deliberation from this consideration to the claim that
on should believe H? The considerations pertains to avoiding a regress, but
not to the truth of H. Thus, it is according to “transparency” not possible to
adduce this consideration in deliberation whether to believe H. And from the
“deliberative constraint” it follows that the consideration does in that case
not constitute or provide a reason for believing H. And, we can conclude,
if the consideration supporting confidence in H cannot provide a reason for
believing H, then confidence in H cannot provide a reason for believing H.
So, if Shah’s argument for evidentialism is right, confidence in H cannot
provide a reflective reason for believing H. So these different lines of reasoning
support the claim that confidence does not provide a reflective reason. In
that case the sensitivity account is not a version of Inferential Internalism.
However, the sensitivity-account implies some sort of reflective control over
the first-order belief-formation. As said, on the sensitivity-account the sub-
ject is required to have a conception of her reason. She has such a concep-
tion in virtue of being sensitive to a specific set of defeaters. Having such
a conception of her reason is a precondition for being capable to reflectively
assess whether she is justified. For in the typical case the reflective process
is prompted by doubt about the falsehood of some defeater. When there is
sufficiently strong evidence against such a defeater the belief in (3) is taken
back. But sufficiently doubtful evidence will rather prompt a reflective pro-
cess. Even if the so prompted reflection is a non-internalist belief-formation
in the sense that it has to take new evidence into account in order to justifi-
ably arrive at H, the sensitivity account at least requires that the reflective
process is prompted by such evidence. In a sense, the conception of her rea-
son, provides the subject the knowledge of how to justify H. Even if to do this
she needs to acquire the evidence for the claims of which she already knows
that they will be required to justify H, i.e. the negations of the defeaters.
The sensitivity-account requires that the subject is disposed to reflect when
some evidence against H is present. It does not imply that at each moment
the subject has the “ingredients” available in reflection for a positive outcome
of such a reflection. In this sense, it is not a version of Inferential Internalism.
It does thus not imply that the first-order belief-formation is under the (most
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of the time sub-personal) control by reasons for H. However, it does require
that no evidence against H is present,54 and it requires that the subject is
disposed to react to such evidence. This is more than other accounts of
believing for a reason require.
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5.1 Introduction
The upshot of the discussion of chapter 4 was that inferential internalism
in the sense of a requirement of reflective access to a higher-order belief
about the inference is subject to two powerful objections, namely the sceptical
argument and the Lewis-Carroll Problem. These arguments refute at least
any explanatory version of inferential internalism. It was also argued that
the psychological view does not commit one to the requirement of reflective
access. Rather the psychological view’s requirement of a dispositional state
of confidence in the falsehood of higher-order defeaters merely constitutes,
in sufficiently sophisticated reasoners, a precondition, a "trigger-sensitivity",
for engaging in reflective assessments of one’s reasoning.
However epistemological internalism in general and requirements of reflec-
tive access to one’s being justified are theses with considerable pre-theoretic
appeal. The catchword in recent times for motivating internalist views is
"epistemic responsibility". Reflective access to one’s being justified is a way
to ensure that one behaves in an epistemically responsible manner.
The psychological view has not been explicitly motivated in this way in chap-
ter 3. It has been introduced as the best account of believing for a reason,
e.g. one that does avoid the problem of deviant causal chains. Where does
this leave us with respect to the important question of the "epistemic re-
sponsibiltiy" of deduction and inference in general? It has been admitted
that the sensitivity-attitude needs to be backed up by reasonable confidence
in the proposition in question. This admission has been made on intuitive
grounds, meaning here because reasonable confidence in the falsehood of the
defeaters seems to be a necessary condition when thinking about particular
cases. However, it is clear that something like the notion of epistemic re-
sponsibility plays some role here: It would be epistemically irresponsible to
be confident in the falsehood of the defeaters if it were not reasonable to
do so. It has also been argued that the condition of reasonableness at play
cannot require there to be evidential reasons for believing in the falsehood
of the defeaters. But the idea of epistemic responsibility of belief-formations
that are not grounded in evidence in favor of such propositions as that the
reasoning is truth-conducive evidently is in need of elucidation. The present
chapter is a contribution to recent discussions on how to account for epistemic
responsibility in the absence of underlying evidence.
In particular, in recent years a number of unorthodox suggestions about how
to account for that kind of demanding epistemic standing —the one asso-
ciated with epistemic responsibility— have been put forward. A common
feature of these suggestions is that pragmatic considerations, as opposed to
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considerations pertaining to truth and truth-conduciveness, are given a ma-
jor role in the task. In this chapter a common strategy based on common
motivations and assumptions is first extracted from these proposals. Then it
is argued that epistemic responsibility cannot be accounted for in line with
the common strategy. It is hoped that some progress in our understanding
of epistemic responsibility can be made in course of the argument. Unfortu-
nately the critical results arrived at in the end of this chapter do not permit
one to see just how epistemic responsibility is to be obtained. It certainly
leads one to discard one option for accounting for the epistemic responsibil-
ity of the kind of states involved in deduction according to the psychological
view. However this does not constitute a special problem for the psychologi-
cal view, but for all views that try to accommodate epistemic responsibility.
Actually the problem seems to lie with the notion of epistemic responsibility
than with the psychological view.
Many people believe that there is epistemic responsibility. They believe that
we are in some sense accountable for our cognitive acts in a way that animals
and very young children are not accountable for their cognitive states. It is a
very difficult task to specify the sense in which we are accountable. A number
of people have suggested that the epistemic responsibility of our most funda-
mental cognitive acts obtains in virtue of pragmatic features —as opposed to
truth-related features. In this chapter, in a first stage, the common central
claims and assumptions are extracted from these unorthodox proposals. It
is thereby established that the proposals form a rather homogenous group.
This warrants the introduction of a common label and a unified treatment.
For reasons that will become apparent shortly the view is called “pragmatic
epistemic foundationalism”.
The epistemological view in question promises to solve a problem that arises
for foundationalism. Very roughly, the problem is the following: A subject’s
foundational cognitive acts are not supported by a prior take on the question
whether they are truth-conducive. As a consequence, a challenge about their
epistemic responsibility can be raised. One is clearly (prima facie) epistemi-
cally responsible when one holds a belief of which one (responsibly) believes
that it is truth-conducive. By contrast, holding a belief that from one’s point
of view could just as well not be truth-conducive does seem to be epistem-
ically irresponsible. The challenge for a foundationalist is to ensure that
foundational beliefs are nevertheless epistemically responsible.
The general form of the solutions that pragmatic epistemic foundationalists
propose is the following: In the absence of a subjective take on the question
whether the foundational cognitive act is truth-conducive certain pragmatic
features of the cognitive act ensure that it is not irresponsible. The specific
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solutions proposed differ with respect to which pragmatic feature they appeal
to. They appeal to the psychological irresistibility of the act, to its role as
a presupposition of rational inquiry, and more. This chapter focuses on two
proposals: on the one hand on Dretske’s account of “epistemic entitlement” in
[Dretske, 2000a], on the other hand on Enoch and Schecher’s account of “the
justification of our basic belief-forming methods” in [Enoch and Schechter,
2008]. The former appeals to psychological irresistibility, the latter to a
Reichenbach-style “best option” consideration. These proposals are chosen
because they can be interpreted in such a way that together they cover a wide
enough range of attempts to account for epistemic responsibility by appeal
to pragmatic features. If none of the conceptions that can be extracted
from these proposals work, then probably no other conception in line with
pragmatic epistemic foundationalism works.1
It is here argued that it is very doubtful that pragmatic epistemic founda-
tionalism can solve the problem of epistemic responsibility. Starting from the
proposals three conceptions of epistemic responsibility are developed. The
first associates epistemic responsibility with defensibility from the subject’s
point of view. It is suggested that the pragmatic epistemic foundationalist
could use this conception in order to argue that foundations are pragmati-
cally defensible. It is argued that this is incompatible with the assumption
that foundations are basic or fundamental (in senses to be specified). The
second conception associates epistemic irresponsibility with unexcused vio-
lations of epistemic obligations. It is suggested that the pragmatic epistemic
foundationalist could use this conception in order to argue that the prag-
matic features provide excuses for our reliance on foundational acts despite
our ignorance concerning their truth-conduciveness. The pragmatic feature
that promises most in this respect is the involuntariness of foundational acts.
It is argued that the strategy fails because it relies on a misconception of cog-
nitive acts. In particular, it relies on the very controversial claim that some
of the central cases of cognitive acts are sometimes voluntary. According
to the third conception epistemic (ir)responsibility obtains in virtue of the
epistemic (ir)responsibility of evidence-related non-cognitive acts and omis-
sions thereof. While this seems to be a promising conception of epistemic
responsibility, it does not serve pragmatic epistemic foundationalism. For,
again, it is incompatible with his conception of foundations as in some sense
1Other authors who have proposed views which at least have some of the central ideas
in common with pragmatic epistemic foundationalism are Wright [2004b] and Williams
[1991]. For extensive criticism of the former see Jenkins [2007] For a short criticism of
both, see Brueckner [2007]. The objections raised in the present chapter are independent
of these criticisms.
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basic and fundamental.
In section 1 pragmatic epistemic foundationalism is set against the back-
ground of current epistemological mainstream. This highlights the unortho-
doxy of the view. In section 2, two specific proposals are summarized and a
general characterization of the view is proposed. Section 3 first characterizes
the problem pragmatic epistemic foundationalism is devised to solve. It then
develops a first account of epistemic responsibility in line with that view.
It is argued that this account fails. Section 4 develops a second account
of epistemic responsibility in line with pragmatic epistemic foundationalism
and rejects it. In section 5 a third account is developed. It is tentatively
endorsed, but it is also argued that it does not serve the pragmatic epistemic
foundationalist’s purpose.
5.2 Mainstream and Dissidents
Some people think that there is no single notion that can capture everything
rightly associated with the term “epistemic justification”. In particular, they
think that the various proposed externalist and internalist criteria, e.g. relia-
bility, objective probability, evidence– and access-conditions, etc., are not to
be seen as the application-conditions for one single notion. They endorse plu-
ralism about epistemic justification.2 Others disagree and think that there is
one notion with more or less heterogenous application-conditions. Still, even
if there are several kinds of epistemic justification, something distinguishes
them from non-epistemic justification. A cognitive act can be positively eval-
uated in a number of ways, but only some are truly epistemic. Mainstream
in epistemology holds that the epistemic notions are united in their concern
for truth. Reliability is epistemically good because it relates an act to truth
or likelihood of truth. It is epistemically good to fulfill access-conditions
because the act thereby (potentially) subjectively appears to link up with
truth.
Mainstream: Any evaluative property of cognitive acts (associated with
our use of “justification”) that is truly epistemic is mainly a matter of
the act’s connection to the truth-value of the proposition that is the
object of that act.
2This view is defended for instance by Alston [2005]. The opposed “monism” is the
traditional view implicitly held by many people.
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Even most “monists” about epistemic justification, i.e. those who think that
there is one single notion of epistemic justification, can agree with this. But
the formulation is meant to make room for two broad categories of conditions
on epistemic justification —whether they are united in one notion or not. One
associates the act’s positive standing with an objective truth-connection, the
other with a subjective truth-connection. It is worth going into a bit of detail.
For the nature of subjective truth-connections in particular is highly relevant
in characterizing and motivating the position to be introduced shortly. (For
the sake of simplicity I focus —here and in what follows generally— on the
case of acceptance).
objective truth-connection: a cognitive act of acceptance is objectively
truth-connected, if and only if it is objectively likely that the act’s
object, i.e. the proposition, qua object of that act is true.
The relevant likelihood of the proposition that I accept is likelihood con-
ditional on the fact that the proposition is the object of that act —hence
“objectively likely qua object of that act”. For instance, if the act is reliably
formed, then its object is likely to be true conditional on it being the output
of that reliable method. It is not sufficient that my acceptance’ object is
likely to be true conditional on just any sort of further facts. For instance,
conditional on the truth of the proposition, the proposition is likely to be
true (!). But this does not imply that it is likely to be true qua object of that
act. If my acceptance is an instance of wishful thinking that happens to yield
a true proposition, then it is not objectively truth-connected. (The criterion
given here is an intuitive, imprecise one. When exactly is the proposition
likely qua object of that act? To give a precise answer, one would no doubt
have to confront the notorious generality-problem for reliabilism [Conee and
Feldman, 1999, cf.].)
The formulation in terms of objective likelihood is here only chosen in order to
draw a terminologically simple contrast between an objective and a subjective
kind of relation. Paradigmatically the act’s reliability is an objective truth-
connection of the act. Other such connections are counterfactual connections
such as tracking and safety. I do not mean to say that all these different
sorts of connections are best captured in terms of —or even less that they
are fully analyzable in terms of— objective probabilities. But objective and
subjective probabilities are a sufficiently familiar contrast. It is therefore
useful for expository purposes.
subjective truth-connection: a cognitive act of acceptance is subjectively
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truth-connected, if and only if it is subjectively likely that the act’s
object qua object of that act is true.
Again, the relevant subjective likelihood is not merely subjective likelihood of
the proposition that I accept conditional on just any other things I accept (or
reject). A subjective truth-connection obtains only when the proposition that
I accept is likely to be true conditional on what further propositions which
are about that act I accept. A subjective truth-connection requires that the
subject has a perspective on her own act and that from that perspective the
following is true: given the proposition is the object of that act, it is likely
to be true.
The formulation is intended to leave room for a wide variety of views. It
means, roughly, that the subject has some positive attitude towards the
proposition that the act is truth-conducive. But what sort of attitude this
is is may vary from view to view. On some views —very intellectualist
views— the subject has an actual occurrent acceptance of the proposition
that the act is truth-conducive. On most views the acceptance is somehow
implicit in her willingness —e.g. in the case of an inference— to infer the
conclusion from the premises, her willingness to put these considerations
forward when asked about the truth of the proposition, or when asked to
justify her acceptance of the proposition. Thus an act may be subjectively
truth-connected without the subject possessing sophisticated concepts such
as act, truth-conduciveness, probability, and so on. But on any account of the
epistemic standing of an act in terms of a subjective truth-connection there
will be an “imminent” acceptance by the subject of the proposition that the
act is truth-conducive.
The characterization of subjective truth-connection is meant to paradigmat-
ically include evidentialist views. These views require that I possess con-
siderations (evidence) in favor of the truth of the proposition that I accept.
But they typically also require that what I possess, i.e. the consideration,
speaks in favor of the truth of the act’s object by my own lights. Thus I ac-
cept, however implicitly, that the considerations speak in favor of the truth
of the acceptance. And thus I implicitly accept that the act based on these
considerations is truth-conducive.
For instance, suppose that I accept that there is boat near the coast on the
basis of my perceptual experience. Suppose that my perceptual experience
provides me with the consideration It perceptually appears that there is a
boat near the cost. And I am strongly disposed —I actually manifest the
disposition now— to take this considerations to bear on the question whether
there is a boat off the coast. I would perhaps even appeal to the consideration
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It perceptually appears that there is a boat near the coast in order to claim
that it is true that there is a boat near the coast. Thus I implicitly accept
that my acceptance that there is a boat near the coast on the basis of it
perceptually seeming-to-be-so is truth-conducive.
Of course this is not meant to be the uncontroversial story about the epis-
temic standing of perceptual belief. But it is a story on which the epistemic
standing is dependent on a subjective truth-connection.
This somewhat demanding conception of subjective truth-connections is here
adopted for the following reason. It is on this conception that subjectively
truth-connected acts can be seen as epistemically responsible. For it is guar-
antees that the act appears in a positive light from the subject’s perspective.
The key feature of what is here called “mainstream” is that it associates
epistemic justification with subjective or objective truth-connections. But
mainstream merely holds that epistemic justification is mainly a matter of
a truth-connection. Other features may be allowed to play some role. For
instance, consider “agent reliabilism” [Greco, 1999, cf.]. On this view relia-
bility is not the only relevant feature of a belief-forming process. In addition
the process must be a manifestation of an “intellectual virtue” (where this
means more than simply that it is a reliable process). For instance the dis-
position underlying the process must have a certain history, been acquired
in certain ways and not in others; it must be stable and integrated in the
subject’s cognitive set-up; and so on. Still this is a mainstream view for the
objective truth-connection is an essential ingredient in epistemic value.3
If mainstream views apply the specific notion of epistemic responsibility to
cognitive acts, it will be applied mostly in virtue of truth-connections. By
contrast, according to the unorthodox views discussed in this chapter non-
truth-connection features play a central role with respect to epistemic re-
sponsibility. A dissident of this kind will most plausibly be a pluralist with
respect to notions of epistemic justification: epistemic responsibility is only
one —but a very important one— of the notions associated with the term
“epistemic justification”. Here is a first, rough characterization of the view.
Pragmatic Epistemic Foundationalism (PF): There is an epistemic stand-
ing, epistemic responsibility, which up to a point is mainly a matter
of a subjective truth-connection, but underlying it are mainly other,
pragmatic features. (“pragmatic foundationalism” for short.)
3Thus the versions of virtue-epistemology defended by Sosa [1991b,c,d, 2003] and Greco
[2002] are mainstream views.
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What needs to be elucidated is evidently the notion of features underlying
subjective truth-connection. Whether or not a subjective truth-connection
can convey positive standing depends on the standing of further actual or
potential acts. Here is the thought in favor of this claim:
First, as defined, if an act of acceptance α is subjectively truth-connected,
then α is likely to be true from the subject’s point of view. The subjective
point of view is constituted by the subject’s other acts already taken, non-act-
like seemings (e.g. perceptual states) and her dispositions to take acts. The
point of view thus specified either already includes an act to the effect that
α is truth-connected or such an act is “imminent”. For present purposes it is
not necessary to specify the exact sense in which such an act is “imminent”.
Next, this actual or potential act has a standing on its own. And it cannot
confer good standing on α, unless its own standing —and the standing of
any act it might itself depend on— is good. Thus the standing conveyed by
subjective truth-connection depends on an underlying standing.
It is an assumption of pragmatic epistemic foundationalism that there is “a
bottom”. Some standing which conveys the standing associated with sub-
jective truth-connection is not itself a standing associated with subjective
truth-connection. The motivation for this assumption is evidently a classic
worry about regresses [fn 5 Dretske, 2000a, cf.],[549 Enoch and Schechter,
2008, cf.]. Notoriously there are several such worries.4 One is that finite
minds as ours could not “contain” the infinity of states necessary to provide
a subjective perspective on the acts, a subjective perspective on the subjec-
tive perspective and so on. Another worry is that some standing has to be
underived, least we are incapable of giving an illuminating account of epis-
temic standing. An account of a kind of standing of act α in terms of the
same kind of standing of act β can presumably not be the last word on the
matter.
5.3 Pragmatic Epistemic Foundationalism
(PA) is not a merely possible view. It has been defended. In this section
it will become apparent that it has at least three proponents: Dretske and
Enoch and Schechter. Their versions of (PA) will be briefly summarized. It
4For a classic paper in which some of these regresses are disentangled, see Sosa [1980].
See chapters 2 and 4 of this thesis for a disentanglement of the issues with respect to
deductive justification.
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will then be possible to refine the characterization of (PA) at the end of this
section.
Dretske’s “epistemic entitlement”:
According to Dretske what has here been called “epistemic responsibility”
comes in two guises. On the one hand in the guise of “justification”, on
the other hand as “entitlement”. In the following passage Dretske introduces
these notions.
I am using justification (for believing P or accepting P as true)
[. . . ] as the reasons, the propositions one already accepts as true,
to which one can appeal in support of P. [. . . ] Justification is
only one of the ways of securing a right to believe. Certain facts
about one’s circumstance, facts one may have no awareness of
and, therefore, facts that are not one’s reasons for thinking P
true, may also give one this right. [Dretske, 2000a, 592]
Thus “justification” is a standing associated with what has been introduced
as a subjective truth-connection. “entitlement” is introduced as a right not
due to a subjective truth-connection but due “to certain facts about one’s
circumstance”.
Furthermore, in the following passages “entitlements” are claimed to provide
the foundations for “justifications”.
[. . . ] The propositions we are entitled to accept may be thought
of as given. [. . . ] Entitled propositions are the facts (or, see be-
low, the putative facts) one is given to conduct one’s cognitive
affairs.[Dretske, 2000a, 593]
[. . . ] There must be a given—some propositions we have
a right to accept without justification. How else would it be
possible to justify scientific and commonsense beliefs about the
world?[Dretske, 2000a, 594]
[. . . ] I here assume [. . . ] that internalists [who take only
justification to confer epistemic rights] are also subject to a jus-
tificational regress they can only halt by appealing to something
like entitlements.[Dretske, 2000a, fn 5]
In the following passage Dretske explicitly denies that entitlement depends
on an objective truth-connection, and thus denies what has here been given
the label of “mainstream”:
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If one’s interest in accepting P as true is to be regarded as
epistemic, though, one would think the primary—indeed the only
grounds for that right would be the truth, or probable truth of P.
I will later reject this idea—the idea, namely, that it is only a
relation to the truth (or probable truth) that can render a belief
[epistemically rightful].[Dretske, 2000a, 594]
The following quotation gives the passage in which Dretske states the central
idea about what does account for the foundations epistemic responsibility.
The foundation in question is a perceptual belief to which one is entitled:
We have no choice about what to believe when we see (hear,
smell, feel, etc.) that things are thus and so. [. . . ] Is it possible
that it is this feature of perceptual beliefs—their unavoidability—
that gives one the right to accept them? If you have no real
choice about what to believe, [. . . ], then you have—don’t you?—
the right to accept P as true. Ought implies can, and if you
cannot do otherwise, it surely can’t be true (as skeptics and in-
ternalists [i.e. those who think that only justification can confer
an epistemic right] maintain) that you ought to do otherwise. We
have a right to accept what we are powerless to reject.[Dretske,
2000a, 598]
The general idea, is that in my given current, un-sceptical frame of mind, I
cannot but accept what presents itself as true via my perceptual states. This
unavoidability of the acceptance is claimed to render it epistemically respon-
sible. Later in the paper Dretske qualifies this claim as follows [Dretske,
2000a, 599-601]: Unavoidability in a given frame of mind can only confer a
right if it is not by an epistemic fault of mine that I find myself in that frame
of mind. The full story goes roughly as follow (Dretske’s line of thought will
be discussed in quite a bit of detail in later sections): In my current frame of
mind I have no doubts about perception, I have no belief which undermines
my confidence in perception, nothing indicates to me that this could be an
illusion. In that frame of mind I can’t resist believing what I seem to see.
And if I can’t resist, then it is not the case that I ought to resist—at least
if it’s not my fault that I can’t resist. Thus the full entitlement-conferring
feature can be characterized thus:
D-feature is the (conjunctive) right-conferring feature as follows:
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D-feature1 the act is psychologically irresistible in the given frame of
mind, and
D-feature2 there is no epistemic irresponsibility with being in that
frame of mind.
One conspicuous feature about the passage it is worth noting. In the passage—
and in many other passages of the paper—Dretske appeals to an analogy with
rights to ordinary (non-epistemic) acts. Thus: “If you have no real choice
about what to believe, [. . . ], then you have—don’t you?—the right to accept
P as true. Ought implies can, and if you cannot do otherwise, it surely can’t
be true [. . . ] that you ought to do otherwise.” Dretske switches from talk
about belief in the first sentence to talk about what to do in the second.
And the second sentence is supposed to establish what is asserted in the first
sentence. The main principle he seems implicitly to rely on could perhaps
be stated thus:
D-Principle If S has no choice doing X and S is faultless about being in the
situation of having no choice about doing X, then S has a weak right
to do X.
There may be some immediate doubts about this principle. For instance,
one may ask, what kind of right is it such that I have a right to do X while
actually not having the choice not to do X? This worry will be discussed in
section 5.5.
The main point to be made at present is that the account appeals to a princi-
ple which in the first instance seems to be a principle of practical rationality.
This justifies in my opinion calling the feature to which he appeals “prag-
matic” —although Dretske never himself applies the term to his account.
This is of course only a terminological point. The substantial point is that
(i) truth-connections play no role in the account “entitlement” and (ii) the
account appeals to principles of practical rationality.
Justifiably employing a belief-forming method as basic
according to Enoch and Schechter
According to Enoch and Schechter [2008] cognitive acts are instances of fol-
lowing a belief-forming method. Some belief-forming methods are “employed
as basic”, others not. They do not provide a precise characterization of this
distinction. But given what they say, it seems safe to assume that what they
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have in mind when a method is said to be “employed as basic” implies that
the corresponding cognitive act is not subjectively truth-connected. (The in-
terpretation of “basicness” will play a role in the argument to be given in
section 5.4. It is therefore extensively discussed there.):
The belief-forming methods that are basic for a thinker are
those methods that are the most fundamental in how the thinker
reasons. All other belief-forming methods employed by the thinker
are derivative.[Enoch and Schechter, 2008, 551]
[. . . ] Given the ex hypothesi basicness of the method for
the thinker, possessing a justification is impossible.[Enoch and
Schechter, 2008, 555]
If a method is subjectively truth-connected, then intuitively the subject does
“possess a justification for employing it” and intuitively the method is “sup-
ported by other methods”. Therefore a when a method is employed as basic,
it is not subjectively truth-connected. They mention as examples (something
like) inference to the best explanation, reliance on modus ponens, reliance
on normative intuitions and the method of forming beliefs from perceptual
experience. Nothing depends on the claim that these are basic methods,
provided there are some basic methods.
In line with the characterization of (PA) Enoch and Schechter think that
methods employed as basic are the foundations on which methods employed
as non-basic rest:
IBE [inference to the best explanation] is plausibly a belief-
forming method that is basic for us, a method that supports
our use of other belief-forming methods but that is not in turn
supported by any other methods.[Enoch and Schechter, 2008, 447]
And the reason there have to be such foundations, according to them is that
otherwise a vicious regress ensues (see quotation below on page).
But just as Dretske, they reject the idea that the reliability of the method
itself could account for the good standing of the methods we employ as basic.
Instead they appeal to the following feature:
The guiding idea of our account is simple. Consider the ex-
planatory project, the project of understanding and explaining
the world around us. This project is of fundamental importance
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to us. [. . . ]; a thinker who does not inquire about the world
around him is intuitively doing something wrong. This counts
in favor of employing whatever methods are necessary for suc-
cessfully engaging in the explanatory project. It it plausible that
employing IBE (or a close relative) is needed for successfully en-
gaging in the explanatory project. And this explains why we are
justified in employing IBE as a basic rule in our thought.[Enoch
and Schechter, 2008, 549]
According to Enoch and Schechter something similar can be said about the
other methods we employ as basic. These include among others something
like modus ponens (a deductively basic method) and the method of forming
beliefs from perceptual experience. The general claim is something like the
following:
We are justified in employing a method as basic, (mainly) in virtue of
the
E&S-feature: employing the method is necessary for successfully en-
gaging in a project we are rationally required to engage in.
They give a detailed account of what is meant by the quasi-technical “the
method is necessary for successfully engaging in a project”. What is worth
noting here is that this does not imply that the method is objectively truth-
connected. It only means that there is some possibility that the method
is effective, e.g. yields (mostly) only good explanations. And that if it is
ineffective, then it is impossible for the subject to successfully engage in
the project: “if even this method fails, then the thinker cannot successfully
engage in the relevant rationally required project”. So the method need only
be potentially truth-connected, but it must in addition be such that if any
(available) method is truth-connected, then this one is. The idea is that since
the project is rationally required, what is perhaps merely potentially a means
to achieve the project, but in a way “the only hope”, is good enough.
The terminology of employing a method and engaging in a project suggests
that the relevant principles at play in the background are principles that
are in the first instance principles of practical rationality. It seems that the
intuitive appeal of the main idea stems from our acceptance of something
like the following principle of practical rationality:
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ES-Principle If P is a rationally required project, and method M is indis-
pensable (“the only hope”) for rationally5 achieving P, then using M is
in good standing.
This is a special-case-version of some principle to the effect that one should
use a means if the benefits of achieving the end outweigh the costs of em-
ploying the means weighed by the chance of succeeding by these means. The
case is special because the end is rationally required. And this has the con-
sequence that even means that represent a dim chance of success, if they are
the only hope, are good enough.
Before giving a general characterization of pragmatic foundationalism, it is
useful to try to reduce Enoch and Schechter’s talk of “employing a belief-
forming method” to talk about cognitive acts. This will considerably simplify
and unify the discussion that is to follow.
To translate their talk of “employing a belief-forming method” into talk about
cognitive acts requires simply to adopt a “thick” conception of cognitive acts.
We should understand a cognitive act as individuated partially by what it is
based on. By “inferential act” one should understand the second of the two
following things: (a) the acceptance of the conclusion, or (b) the acceptance
of the conclusion on the basis of the premises.If we think of the inferential
act in way (b), then it is possible that an inferential act is unsupported. If
we adopted the other way, (a), of individuating the inferential act, then it
would be odd to say “the act is unsupported” —for the premises do support
it. But the premises do not “support accepting the conclusion on the basis
of the premises”6. If we agree to take the inferential act to be (b), then it
5Not just anything necessary to engage successfully in a rationally required project
could have good standing derived from this principle. For instance, in some possible
world I (psychologically) could only successfully engage in the explanatory project by
associating a range of possible explanations with randomly chosen people; furthermore I
psychologically could only discard the bad explanations by killing the person associated
with that explanation. But arguably killing these people would not even have prima facie
good standing in this possible world, for it would be outright irrational. Thus some sort
of restriction to rational methods for engaging in a project would have to be made. For
instance, one could require that the method must be a method that is indispensable for
rationally successfully engaging in the project. Thanks to Torfinn Huvenes for providing
a predecessor of this counterexample and Crispin Wright for ideas for responding to it.
I do not claim that —once all the things Enoch and Schechter say in order to refine the
notion of “indispensability” are taken into account— these counterexamples still apply to
their view. They do arise against my appeal to what I call the “E&S-Principle” in my
rendering of the general idea behind their account.
6Except on a very specific view on the epistemic status of inference. This would be the
view that the premises support not only the conclusion, but also the proposition that the
premises make the conclusion probable.
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makes perfectly sense to say of an inferential act that it is unsupported (or
not subjectively truth-connected). An act as in (b) would only be supported
(or subjectively truth-connected) if the subject accepted that the acceptance
based on the premises is truth-connected. And this is what a subjective
truth-connection as introduced in section 5.2 requires.
Thus, we should take “foundational acts” to be all those acts, whether in-
ferential or not, that are not subjectively truth-connected. Dretske does not
consider the inferential ones, but his proposal may simply be taken as one
about a more restricted class of foundational acts.
This way of characterizing foundational acts is more useful in the present
context than the more classic conception which assimilates foundational with
non-inferential. For as explained, an inferential act can just as well fail to be
subjectively truth-connected as a non-inferential act.
These two examples help to give a general characterization of the views
grouped together under the label of “pragmatic foundationalism”. These
views implicitly or explicitly appeal to principles that in the first instance
are principles of practical rationality. This is the reason why the features to
which these views appeal can be called “pragmatic”.
Pragmatic Foundationalism (refined): There is a specific epistemic value
associated with a subjective truth-connection that has foundations as
follows:
1. The principles accounting for the epistemic value of the founda-
tional cognitive acts are principles that are plausible in the first
instance for ordinary actions; and
2. the cognitive acts do not satisfy the principle in virtue of objective
(and subjective) truth-connection.7
5.4 Responsibility and Defensible Stand
In the first part of this section the motivation for (PA) and the assumptions
on which it rests will be made explicit. In the second part a first conception
7The second clause is necessary not to rule out too much. For instance, some hold that
epistemic rationality is a form of instrumental rationality (for discussion see Kelly [2003]).
But they hold that cognitive acts are instrumental to the epistemic aim because they are
truth-connected. Such a view is obviously not a version of “pragmatic foundationalism”.
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of epistemic responsibility will be extracted from the proposals. And it will
be argued that it is incompatible with the motivating assumptions of (PA).
Pragmatic foundationalists deny that epistemic standings associated with an
objective truth-connection exhaust the class of epistemic standings. While
most of them would probably readily acknowledge that there is a value as-
sociated with something like reliability, they insist that there is some other
independent epistemic value. “[. . . ] there may be several different senses
of epistemic justification. The sense of epistemic justification we are af-
ter is the one closely related to the notions of epistemic responsibility and
blameworthiness. [. . . ] Whether there are other, more externalist notions of
epistemic justification is an issue on which we can remain neutral.” [Enoch
and Schechter, 2008, 551] Thus, objective truth-connections lack the capabil-
ity to confer the epistemic standing associated with epistemic responsibility
and blameworthiness.
(PF1) An act’s objective truth-connection cannot confer epistemic responsi-
bility on it.
Furthermore pragmatic foundationalist claim that a subjective truth-connection,
“possessing a justification”, does confer epistemic responsibility.
(PF2) Cognitive acts that are subjectively truth-connected are prima facie
epistemically responsible —provided the cognitive acts underlying the
subjective truth-connection do not involve epistemic irresponsibility.
As said, pragmatic foundationalists claim that not all cognitive acts can be
subjectively-truth-connected and for each subjectively truth-connected act
there is one or more underlying cognitive act that is not itself subjectively
truth-connected.
(PF3) Underlying each act that is subjectively truth-connected there are
other acts that are not themselves subjectively truth-connected.
(PF1) — (PF3) give raise to the threat that cognitive acts are globally epis-
temically irresponsible. They imply that epistemic responsibility has a foun-
dational structure and that the foundations are neither epistemically respon-
sible in virtue of a subjective truth-connection —for there is none— nor in
virtue of an objective truth-connection —for that cannot confer epistemic re-
sponsibility. And epistemic irresponsibility at the foundations contaminates
the whole of our cognitive acts (see the proviso-part in (PF2).
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The pragmatic foundationalists deflect the threat of thoroughgoing epistemic
irresponsibility —or “responsibility-scepticism” as one might call it— by
claiming that cognitive acts can be epistemically responsible in virtue of
pragmatic features. There is epistemic responsibility established neither by
a subjective nor on an objective truth-connection.
(PF4) Cognitive acts can be epistemically responsible in virtue of features
other than an objective or subjective truth-connection (for short: in
virtue of pragmatic features).
Thus: “ [. . . ] although employing a belief-forming method is typically only
epistemically responsible only if the relevant thinker is antecedently justified
in believing that the method is a good one, and although in the case of
basic belief-forming methods no such justified belief is antecedently available,
nevertheless employing such a method is epistemically responsible.”[Enoch
and Schechter, 2008, 555] The general desideratum that (PA) is supposed to
satisfy is the following:
Desideratum: Establish and account for the epistemic responsibility of the
foundational cognitive acts, despite their lack of a subjective truth-
connection.
The first way in which this desideratum can be fulfilled is as follows: There
is a feature in virtue of which subjective truth-connection confers epistemic
responsibility and this same feature is present when the proposed pragmatic
features are present. This common feature is that the subject is in a position
to defend her cognitive act and to seeing herself as doing the right thing.
The presence (or absence) of defensibility is the feature in virtue of which
all cognitive acts are epistemically responsible (or not). Thus this strategy
aims at providing pragmatic features that secure for the subject a defensible
position.
Defensibility Strategy: The pragmatic features and principles secure a
defensible position for the subject, in the absence of her having avail-
able considerations speaking in favor of the truth-connection of the
underlying states and transitions.
Defensible of course means that the subject could defend her position, and
the kind of modality here is an important issue. How readily available must
this defense be? Must the actual subject have antecedently reasoned through
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the defense, having accepted all the premises required for the defense? Or
is it enough that an idealized version of the actual subject would have these
premises and steps of reasoning available? Or is it something in between
these two extremes that is required? This issue is addressed below.
Enoch and Schechter could (against their intention, see below) be taken as
adopting the Defensibility Strategy. They propose what they call “a vindi-
cation” of our basic belief-forming methods along the following line:
(1) If the environment cooperates to some extent (IBE is
conditionally reliable), we successfully engage in the ex-
planatory project by employing IBE.
(2) If the environment does not cooperate at all, then any
other method fails too.
(3) Engaging in the explanatory project is rationally re-
quired.
(4) Employing IBE is among the best options calculated on
the uncertainty whether it is reliable/truth-conducive.
There are some worries about this vindication that should be put aside. They
are briefly mentioned .
One worry that some readers will find devastating is the following: What
are the epistemic credentials of such a vindication? How could it establish
a truly epistemic standing for the foundations? This is a vindication all
right, one might say, but in what sense is it epistemic, if it is independent
of a truth-connection? One way to flesh out this worry is as follows: The
vindication does not support the proposition that the conclusion of a given
instance of IBE is likely to be true. Therefore there is no rational route for a
subject from that vindication to the act of accepting the IBE-conclusion on
the basis of its premises. For nothing except considerations in favor of the
likelihood of truth of an acceptance’s object can rationalize that act.8 What
the vindication can at most rationalize is the act of bringing it about (by
influencing all sorts of further factors) that one accepts. But this is not the
cognitive act of accepting itself. Therefore, whatever merit there is in using
IBE by the light of the vindication, it is not epistemic merit at all.
8For a detailed general argument in favor of evidentialism along these lines, see Shah
[2006].
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This is a worry which might be devastating. But it depends on a substantial
background theory about epistemic value. I take it that it is not obvious
that the vindication is purely pragmatic. It does not obviously parallel cases
of clearly merely pragmatic standing of cognitive acts. One such case is the
one in which it would be good if I believed that smoking was not unhealthy
in order to get a job at a tobacco company. Surely there are all sorts of
differences between this case and the case of IBE evaluated according to the
vindication above. The vindication does not establish that sort of merely
pragmatic advantageousness for using IBE.9
It is not the aim of this chapter to assess pragmatic foundationalism from
the standpoint of whatever is the correct theory of epistemic value. The
target here is the claim that pragmatic foundationalism can account for epis-
temic responsibility. The main aim of this chapter is to challenge pragmatic
foundationalists to provide a satisfactory account of something worthy to be
called “responsibility”.
Another worry slightly more relevant to the objection to be raised in a minute
concerns the epistemic status of the premises. Surely, the vindication should
not circularly rely on IBE itself. But it is not obvious that (1) and (2) are
not supported by IBE. These seem to be claims about human capacities
and the relative likelihood of certain environments. Such claims are prima
facie epistemically on a par with many other empirical claims about humans
and their environment. In particular, it is not obvious that their epistemic
standing depends less on IBE than our claim that IBE is truth-preserving.
But again, while this seems to be a legitimate worry, it depends on certain
constraints on a good vindication —such as non-circularity. But this is a
constraint which is to some extent independent of the particular use the vin-
dication is put to. Here the focus is on the particular use of the vindication in
a development of the Defensibility Strategy. As such it has to satisfy certain
constraints too. And the aim here is to argue that it is these constraints that
it cannot fulfill.
In line with the Defensibility Strategy, this vindication must be in some
sense available to the subject herself. For it is in virtue of the availability of
a defense that the subject is not irresponsible in employing IBE as basic.
But there is a fundamental problem with such a proposal. If the the weighing-
considerations are available to the subject herself, then the act (employment
of IBE) is not foundational (resp. IBE is not employed as basic). For in that
case the standing of our use of IBE depends on the standing of further states
9Enoch and Schechter [2008, sec 5.1] address this worry.
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and transitions, in particular of the weighing method and the methods by
which the premises of the weighing consideration are given. And if the act is
not foundational, then we simply have not reached the bottom—the standing
of which the proposal is supposed to account for. Now we are simply pushed
to account for the standing of the weighing-consideration and its premises.
As it stands, this objection is mistaken. Nevertheless a proper refinement
of it, or so it will be argued, is right. What is wrong about it as stated
is that it assumes a different conception of foundation than the one used
by the pragmatic foundationalist. Foundations were introduced in order to
stop a regress (or avoid circularity) of subjective truth-connections. All this
requires is that the foundations are not subjectively truth-connected. It does
not imply that the foundations’ epistemic responsibility does not depend on
the standing of any other acts at all. Foundations can depend on the standing
of acts that do not provide a subjective truth-connection. And it is clear from
the vindication that the piece of practical reasoning does not establish that
the employment of IBE is truth-conducive.
However, the proponent of (PF)’s fear of regress and circularity, which mo-
tivates his endorsement of foundationalism, also motivates a requirement to
the effect that the foundations are in some wider sense fundamental —in
other words, that there is a sense in which the foundation’s responsibility
does not depend on further acts. It will be argued that if a foundational act
is pragmatically defensible as required by the Defensibility Strategy, then it
cannot be fundamental in the relevant sense.
Consider a given candidate for being a foundational act, e.g. an instance of
IBE. A proponent of the Defensibility Strategy is committed to the claim
that there is a relevant difference between
(a) requiring that this act is subjectively truth-connected and
(b) requiring that it is pragmatically defensible.
He is committed to claiming that while the former gives raise to a a vicious
regress or malign circularity, the latter does not. But pace that, it will be
argued, there is no reason to expect that there is a relevant difference.
Consider an instance of IBE, called now for simplicity’s sake an “IBE-act”.
Suppose that it is subjectively truth-connected. According to how this notion
has been introduced, this implies that the subject “imminently” accepts that
the IBE-act is truth-preserving. Let us say that the the subject therefore has
an available truth-connection defense.
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So, it is possible to compare the available truth-connection defense with an
available pragmatic defense. The pragmatic defense might be one along the
lines of the vindication given by Enoch and Schechter. The proponent of
the Defensibility Strategy denies that the subject has an available truth-
connection defense. But his reason for denying this should not be a reason
also to deny that she has an available pragmatic defense.
One possible worry concerning a further subjective truth-connection is the
following: We are about to give an account of epistemic responsibility, that
is, we are to explain why a given cognitive act is epistemically responsible. If
the account satisfies the relevant explanatory standards, then for some cog-
nitive acts the epistemic responsibility must be explanatorily fundamental.
This means it must be fundamental in the sense that it’s responsibility is
not explained in terms of the responsibility of some other of the subject’s
act. Now we are accounting for the responsibility of a given IBE-act. But
if we appeal to an available truth-connection defense, we appeal to the re-
sponsibility of a potential, imminent cognitive act. But it is not the case
that that further act (or, if any, the further acts it relies on) are explanato-
rily more fundamental. On the contrary these acts are explanatorily less or
equally fundamental than an IBE-act. Perhaps some of them are IBE-acts
themselves. Therefore our account risks to fall prey to an explanatory regress
explaining something in terms of what is to be explained. At the very least
the appeal to an available truth-connection defense does not allow us to make
any explanatory progress. Everything remains to be explained.
But if this is a legitimate worry (the objector can remain neutral on this),
then the Defensibility Strategy commits one to the following: the poten-
tial act of the pragmatic defense and, if any, the acts it itself relies on are
explanatorily more fundamental than the foundational cognitive acts.
It cannot here be given a precise account of what it means to be explanatorily
more fundamental (with respect to epistemic responsibility). A plausible
requirement is that if an act’s epistemic responsibility is explanatorily more
fundamental than another’s, then one can understand why it is responsible
without first understanding why the less fundamental act is responsible. This
requirement is obviously violated when the supposedly more fundamental act
is of the same kind than the less fundamental act. Perhaps one could argue
that a defense of IBE along a subjective truth-connection would necessarily
be circular relying at some point at least on IBE itself, while the pragmatic
defense does not. That the weighing consideration above does not rely on
IBE is not that clear, since we do not know how the premises could be
supported. At least the argument form does not seem to be an IBE. But
be that as it may, it is very difficult to contend that a similar pragmatic
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defense for the basic deductive method would not rely on that method itself.
(The parallel pragmatic defense of MP —assuming that this is one of our
basic deductive methods— would be a similar weighing consideration. The
only difference between the vindication for IBE and MP is that they are
the best options with respect to different rationally required project.) It is
very plausible that practical reasoning exploits the same connections between
contents that deductive reasoning does. For instance, means-end reasoning
can be brought in MP-form.
And even if all the support relations involved in the pragmatic defense were
of a different kind, the question whether the reliance on these methods is
responsible does not seem to have an easier answer than the original question
about IBE, modus ponens, perception, and so on. I can see no reason why
the acts and support relations involved in the pragmatic defense would not
give rise to an explanatory regress as well.
This obviously does not definitively refute the claim that there is any relevant
difference. But it raises a challenge for a proponent of this line of thought.
She must provide good reasons to think that the pragmatic defensibility is
less subject to an explanatory regress than a truth-connection defensibility.
Perhaps there are such reasons, but they can only lie in a detailed account of
practical reasoning. For it seems that the intuitive view of the interrelation
between theoretical and practical reasoning does either not give priority to
either one, or, if it gives a priority, then it lies with theoretical reasoning.
Practical reasoning is not, it seems, more explanatorily fundamental or self-
standing, than theoretical reasoning.
Consider now another worry about a further subjective truth-connection.
This would involve, as said, an imminent act of acceptance that the IBE-act
is truth-preserving. This act is imminent in virtue of the subject’s further
mental states, that is experiential states, cognitive acts already taken and
dispositions to engage in cognitive acts. If this imminent act is to help
explain epistemic responsibility —as subjective truth-connections do in the
case of non-foundational acts, then there must be a psychological explanatory
connection between the imminent defense and one’s taking the IBE-act. For
if the potential defense were psychologically ineffective, then how could it
account for responsibility? It must be in virtue of the defensibility that the
subject takes her act. Therefore the further mental states which constitute
the defensibility’s psychological implementation must psychologically explain
(in part) the IBE-act.
But this precludes the possibility that the IBE-act is psychologically funda-
mental in the following sense: An act is psychologically fundamental if and
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only if it is not taken because of any further actual or potential cognitive act.
It may be argued that some cognitive act must be psychologically fundamen-
tal. For if there are not, then a vicious regress of cognitive acts ensues. It
requires that there is an infinity of actual or imminent cognitive acts. And
this, it may be argued, is impossible for limited human minds.
Whatever may be thought of this worry, it again does not seem to allow to
point to a relevant difference between the availability of a truth-connection
defense and the availability of a pragmatic defense. For if the pragmatic
defensibility is to account for responsibility then it has to be psychologically
implemented too. And if psychological implementation poses a problem for
truth-connection defensibility, why should not there be the same problem for
pragmatic defensibility.
In sum, it is hard to see a sense in which pragmatic defensibility is less
problematic for an account of epistemic responsibility than a thoroughgo-
ing truth-connection defensibility. If the latter gives raise to a regress or
circularity problem, then so does the former.
Enoch and Schechter clearly agree, as is witnessed by the following passage:
[. . . ] A thinker may, for instance, be justified in relying upon
her favorite thermometer because she is antecedently justified
in believing that it reliably indicates the prevailing tempera-
ture. But holding a belief about the reliability of a belief-forming
method cannot be a necessary condition for being justified in
employing it as basic [. . . ]. [. . . ] since the relevant reliability be-
liefs must themselves be justified, the threat of an infinite regress
or vicious circularity looms large. And analogous problems face
views that ground the justification of our employment of basic
belief-forming methods in the justification of other beliefs. [. . . ]
we account for the justification of employing basic belief-forming
methods directly, and not via the justification of any belief. [em-
phasis added] [Enoch and Schechter, 2008, 549]
In other passages they explicitly reject the idea that their vindication is
available to the subject [564 Enoch and Schechter, 2008, cf.]. It is clear that
they do not endorse the Defensibility Strategy. (And the same is true of
Dretske.)
But in what way does their vindication ensure that the subject employs the
basic method in an epistemically responsible manner, if not by endowing her
with a defensible position with respect to her cognitive act?
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How can the pragmatic features account for epistemic responsibility —but an
objective truth-connection would not, while the pragmatic features are just
as unavailable to the subject as an objective truth-connection is? Enoch and
Schechter appeal to Reichenbach’s analogy between the blind man’s choice
to follow the path, although he does not know that it will lead him out of the
wood rather than near to a precipice. [567 Enoch and Schechter, 2008, cf.]
They say that just as the blind man should follow the path because it is his
only hope, so should we rely on our basic belief-forming methods as our only
hope. But, if the blind man has nothing at his disposal to assess whether
following the path is his only hope, then his behavior is not particularly
responsible. If from all he knows it is just as likely that a helicopter will find
him only if stays where he is than that this is actually a man-made path
leading somewhere, then from his point of view following the path is not the
right thing to do. We might say that he does the right thing by following
the path. And we can say that even if we do not know where that path
leads. For we think that it is his best chance of getting out. But thereby
we evaluate his behavior with respect to our best guess of what its objective
consequences are. We do not evaluate whether his choice of following the
path is a responsibly made choice.
One may fail to see this point if one thinks of epistemic responsibility by way
of the usual objections to pure reliabilism.10 Pure reliabilism is at odds with
common intuitions about several cases: the new evil demon scenario (envat-
ted brain otherwise similar to me), Bonjour’s clairvoyant Norman, Boghos-
sian’s (and other’s) logician who takes the “short route” to a very non-obvious
logical implication of what he believes. These cases establish that there are
kinds of epistemic standings for which reliability is either not necessary or not
sufficient. One may think that there is one single notion for which reliability
is neither necessary nor sufficient and that this is the notion of epistemic
responsibility. It is true that the criterion proposed by Enoch and Schechter
does better than reliability with respect to these cases. But this alone does
not suffice to account for epistemic responsibilty. There may be several kinds
of epistemic standing around. Some have refined reliabilism to account for
the insufficiency [Greco, 1999, cf.]. And some reliabilists account for the new
evil demon by a derived notion of epistemic standing: it may be legitimate to
apply “justification” to the envatted brain otherwise similar to me, because
the brain’s methods are methods that are reliable in the actual world [Greco,
2002, cf.]. To account for epistemic responsibility one needs to provide a
10Both Dretske [2000a] and Enoch and Schechter [2008] proceed in this way. This is quite
common, see also Boghossian [2003] who also addresses the problem of the responsibility
of foundational acts.
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standing that deserves the deontological term “responsibility”.
The focus of much of the discussion in this section has been on Enoch and
Schechter’s account. But it is clear that the problem raised is a problem for
anyone who endorses the Defensibility Strategy. Having an available defense
implies that the defensible act’s standing depends on the standing of some
further actual and imminent acts. But it is not clear at all why this should
not lead to the same regress problems that motivated the appeal to pragmatic
features in the first place.
If what has been argued in this section is right, then the following claim
should be added to the pragmatic foundationalist’s set of claims, (PF1)–
(PF4):
(PF5) The pragmatic feature of the foundational act does not depend on the
subject’s other actual or potential cognitive acts (where this includes
instances of practical reasoning).
5.5 Blame and Excuses
It has been argued that the Defensibility Strategy fails. But it has also been
admitted that neither of the proponents of (PF) at the focus of this chapter
endorses that strategy. Both deny that the pragmatic features and principles
are in any relevant way accessible to the subject. Are there other ways in
which the pragmatic features could account for epistemic responsibility?
In this section the following idea is discussed: Although a lack of a subjective
truth-connection normally implies epistemic irresponsibility, the foundational
acts’ pragmatic features render the subject excusable in this instance. The
subject is exempt from blame, because the foundational acts are special in a
way such that one is excused for lacking a subjective truth-connection.
Excuse Strategy: Given the foundational act of acceptance is not subjec-
tively truth-connected, the subject ought to suspend judgment. But
the pragmatic features provide an excuse and the subject is exempt
from blame.
According to the Defensibility Strategy epistemic responsibility is ensured
by defensibility. Defensibility was supposed to come in two guises, on the
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one hand as a subjective truth-connection, on the other as the availabil-
ity of a pragmatic vindication. On the Excuse Strategy epistemic responsi-
bility consists in either acting cognitively according to the act’s subjective
truth-connection or in being excused for not doing so. This allows the two
responsibility conferring features to be very dissimilar: what provides an ex-
cuse, the pragmatic feature, need not resemble what positively accounts for
responsibility, the subjective truth-connection.
This is a promising idea. Furthermore Dretske can plausibly be read as
implicitly endorsing the Excuse Strategy. The main feature of his proposal
is that it appeals to the psychological irresistibility of the foundational acts.
But lack of voluntary control is in a general a condition under which one
is —given certain further conditions are fulfilled— excused for behaving in
ways one ought not. For example, when I am provoked, I may behave in
ways I ought not. But when I am provoked I may find myself in a state in
which I am powerless to control my reactions. My behavior in that case may
be excusable.11
The main steps of Dretske’s reasoning in the passage quoted on page 179 are
the following:
(D-feature1) In my current frame of mind, I cannot psychologically
resist accepting what I seem to see.
(Step 1) I have no obligation not to accept what I seem to see when
I am in that frame of mind —except if in being in that frame
of mind I violate an obligation.
(Step 2) I have a (“weak, liberty-”) right to accept what I currently
seem to see —except if I am blameworthy for being in my frame
of mind.
After having gone through this line of thought, Dretske appeals to (D-
feature2), i.e. that one is blameless in being in the frame of mind, and con-
cludes that one is blameless simpliciter to accept what one seems to see in
the usual circumstance. This further step is irrelevant for the discussion in
this section. I return to it in the next section.
The main steps explicitly stated by Dretske leave room for at least three
different interpretations. The psychological irresistibility affirmed in (D-
feature1) is supposed to (at least partially) establish in the end that I am
blameless to accept what I seem to see. But there are three different routes
11Thanks to Jonathan Schaffer for suggesting the example.
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from (D-feature1) to this conclusion. According to these routes the role
played by (D-feature1) differs.
First, psychological irresistibility can be taken to establish that obligations do
not apply to foundational acts at all: Foundational acts are mere happenings,
not things I do. Therefore I do not have obligations pertaining to them. This
line of thought will be called “interpretation (A)”. It will be developed and
rejected at the outset of this section.
Second, psychological irresistibility can be taken as a condition under which
I am excused for violating an epistemic obligation of mine. It thereby es-
tablishes that I am not to be blamed. This line of thought will be called
“interpretation (B)”. It will be developed and rejected in the main part of
this section.
Third, psychological irresistibility can be taken to establish that obligations
(and blame) apply to foundational acts derivatively: Foundational acts are
not to be understood as decisions to accept, reject or suspend judgment. But
they are consequences of some decisions. Obligation and blame pertaining to
foundational acts is therefore derived from these further decisions. This line
of thought will be called “interpretation (C)” and developed and discussed
in the next section.
The first interpretation runs as follows: (D-feature1) establishes that founda-
tional cognitive acts are not my proper acts of mine but things that happen
to me. Events that occur independently of one’s proper acts are not proper
objects of one’s obligations. On this interpretation, the proposition I have
no obligation not to accept what I currently seem to see is trivially true in
the sense that the concept obligation does not apply to happenings, but only
to proper acts. An obligation is an obligation for a subject to act, events
that are not proper acts of a subject (or consequences thereof —see below)
are not objects of obligations.
According to this interpretation the event constituting my accepting what
I seem to see is comparable to the event that my heart beats right now
or the event that the moon passes position XY at this instant. But mere
happenings —whether they are in the universe at large or inside my body or
inside my mind— are not proper objects of obligations. On this interpretation
“foundational act” is a misnomer.
But there is a problem with this line of thought. If it were correct that
foundational acts are mere happenings not subject to obligations, how could
they be subject to rights as affirmed in (Step 2)? If accepting what I seem to
see is not something I do, but merely something that happens, how can there
be a “right” for me “that it happens”? One of the weakest forms of a right
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is a permission. So, (Step 2) affirms that I am permitted to accept what I
currently seem to see. But, on the present interpretation, this is a funny thing
to say. For the idea of permission involves the idea of the possibility of doing
something else. It does not make much sense to say that it is permitted that
my heart beats right now. Having no obligation not to, when it is trivially
true, does not amount to having the right or being permitted to.
For the moment then, this interpretation of Dretske’s line of thought is not a
very promising one. For if (D-feature1) establishes that foundational acts are
not proper acts but mere happenings, then it establishes not only (Step 1),
but also that the concepts of epistemic responsibility and blameworthiness
do not apply to foundational acts.12 But then the proponent of (PA) would
rather explain epistemic responsibility away than provide an account of it
—as for instance Dretske claims he does.
There is a further problem with interpretation (A). Arguably obligations do
not only apply to my proper acts, but also to certain consequences thereof.
Psychological irresistibility can at most establish that foundational acts are
not proper acts, it does not establish by itself that it is not a consequence of
a proper act. Thus (D-feature1) cannot by itself establish that obligations do
not apply to foundational acts. It can only establish that either obligations
do not apply, or if they do, then they are derived from proper acts of which
the acceptance is a consequence. This line of thought will be developed as
interpretation (C) in the next section.
Let us now put the idea that obligations do not apply to foundational acts
aside. There is another available interpretation of Dretske’s line of thought.
It runs as follows: Foundational acts, just as any other cognitive acts, are
proper objects of obligations. Furthermore, the cognitive act that is appro-
priate when one lacks subjective truth-connection is suspending judgment
and not accepting. Thus, normally, I have an obligation not to accept what
is not subjectively truth-connected. But (D-feature1) —i.e. the fact that I
lack control in the current circumstance— provides me with an excuse.
On this interpretation the case of foundational acts is similar not to the case
of the heartbeat, but to the following case mentioned earlier: I am provoked
and hit the person who provokes me —an act which in the circumstance is
morally wrong. Suppose that I am under the moral obligation not to hit
this person. But given one’s lack of control over one’s emotions and behavior
when provoked —just suppose that this is the case, or replace the example by
another one where it is the case— my disproportionate reaction is excused.
12For an influential argument from general doxastic involuntarism to the claim that
there is no epistemic responsibility, see [Alston, 1988]. See also later in the text.
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There is a question about how best to describe such cases. Should one say
that the obligation persists or should one say that the obligation is sus-
pended? The most natural thing to say it seems is that I am excused from a
persistent obligation. Some might prefer to say that my excuse suspends the
obligation. Not much depends on this for the present purpose. (The issue
is however relevant in the debate whether ‘ought’ implies ‘can’. For if (i) I
am excused for not suspending judgment because I cannot do otherwise, and
(ii) the obligation to suspend judgment persists, then (iii) I have an obli-
gation I cannot fulfill . Therefore, a proponent of ‘ought’ implies ‘can’ will
want to treat the case as one where the obligation is suspended [Ryan, 2003,
cf.]. Here the opposed way of speaking is adopted, according to which I have
an obligation I cannot fulfill.) If I am excused from a persistent obligation
(Step 1) should then be reformulated as follows:
(Step 1’) I have an excuse for accepting what I currently seem to see when
in that frame of mind —provided I have not violated an obligation in
being in that frame of mind or have an excuse for having done so.
On the current interpretation (Step 1’) establishes that a positive evaluative
concept applies to my accepting what I currently seem to see. It is a con-
ceptual truth that when I am excused, then I am blameless. Thus we can
derive some positive evaluative status, blamelessness or responsibility, from
psychological irresistibility.
(Step2’) I am blameless in accepting what I currently seem to see —except
if I am blameworthy for being in my current frame of mind.
However, the Excuse Strategy fails because it implicitly relies on an implau-
sible conception of cognitive acts. It tries to treat epistemic responsibility in
an analogous manner to moral responsibility. But morally evaluated actions
differ in a crucial respect from epistemically evaluated cognitive acts.
The objection is best brought out by making the analogy as explicit as pos-
sible.
The Moral Case: In order to keep the comparison as simple as possible
assume the principle as follows: I never ought to hit a person, unless
I have a very good reason to do so. Suppose now that I am provoked
by someone, but not sufficiently to acquire a reason to hit that person.
Whether I hit someone or not is usually something I decide to do or
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not. Therefore, when I decide to hit a person and I have insufficient
reason to hit that person, then I am blameworthy. However, in the
present circumstance I am incapable to act on the basis of a decision
to do this rather than that. Rather, I hit the person in a state in which
I am powerless to act otherwise. Provided I am blameless for being in
that state, I have an excuse for acting against my obligation not to hit.
Consider now the analogous account of epistemic excusability:
The Epistemic Case: Assume (O): I never ought to accept when the ac-
ceptance is not subjectively truth-connected. Whether I accept a propo-
sition or not is something I decide to do. Therefore when I decide
to accept a proposition and the acceptance is not subjectively truth-
connected, then I am blameworthy. However in the present circum-
stance (my frame of mind and the occurrent perceptual experience) I
cannot decide whether to suspend judgment, to accept or to reject. I
accept in a state where I am powerless to act otherwise. Provided I
am blameless for being in that state, then the fact that I have lost
control over my cognitive acts provides an excuse for acting against my
obligation to suspend judgment.
In both cases, one is excused for violating one’s obligation when a particular
condition for blameworthiness does not obtain. In both cases, this condition
is that one can decide to act in one way or another and act according to that
decision. That is, one can bring the act about by a decision. One is excused if
that condition does not obtain. But the interplay between blameworthiness
and excuse is slightly more complicated: it must in principle be possible for
acts of the kind to be brought about by decision. Suppose it were in principle
psychologically impossible to hit a person based on a decision. Suppose that
hitting were like the growing of my nails. I cannot be excused for the event
of the growing (just this moment) of my nails. For there is no condition on
blameworthiness pertaining to the growing of my nails. Rather the growing of
my nails is not a proper object of the deontological concept blameworthiness
and therefore it is not a proper object of the concept excuse. The difference
between my hitting and the growing of my nails is that it is in principle
possible for me to hit or not according to how I decide.
Thus the application of excuses depends on a contrast among acts of a given
kind. On the one hand there are psychologically possible circumstances in
which an act of the kind is taken on the basis of a decision. On the other
hand there are circumstances in which acts of the kind are not the result of
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decision. The case where I have an excuse because I lack the power to act
otherwise is contrasted with the (at least in principle possible) case where
I am blameworthy because I have taken the wrong decision. Without that
contrast lack of power to act otherwise cannot constitute an excuse.
There is the following major obstacle to running the Excuse Strategy: While
it is prima facie plausible that one can in principle decide to hit another
person or not, it is prima facie plausible that one cannot decide to accept,
reject or suspend judgment about a proposition. Cognitive acts are the
mental events more commonly singled out as belief, disbelief and being neutral
and perhaps others. There may be some cognitive acts which properly involve
a decision, such as accepting for the sake of argument. And there may be
acts usually involving a decision which are not cognitive acts but are easily
confused with them, such as acting on the assumption of. But belief generally
does not involve a decision or an intention to believe. And similarly for the
other mentioned attitudes, disbelief and the neutral attitude. And these
cases are the cases central for epistemology and they are the cases to which
the Excuse-Strategy is supposed to apply. It cannot here be argued for the
psychological impossibility to decide to believe, but there is a widespread
agreement among epistemologists and meta-ethicists that this is the case.
The point is sufficiently well entrenched to pose a very serious threat to the
excusability-strategy.
It might be objected that if one cannot decide to act cognitively in this way
or that, then the whole idea of epistemic responsibility is undermined. For
epistemic responsibility is equivalent to epistemic blamelessness. But if there
is no possibility of blame for cognitive acts because they are not intentional,
then they cannot be epistemically (ir)responsible. But this conclusion is too
strong. The objection merely depends on the point that there is no possibility
of blame for cognitive acts in virtue of a wrong decision to accept, reject or
suspend judgment. But blame for a cognitive act may have a different source
than a supposed decision to act cognitively in this way or that. The act may
be a consequence of other decisions and may be blameworthy or blameless in
virtue of these other decisions. This idea will be explored in the next section.
The objection does not rely on the claim that there is no distinction with re-
spect to (some sort of) psychological irresistibility between foundational and
non-foundational acts. Dretske thinks that perceptual belief and acceptances
of principles of inference are irresistible to a higher degree than inferential
belief. Although this seems questionable, the objection raised here does not
depend on that point. It may be granted to Dretske, for example, that a
reflective inference, say, leaves more possibilities for further judgments to in-
tervene in the belief-forming process, than the usual perceptual belief: “The
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causal process —from experience of lights to a judgment that they are on—
runs its course before rational processes can be mobilized”. The objection
here depends on the point that whatever rational processes may be mobi-
lized in the inferential case, none amounts to the intervention of the subject
deciding to accept, reject or suspend judgment. And this point suffices to
undermine the idea of blameworthiness in virtue of a decision to accept and
of excusability in virtue of lack of power to decide.
At this point a proponent of the Excuse Strategy might respond as follows:
“The analogy to the moral case is not to be taken so strictly. The possi-
ble blameworthiness of a cognitive act does not depend on the possibility
to decide to accept, reject or suspend judgment. Rather it depends on the
possibility of rational processes of evaluation to intervene in the formation of
the act. Perhaps you think that blame implies ‘can not’ and that therefore
the mere possibility of the intervention of rational processes is insufficient to
allow for blame. Be that as it may. If you don’t think that such blamewor-
thiness is true blame, then just call it quasi-blame. The foundational acts
are special because they do not allow rational processes of evaluation to in-
tervene. This means that a condition for quasi-blame is not fulfilled. And
just as for the case of true blame where involuntariness suspends blamewor-
thiness, here the impossibility for rational processes to intervene suspends
quasi-blameworthiness.”
Of course this response depends on how to interpret “intervention of ratio-
nal processes” in such a way that it is psychologically impossible in the case
of foundational cognitive acts, but possible otherwise. The idea seems suffi-
ciently awkward to warrant looking for alternative conceptions of the grounds
of epistemic blameworthiness and epistemic responsibility. Perhaps one has
in the end to reject the notion of epistemic responsibility, as some have done.
But there are other options one can explore before that.
It has been argued that the Excuse Strategy fails. The argument relied on
a conception of blameworthiness according to which an act is blameworthy
only if it can be traced back to a decision. The Excuse Strategy was rejected
because it assumed wrongly that the decisions in question are decisions to
accept, reject or suspend judgment —that is, the cognitive acts themselves.
But if cognitive acts are not decisions, what are the decisions in virtue of
which cognitive acts are blameworthy or blameless, irresponsible or respon-
sible? The next section provides an answer to this question.
5.6 Cognitive Acts and Real Acts
202 CHAPTER 5. EPISTEMIC RESPONSIBILITY
Dretske does not only appeal to the psychological irresistibility of perceptual
belief in a certain frame of mind. He also appeals to the (alleged) fact that
one is normally blameless in being in that frame of mind. This (alleged)
fact was referred to as (D-feature2). In interpreting Dretske so far his appeal
to (D-feature2) has been circumvented by leaving the conclusions, (Step 2)
and (Step 2’), with a proviso: One is blameless provided one is blameless in
being in that frame of mind. But this formulation as a proviso suggests that
(D-feature2) plays a minor role in the establishment of blamelessness for the
foundations.
However, this suggestion might be misleading. (D-feature2) may be taken as
the “source” of epistemic responsibility and (D-feature1) as the ground for
a principle about how responsibility transmits from the source onwards. On
this new interpretation Dretske’s line of thought develops as follows:
(D-feature1) In my current frame of mind, I cannot psychologically
resist accepting what I seem to see.
(Step 1”) I have no obligation {not to accept what I seem to see
when in that frame of mind}.
(Step 2”) I am blameless {not to accept what I seem to see when
in that frame of mind}.
(D-feature2) I am currently blameless in being in that frame of
mind.
(Step 3) I am currently blameless to accept what I seem to see.
The parenthesis in (Step 1”) and (Step 2”) indicates a wide scope reading
of the normative and deontological terms “obligation” and “blameless”. The
wide scope reading of (Step 2”) contrasts with the following narrow scope
reading:
When in that frame of mind I am blameless {not to accept what I seem
to see}.
From the proposition rendered by the narrow scope reading, and the propo-
sition that I am currently in that frame of mind, it follows that I am cur-
rently blameless not to accept what I seem to see. Thus, from the narrow
scope reading of (Step 2”), (Step 3) would be detachable independently from
(D-feature2). It therefore yields the wrong result. For one may be in a un-
5.6. COGNITIVE ACTS AND REAL ACTS 203
sceptical frame of mind when one should not, as will become clear in what
follows.
Now (Step 1”) and (Step 2”) can be read as transmission principles. They
state that any obligation and blame applying to the cognitive act of accep-
tance is derived from obligation and blame that applies to the frame of mind.
This disposes of the main worries raised against the previous interpretations
of Dretske’s line of thought.
First, on interpretation (A) cognitive acts were no proper object of obli-
gations at all. This disqualified immediately any attempt to account for
epistemic responsibility. For if the notion of an obligation does not apply,
then the notion of responsibility does not apply either. This is not the case
with the interpretation currently under discussion. (Step 1”) is not trivially
true. Some obligations do apply to cognitive acts (of the kind). If I had an
obligation not to be in the frame of mind, then I would have an obligation
not to accept what I seem to see. If then I did accept, I would be blamewor-
thy. Thus, (Step 3) is not trivially true either. I could be blameworthy for
accepting what I seem to see, namely if I were blameworthy for being in the
frame of mind.
Second, there is a straightforward route from (Step 1”) to (Step 2”). If there
is no obligation, then there is no violation of an obligation, and then one is
not blameworthy. There is no need to appeal to excusable violations.
Therefore, the problematic distinction between cognitive acts that result from
a decision to accept and are therefore capable of blame and those that are
involuntary and therefore excusable is avoided. (D-feature1) can now be seen
as an instance of the general involuntariness of cognitive acts. It need there-
fore not be assumed that some cognitive acts are decisions to accept, reject or
suspend judgment. Epistemic blameworthiness and epistemic responsibility
do not obtain in virtue of decisions to accept, reject or suspend judgment.
The present interpretation is in line with a conception of blame according to
which it is decisions for which one is to be blamed in the first instance. In
slogan form: ‘to be blamed’ implies ‘can’.13 It is not only decisions for which
one can be blamed —for transmission principles such as (Step 2”) transmit
blame from “sources”, which are decisions, to involuntary mental events and
states such as cognitive acts.
13The responses to Alston [1988] by Feldman [2000], Kornblith [2001], Ryan [2003] do
not touch on that principle. They are directed against the principle that epistemic ‘oughts’
imply ‘can’. They therefore do not refute the core of Alston’s view, namely that doxastic
involuntarism undermines deontology.
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A brief aside is in order. The transition from (D-feature1) to (Step 1”) ap-
pears to assume that there cannot be an obligation when one does not have
a choice. This is a version of the controversial ‘ought’-implies-‘can’. But note
that a proponent of the currently considered line of thought need not claim
that this is in general true —true for all kinds of epistemic ‘oughts’. The
important principle is (Step 2”). So, the important point about (Step 1”)
is that there is no obligation such that if one violates it, one is blamewor-
thy. On the present conception of epistemic responsibility, one is ultimately
blameworthy in virtue of choices. As said, ‘to be blamed’ implies ‘can not’.
This is compatible with allowing for ‘oughts’ that do not imply ‘can’ and are
not associated with blame. For instance, there may be an ‘ought’ for the
ideal of rationality [Kornblith, 2001, cf.], that no one fulfills. But violation
of such an ought does not give raise to blame, even though it is negatively
evaluated in some other way: it is not conform to the ideal.
(Step 2”) allows to derive the blamelessness of an acceptance from the blame-
lessness of the frame of mind. But it is not plausible that one decides directly
to be in one or another frame of mind. Thus, if we are to trace blamelessness
back to a decision, we need to look further. It will be argued in a moment that
there are such decisions that result in one’s being in one or another frame
of mind. There are decisions, it will be argued, that result in one’s being
in a certain frame of mind which in combination with certain uncontrolled
events (e.g. that it perceptually appears to one that such and such) results
in certain cognitive acts. The act is blameworthy or blameless according to
whether these decisions are.
My frame of mind in circumstances in which I responsibly form perceptual
beliefs can be mainly characterized by the absence of doubts and undermining
beliefs about my cognitive performance and the environment. For instance, I
do not currently suspect that my tea contained hallucinogenic substances, or
that someone has swapped the things in my flat with fakes. On the present
view of cognitive acts, whether I have such doubts and undermining beliefs
is not something I decide —anymore than whether I accept that there is a
cup of tea on my desk. However, there are things that I can decide to do by
which it is brought about that I acquire, loose or avoid acquiring undermining
doubts. That is, there are many decisions that influence whether I am at a
given time in a certain frame of mind.
Of course, if I had decided to sleep longer this morning, then I would not
be in the unsceptical perception-friendly frame of mind I am in now. For I
would be sleeping. This is not the kind of influence which is relevant here.
The relevant sort of influence must be such that it determines which of two
possible frames of mind I am now in, such that were I in the first I would
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accept, whereas were I in the second I would suspend judgment or reject. The
relevant decisions influence whether I am in a perception-friendly as opposed
to perception-unfriendly state of mind right now —when I am sleeping I am
in neither. Decisions that determine whether I am sleeping or awake, dead
or alive, here or somewhere else determine whether I have now a perceptual
experience, but not what my reaction to it will be.
The relevant choices are choices to take up or omit activities by which one
acquires or avoids undermining beliefs and doubts. Let us call them “choices
regarding evidence-related activities”. For one acquires undermining beliefs
by acquiring new undermining evidence. This is here meant as an uncontro-
versial conceptual claim. Evidence is just whatever allows for the acquisition
of belief and the other cognitive attitudes. It is not a here a normatively
loaded notion such that only rational belief-acquisition is prompted by evi-
dence. (A fortiori, not only that which provides considerations in favor of the
truth of a proposition counts as evidence.) Evidence is whatever can trigger
the involuntary cognitive acts. At present only the psychological possibility
of influencing by decision the acquisition of undermining beliefs is relevant.
The deontological and normative standing of the decisions and processes is
discussed later.
There are some decisions by which I may in the long run influence whether I
acquire undermining beliefs and doubts. For instance, suppose I think that
life as a sceptic is much more rewarding, that I could then take everything
more lightly and be much more serene and open-minded about my (mental)
life. I therefore decide to train myself to become a sceptic. I could for instance
decide to avoid reading epistemology-papers by anti-sceptics and thus avoid
evidence against scepticism. I could also try even more self-manipulative
strategies such as rewarding myself whenever I notice that I have doubts
about my cognitive performance. Perhaps by taking certain drugs I could
make hallucinations so much more common that I would loose the now some-
what natural prima-facie unsceptical attitude towards perceptual experience.
So, there are some long-term decisions by which I can control my frame of
mind.
But there also decisions that have a more immediate influence on whether
I acquire undermining beliefs and doubts. I can choose to take up certain
activities that may or may not result in a change of frame of mind, and I can
choose not to take up such activities. For example, I can choose to pursue
a line of thought, I can choose to pursue or abandon an argument with a
(possibly imaginary) opponent. I can choose to look for further considera-
tions bearing on a question or I can “make up my mind”, i.e. decide to come
to a conclusion on the basis of the considerations available to me now. For
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instance I can choose to check my tea or to check whether there are fake
objects in my flat. I can choose to reflect on my cognitive performance or
not. Depending on what I will find if I take up these activities, I will switch
frame of mind. I can intentionally pursue or avoid activities which (I believe)
may result in acquiring or loosing doubts about my cognitive performance.14
Do I have the right to be in my unsceptical frame of mind? This depends
on whether all decisions which could have brought a switch in frame of mind
about were blameless. As a consequence, (D-feature2) must be established
with respect to such choices.
Consider my perceptually formed acceptance that there is a cup of tea on
my desk. There are certainly some evidence-related activities that I have
omitted. For instance, I have not checked whether there was some hallucino-
genic substance in the tea I drank earlier this morning. So, if I am rightfully
unsceptical now, then my earlier omission must have been blameless.
This seems to be the case. Here are (some of) the considerations that are
relevant: First, the subjective probability of finding such a substance is low.
Mainly because the subjective probability that there is such a substance in
my tea is very low. Second, the costs in time and energy required for such
a check are quite high. Third, the benefit of acquiring a true undermining
belief (a defeater) and thus to avoid mistakenly accepting that there is a cup
of tea is relatively low.
In general, evidence-related activities are blameless, when they satisfy the
following principle: (For the sake of simplicity, I treat omissions as a sort
of activity. According to this way of speaking, when I continuously omit
checking for certain undermining evidence, I “pursue an evidence-related
activity”.)
(P) If the expected benefits outweigh expected costs both calculated on the
relevant uncertainties, then I am blameless for intentionally pursuing
an evidence related-activity
This principle explains why the things mentioned earlier are relevant. For in-
stance, the subjective probability for finding a defeater (partially, see below)
determines the relevant uncertainties.
There is a question of what renders evidence-related activities specifically
epistemically responsible. One idea is that the costs and benefits mentioned
14That such evidence-related activities are responsible for some intuitions concerning
epistemic justification has been claimed by Kornblith [1983]. See also [Montmarquet,
2007] for a related view.
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in principle (P) are somehow epistemic costs and benefits. That is, they
are costs and benefits with respect to specific epistemic aims as opposed to
moral or prudential aims. Another idea is that the relevant costs and benefits
involve a specific interplay between all sorts of concerns.15 On this view too,
the benefit of finding a true defeater is that of avoiding an epistemic mistake
(avoiding a false belief). But how important a mistake that is depends on
the relevance of not being mistaken on the particular matter at hand. It
is sometimes morally important not to be mistaken. Most of the time it is
prudentially important. Again, the costs are mainly time and energy which
are general goods that are then missing for activities that may be beneficial
in all sorts of respects. Not just everything is relevant on this second view.
Maybe having a certain belief about tobacco is beneficial for my career in a
tobacco company, thus not finding defeaters is beneficial. But this cannot
ensure the epistemic responsibility of my omitting to look for such defeaters.
It is the benefits and costs of being mistaken or not that are relevant, not the
benefits and costs of having a belief whether it is mistaken or not. It is here
not the place to develop and discuss criteria for the specifically epistemic
character of the responsibility.
Let us now see what follows if we apply (P) to a circumstance in which my
cognitive act is subjectively truth-connected. It is plausible that under this
condition I can responsibly omit checking for undermining evidence. If my
acceptance, is subjectively truth-connected, then the subjective probability of
there being a true defeater is low (or nil). Thus the subjective probability of
finding a true defeater is low (or nil). In that case looking for a defeater is just
a waste of time. (Perhaps the complete story is quite a bit more complicated.
For it probably necessary to introduce degrees of being subjectively truth-
connected. An act may then be insufficiently subjectively truth-connected
to render not looking for undermining evidence responsible, given it is very
important not to be mistaken.) Thus, it seems that a blamelessly subjectively
truth-connected act, α, will come out blameless. For first (P) is applied to
the evidence-related activities as just suggested. This yields the result that
the omissions were blameless and thus that my unsceptical frame of mind
is blameless. Then the transimission principle (Step 2”) is used to derive
blamelessness for α. This far everything is as as it should be according to
pragmatic epistemic foundationalism.
What if my cognitive act is not subjectively truth-connected? Imagine for
instance that I believe that a given acceptance of mine has a 0.5 chance of
being certain sort of reliable blind-sight, and a 0.5 chance of being unreli-
15For a somewhat similar view, see [Montmarquet, 2007].
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able wishful thinking. Let us assume that this implies that the subjective
probability of there being a true defeater is 0.5. Suppose further that the
importance of not being mistaken is not negligible. Under that circumstance
it seems that I cannot responsibly have omitted checking whether there is a
true defeater. Therefore I am not blameless in being in an unsceptical frame
of mind and my acceptance is blameworthy. Again, this seems to be the
wanted result. Cognitive acts that are not subjectively truth-connected are
normally epistemically irresponsible.
What now about a foundational act that is not subjectively truth-connected?
Let us assume that this implies that the subjective probability that the act
is truth-conducive is 0.5. So, again, there cannot be a presumption in favor
of not finding a true defeater. Does this mean that I should have checked?
Does it mean that the weighed benefits outweigh the costs —again, assuming
that the importance of not being mistaken is not negligible? This is not
clear at all. For (P) introduces several further factors besides the subjective
uncertainties of finding a defeater. Thus equal chance with respect to finding
and not finding a defeater does not prevent an imbalanced verdict. For
instance, among the costs does not only figure time and energy, but also
the risk of finding a misleading defeater. If, for instance, the subjective
probability that the activity turns up with a misleading defeater is equal
to that of turning up with a true defeater, the weighed benefits are further
diminished. Since positive evidence-seeking will, if it turns up with a piece
of evidence, necessarily involve a further foundational act, there might be
a problem here. If the subjective probability that the latter act is truth-
conducive is also 0.5, then the chance of acquiring a false undermining belief
(a misleading defeater) is equal to that of acquiring a true one. Therefore
it might well be that in the circumstance it was responsible not to check for
defeaters for the foundational act. Perhaps this sketch of a line of thought
could be developed into a full vindication of the claim that foundational acts
are blameless despite not being subjectively truth-connected.
So, does this mean that (PF) is vindicated after all? Does this conception
of epistemic responsibility finally serve the purpose of pragmatic epistemic
foundationalism? Not at all. For it is subject to exactly the same problems for
(PF) as the defensibility-conception discussed earlier: The blamelessness of
foundational acts is not fundamental. It again depends on the blamelessness
of an imminent act, namely the subject’s imminent application of (P) in
order to determine whether the activity is worth taking up or not.
(PF) grounds responsibility in a weighing consideration that must in some
form be available to the subject. There are the subjective probabilities that a
positive or negative outcome occurs (i.e. that one finds a true defeater, that
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one wastes time and energy, that one finds a misleading defeater). And there
must be some sort of psychological implementation of the weighing itself
—some disposition to reason in this way. And these potential acts must
all themselves be blameless. If I am blameworthy in distributing subjective
probabilities the way I do, then however responsibly I weigh benefits and
costs on that basis, the resulting activity will not be blameless. (P) therefore
should be replaced by the following principle:
(P’) If the expected benefits outweigh expected costs both blamelessly cal-
culated on the relevant blameless subjective uncertainties, then I am
blameless for intentionally pursuing an evidence related-activity.
As before, it is not an option to appeal merely to the objective benefits and
costs of an evidence-related activity. For if the proponent of (PF) cannot
accept that an objective truth-connection conveys epistemic responsibility,
why should she accept that an objectively beneficial evidence-related activity
can be epistemically responsible?
As said, the conception of epistemic responsibility currently under consider-
ation does justice to the involuntariness of cognitive acts. And it still asso-
ciates blame with a choice. Of all the conceptions of epistemic responsibility
discussed in this chapter it is therefore the one that is most robustly deon-
tological. For blame plausibly implies that there has been a decision to act
in one way or another. But for the same reasons for which the defensibility
strategy failed, that conception does not serve the pragmatic epistemic foun-
dationalist’s purpose. For it is incompatible with his fear of regress and circu-
larity. If there is a regress problem concerning subjective truth-connections,
then there is a regress problem concerning evidence-related activities which
subjectively appear to be beneficial.
5.7 Conclusion
In this chapter it has been argued against pragmatic epistemic foundation-
alism. This view has two main tenets: First, epistemic responsibility is in
general ensured by an epistemically responsible subjective truth-connection.
Second, epistemic responsibility ultimately relies on foundational cognitive
acts. Foundational acts are epistemically responsible despite the fact that
they are not subjectively truth-connected.
In the course of the argument three conceptions of epistemic responsibility
have been developed and discussed.
210 CHAPTER 5. EPISTEMIC RESPONSIBILITY
The first one associates epistemic responsibility with defensibility of the cog-
nitive act from the subject’s point of view. The problem with this conception
is that it goes against the spirit of foundationalism. There is a potential
regress problem for this conception.
The second conception best accommodates foundationalist inclinations. On
this conception foundational acts are epistemically responsible because they
have features which render them excusable. The problem with this concep-
tion is that it does not accommodate the general involuntariness of belief.
At least it cannot do so if the notion of epistemic responsibility is robustly
deontic.
On the third conception the epistemic responsibility of cognitive acts is de-
rived from the epistemic responsibility of evidence related activities. This
is the most robustly deontological conception of the three. For responsibil-
ity arises in connection with decisions to act. But this conception does not
serve the pragmatic foundationalist’s purpose. Indeed neither of the main
tenets of this view is supported. First, there is no necessary connection
between epistemic responsibility and a subjective truth-connection. It has
been suggested on page that when a cognitive act is blamelessly subjectively
truth-connected, then the omissions of evidence-related activities are blame-
less. But this is only a contingent connection. Second, the conception does
not allow to account for epistemic responsibility of an act independently of
the antecedent standing of other cognitive acts. Thus, the conception is not
foundationalist.
No completely satisfying conception of epistemic responsibility has emerged
from the discussion. It seems that we are lead to a difficult choice between the
following: Allow epistemic responsibility to have a non-foundational struc-
ture (for instance by endorsing infinitism)16, or give up on a notion of epis-
temic responsibility with robustly deontological connotations.
16Such a view is held by Klein [1998, 1999]
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